FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL 1956

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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FORCE AND DIPLOMACY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

By Henry A. Kissinger

IN his whimsical essay "Perpetual Peace" written in 1795, the German philosopher Kant predicted that world peace could be attained in one of two ways: by a moral consensus which he identified with a republican form of government, or by a cycle of wars of ever-increasing violence which would reduce the major Powers to impotence.

There is no evidence that Kant's essay was taken seriously in his lifetime, or indeed for a century and a half afterwards. But much of current thought about the impact of the new weapons of today carries a premonition of Kant's second proposition. We respond to every Soviet advance in the nuclear field by what can best be described as a flight into technology, by devising ever more fearful weapons. The more powerful the weapons, however, the greater becomes the reluctance to use them. At a period of unparalleled military strength, the President has best summed up the dilemma posed by the new weapons technology in the phrase "there is no alternative to peace."

It is only natural, of course, that an age which has known two world wars and an uneasy armistice since should have as its central problem the attainment of peace. It is paradoxical, however, that so much hope should concentrate on man's most destructive capabilities. We are told that the growth of thermonuclear stockpiles has created a "nuclear stalemate" which makes war, if not too risky, at least unprofitable. The Geneva "summit" conference has been interpreted as a nonaggression treaty: a recognition by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that war is no longer a conceivable instrument of policy and that for this reason international disputes can be settled only by means of diplomacy. Mr. Stassen has maintained that the peaceful application of nuclear energy has made

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irrelevant many of the traditional reasons for wars of aggression because each major Power can now bring about a tremendous increase in its productive capacity without annexing either foreign territory or foreign labor. And many of the critics of Mr. Dulles' interview in *Life* were concerned less with the wisdom of the specific threats than with the fact that a threat of war was made at all.

These assertions have passed almost without challenge. They fit in well with a national psychology which considers peace as the "normal" pattern of relations among states and which has few doubts that reasonable men can settle all differences by honest compromise. So much depends, however, on the correctness of such propositions that they must be subjected to close scrutiny. For the impact of the new weapons—as every revolution—has not only a technical but a conceptual side. Until power is used, it is, as Colonel Lincoln from West Point has wisely said, what people think it is. But except for the two explosions of now obsolete bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no nuclear weapons have ever been set off in wartime; there exists, therefore, no previous experience on which to draw. To a considerable extent the impact of the new weapons on strategy, on policy, indeed on survival, depends on our interpretation of their significance.

It therefore becomes of crucial importance that the United States not paralyze itself by developing a calculus of risks according to which all dangers would seem to be on our side. But this is precisely what has happened to us recently. The slogan "there is no alternative to peace" is the reverse side of the doctrine of "massive retaliation." And both deprive us of flexibility—"massive retaliation" because it poses risks for us out of proportion to the objectives to be achieved, and "there is no alternative to peace" because it relieves the Soviets of a large measure of the risk of aggressive moves. This is true despite Soviet reiteration of the horrors of a hydrogen war. For apart from the fact that these statements are usually addressed to foreigners and may, therefore, be designed to increase the inhibitions of others, it makes all the difference which side has to initiate thermonuclear war. And as long as the Soviets retain a sufficiently flexible weapons system, they can confront us with contingencies from which we can extricate ourselves only by initiating such a war. To be sure, the President has said explicitly (December 17, 1954), "Let no man think that we want peace at any price." But the price of peace cannot be determined in the abstract. The growth

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of the Soviet nuclear stockpile is certain to increase our reluctance to run the risks of an all-out war; the line between what is considered "vital" and what is "peripheral" will shift if we must weigh all objectives against the destruction of New York or Washington or Chicago.[1]

It may be argued that the emphasis on the rôle of force mistakes the main thrust of the current Soviet threat, which presents more ambiguous and subtle challenges than overt aggression. To be sure, the present period of revolutionary change will not be managed by a military doctrine alone; imaginative diplomacy and a consistent program are necessary if our aims are to be identified with the aspirations of humanity. But we always seem in danger of focussing so much attention on the current Soviet threat that we are taken unawares by the Soviet Union's frequent changes of tactics. During the period of Soviet militancy we were so preoccupied with building defensive barriers that we neglected the supporting psychological and political framework. And now, with the Soviet emphasis on more indirect methods of penetration, we stand in danger of forgetting that economic development must be accompanied by a modicum of security against foreign invasion. Moreover, it is one of the most difficult tasks of statesmanship to relate what a Power says it will do to what it is able to do. If the international order possessed the sanctions that prevail in domestic arrangements—courts and enforcement machinery, for example—relations could be conducted largely on the basis of what states assert their intentions to be. But in an international order composed of sovereign states, the principal sanction is the possession of superior force; any adverse change in power relationships involves the possibility that the gain in strength will be used with hostile intent. This is the real meaning of "atomic blackmail." As the Soviet nuclear stockpile grows, overt threats have become unnecessary; every calculation of risks will have to include the Soviet stockpile of atomic weapons and ballistic missiles.

If the phrase "there is no alternative to peace" were to become accepted doctrine, it could lead only to a paralysis of policy. It would be tantamount to renouncing power and staking everything on the professions of another sovereign state. This would have been difficult at any period; it becomes an invitation to dis-

[1] For a more detailed discussion of the doctrine of "massive retaliation" see the author's "Military Policy and the Defense of the Grey Areas," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1955.

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aster when we are confronted with a revolutionary Power which prides itself on its superior understanding of "objective" forces, and to which policies unrelated to a plausible possibility of employing force will seem either hypocrisy or stupidity. Force and diplomacy are not discrete realms; on the contrary, the ultimate pressure during negotiations has always been the possibility that recourse might be had to force. To the extent that the slogan "there is no alternative to peace" is taken seriously by the Soviets as a statement of American intentions, it will remove a powerful brake on Soviet probing actions and any incentive for the Soviet Union to make concessions. At best the doctrine "there is no alternative to peace" can achieve only an indefinite continuation of the status quo. In this context, our frequent pronouncements that we refuse to accept the satellite orbit will seem hollow or will even backfire: they will give impetus to Soviet peace offensives without generating a meaningful pressure on the Soviet sphere.

The discussion about war being "inconceivable" has, however, performed this useful purpose: it has drawn attention to the paradox that we are preparing for a war which we did not fight even when we possessed an atomic monopoly and that we have not yet found a rationale for such a war when weapons have become incomparably more destructive. On the contrary, far from giving us freedom of action, the very power of modern weapons seems to inhibit it. In short, our weapons technology and the objectives for employing them have become incommensurable. No more urgent task confronts the United States than to bring them into harmony.

II

But perhaps this incommensurability is inherent in the new weapons and not in the military doctrine? Perhaps we are moving into a new era of international relations in which the Powers will have to adjust themselves to the fact that force can no longer be used? What about "nuclear stalemate?"

Of course, "stalemates" have occurred before in the history of war, particularly in the relation of offense to defense. The distinguishing feature of the current use of the term is that it refers not to a balance on the battlefield, but to a calculus of risks: with each side possessing the capability to inflict catastrophic blows on the other, war is said to be no longer a rational course of action. It is important, however, to be precise about the deterrent

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effect of the "nuclear stalemate:" it deters not only aggression, but resistance to it; and it deters not war as such, but *all-out* war. The side which can present its challenges in less than all-out form may, therefore, be able to use the "nuclear stalemate" to its advantage.

Moreover, even if a nuclear stalemate does exist, it does not make for stability in the present volatile state of technology—much less for a sense of harmony. The spectre of a technological breakthrough by the other side would always loom large; it would lend an apocalyptic quality to all current international relations.

For the purpose of national policy, however, the significance of the term "stalemate" resides not in the technical but in the psychological aspect. For the "stalemate" is not anything new. Actually it has existed ever since the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To be sure, it was not a physical stalemate; for nearly a decade the United States was relatively immune from Soviet retaliation. But it was a stalemate nonetheless in the sense that we never succeeded in translating our military superiority into a political advantage. This was due to many factors: a theory of war based on the necessity of total victory, the memory of the wartime alliance with the Soviets, humanitarian impulses, lack of clarity about the process in which we found ourselves involved. But whatever the reason, our atomic monopoly had at best a deterrent effect. While it may have prevented a further expansion of the Soviet sphere, it did not enable us to achieve a strategic transformation in our favor. Indeed, even its importance as a deterrent is questionable. Assuming that there had never been an atomic bomb, would we really have acquiesced in the Soviet Union's taking over Europe? Would the U.S.S.R. have risked a general war so soon after having its territory devastated by the Germans and having lost, by the most conservative estimates, 10,000,000 dead? Not even a dictatorship can do everything simultaneously.

But apart from the questionable assumption that all-out war was prevented by our atomic monopoly, the decade witnessed the consolidation of a satellite orbit in Eastern Europe, the triumph of Communism in China and, most fundamental of all, the growth of the Soviet atomic stockpile. Those who expect great things from technological breakthroughs would do well to study American actions after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. No foreseeable technological breakthrough is likely to be more fundamental than

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the discovery of the A-bomb. Yet possession of it did not enable us to prevent another Power which never hid its hostile intent from expanding its orbit and developing a capacity to inflict a mortal blow on the United States.

How did this come about? Primarily because we added the A-bomb to our military arsenal without integrating its implications into our thinking; because we saw it merely as another tool in a theory of warfare which had showed a poverty—indeed almost an absence—of political conception during the two world wars, and which became completely inapplicable after the explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

For over a century before the outbreak of World War I, wars were an extension of policy. Because they were fought for specific political objectives there existed a rough commensurability between the force employed and the goal sought. But with the outbreak of World War I, war suddenly seemed to become an end in itself. After the first few months, none of the protagonists would have been able to name an objective other than the total defeat of the enemy or, at least, they would have named objectives, such as the German demand for the annexation of Belgium, which amounted to unconditional surrender. There had occurred a hiatus between military and political planning which has never subsequently been bridged. The military staffs had developed plans for total victory, because it is in such plans that all factors are under the control of the military. But political leadership proved incapable of giving this conception a concrete expression in terms of peace aims. The result was four years of war of ever-increasing violence which carried its hatreds into a peace treaty that considered more the redressing of sacrifices than the stability of the international order.

The notion that war and peace, military and political goals, were separate had become so commonplace by the end of World War II that the most powerful nation in the world found itself paralyzed by the enormity of its own weapons technology. In every concrete instance, even in the matter of the regulation of the atom which affected our very survival, we found ourselves stalemated by our own preconceptions. The consequences of military actions which we might take always seemed to outbalance the gains to be achieved. Thus our policy became entirely defensive. We possessed a doctrine to repel overt aggression, but we could not translate it into a positive goal. And even in the one

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instance where we resisted aggression we did not use the weapon around which our whole military planning had been built. The hiatus between military and national policy was complete. Our power was not commensurate with the objectives of our national policy and our military doctrine could not find any intermediary application for the new weapons. The growth of the Soviet atomic stockpile has merely brought the physical equation into line with the psychological one; it has increased the reluctance to engage in a general war even more. But it has not changed the fundamental question of how the political and military doctrines can be harmonized, how our power can give impetus to our policy rather than paralyzing it.

One way of avoiding this problem is to deny that it exists. It is possible to argue that the term "'stalemate" is illusory, that in an all-out war one side is almost certain to be able to "win" in the sense of being able to impose its will on its antagonist. This is technically correct. But it does not affect the calculus by which the decision to enter the war is taken: in its crudest form, whether it is "worth" fighting the war in the first place. Obviously no Power will start a war it thinks it is going to lose. But it will also be reluctant to start a war if the price of victory may be its national substance. The capacity to inflict greater losses on the enemy than one suffers is the condition of policy; it cannot be its objective.

The transformation imposed by the "nuclear stalemate" is not that victory in an all-out war has become technically impossible but that it can no longer be imposed at an acceptable cost. Nor is this conclusion avoided by an appeal to military rationality. For example, in Paul Nitze's hypothetical general war confined to airfields and S.A.C. installations, the bombing of cities would be unwise in the early stages of the war and unnecessary in the later ones after air superiority has been achieved.[2] But this assumes that victory is the only rational objective in war. It overlooks the fact that war is not only the instrument for imposing one's will on the defeated but is also a tool for frustrating this intent by making the effort too costly. An air battle would be a rational strategy for the side which has a strategic advantage either in terms of base structure or in weapons potential, for it would put the enemy at its mercy at a minimum cost. But for the side which stands to lose the air battle and which seeks to

[2] Paul Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1956.

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exact a maximum price for its own defeat, the most rational strategy may well be to inflict maximum destruction. Such a Power may at least attempt to equalize the *threat* of nuclear destruction by inflicting its *actuality* on the enemy and thereby deprive him of the fruits of his victory, or at least make it too risky for him to seek total victory. Unconditional surrender—or depriving the enemy of his nuclear capability, which amounts to the same thing—cannot be achieved by subterfuge.

III

But does the stalemate, defined as the impossibility of achieving total victory at an acceptable cost, apply to lesser conflicts? In other words, is limited war a conceivable instrument of policy in the nuclear period? Here we must analyze precisely what is meant by limited war.

One can think of many models: a war confined to a geographic area, a war that does not utilize the whole weapons system, a war which utilizes the whole weapons system but limits its employment to specific targets. But none of these military definitions seems adequate, since a war may be confined geographically or in terms of targets and yet be total in the sense of exhausting the national substance, as happened to France in World War I. The fact that the whole weapons system is not employed, or that the destructive capability of the existing weapons system is small, is not of itself a factor of limitation. In the Thirty Years' War the number of men in each army was small by present-day standards, the power of the weapons was negligible compared to modern armaments, and yet it is estimated that at least 30 percent of the population of Germany died during the course of it.

A distinction based on the difference between nuclear weapons and "conventional armaments" is no more fruitful. Apart from the fact that the distinction becomes increasingly nebulous as we develop nuclear weapons of very low yield, it will be impossible to reverse present trends. The very existence of nuclear armaments on both sides seems to insure that any future war will be nuclear. At a minimum, forces will have to deploy *as if* nuclear weapons might be used, because the side which concentrates its forces might thereby give its opponent the precise incentive he needs to use nuclear weapons. But if forces are dispersed, they will not be able to hold a line or achieve a breakthrough with conventional weapons, because the destructive

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power of conventional weapons is so much smaller. Finally, nuclear weapons, particularly of the low-yield type, seem to offer the best opportunity to compensate for our inferiority in manpower and to use our superiority in technology to best advantage.

It is not for nothing that Soviet propaganda has played on two related themes: 1, there is no such thing as a "limited" nuclear war, and 2, "ban the bomb." For both emphasize the corollary "there is no alternative to peace" and both deprive our policy of flexibility and sap our resistance to the preferred forms of Soviet strategy: peripheral wars, subversion and atomic blackmail.

Our discussion up to this point thus leads to these conclusions: Any war is likely to be a nuclear war. Nuclear war should be fought as something less than an all-out war. There exists no way to define a limited war in purely military terms. On the contrary, wars can be limited only by political decisions, by defining objectives which do not threaten the survival of the enemy. Thus an all-out war is a war to render the enemy defenseless. A limited war is one for a specific objective which by its very existence will establish a certain commensurability between the force employed and the goal to be attained.

Limited war, therefore, presents the military with particular difficulties. An all-out war is relatively simple to plan for, because its limits are set by military considerations and even by military capacity. The characteristic of limited wars, on the other hand, is that there are ground rules which define the relationship of military to political objectives. Planning here becomes much more conjectural, much more subtle and much more indeterminate, as we found when considering intervention in Indo-China. The political leadership must therefore assume the responsibility for defining the framework within which the military are to develop plans and capabilities. The prerequisite for a policy of limited war is the re-introduction of the political element into our concept of warfare and the surrender of the notion that policy ends when war begins or that war has goals different from those of national policy.

IV

This raises the question to what extent the nuclear age permits a policy of intermediary objectives. Do any of the factors apply today which formerly led to a diplomacy of limited objectives and a military policy of limited wars?

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In the great periods of European cabinet diplomacy between the Treaty of Westphalia and the French Revolution and between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of the First World War, wars were limited because there existed a political framework which induced the major Powers to conduct a diplomacy of limited objectives. This political framework was due to several factors. There was, to begin with, a conscious decision that the upheavals of the Thirty Years' War and of the Napoleonic Wars should not occur again. More important was the fact that the international order did not contain a revolutionary Power. No state was so dissatisfied with the peace settlement that it sought to gain its ends by overthrowing it and no Power considered that its domestic notion of justice was incompatible with that of other states. Again, the domestic structure of most governments set a limit to the proportion of the national resources which could be devoted to war. Not even the most absolute ruler by the grace of God could think of conscripting his subjects or confiscating their property. Finally, in an era of stable weapons technology, both the strength of the Powers and their assessments of those strengths were relatively fixed and as a result the risks of surprise attack and of unforeseen technological developments were relatively small.

If we inquire which of these factors—fear of war, legitimacy, limits on the domestic exercise of power and a stable power relationship—is present today, little cause for optimism remains. Under conditions of nuclear plenty, no major Power will be forced to adopt a policy of limited objectives because of insufficient resources. Moreover, for over a generation the U.S.S.R. has proclaimed the incompatibility of its domestic notion of justice with that of other states and has built an internal control system on the theory of a permanently hostile outside world. Peaceful coexistence, too, is justified by the Soviets on the basis that it will enable them to subvert the existing structure by means other than all-out war.

Nor is the nature of power relationships more reassuring. Even with a less volatile technology, a two-Power world would have an element of inherent instability because an increase in strength of one side cannot be made up by superior political dexterity but is tantamount to an absolute weakening of the other side. Actually, the weapons technology is far from stable. Almost up to the outbreak of World War II a weapons system would be good

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for a generation at least, while today it may be outdated when it has barely passed the blueprint stage. In this technological race, moreover, the side which has adopted a policy of letting its opponent strike the first blow is at a distinct disadvantage; it cannot afford to fall behind even for an instant. It must phase its planning and procurement over an indefinite period while its opponent, if he is determined on a showdown, can plan for a target date.

But if neither an agreed legitimacy nor a stable power relationship exists today, they may be outweighed by the third factor in the equation: the fear of thermonuclear war. Never before have the consequences of all-out war been so unambiguous, never have the gains seemed so incommensurable with the sacrifices. What statesman who declared war in 1914 would not have recoiled had he known the shape of the world in 1918? Today every weapons test augurs much worse horrors. There exists, therefore, a limiting condition to every diplomatic move. The distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons may be nebulous in military terms, but every state has a powerful incentive to make some distinction, however tenuous its logic. The fear that an all-out thermonuclear war might lead to the disintegration of the social structure should be utilized to guarantee the "limits" of war and diplomacy.

The key problem of our present-day strategy is therefore to devise alternative capabilities to confront our opponent with contingencies from which he can extricate himself only by thermonuclear war, but to deter him from this step by our retaliatory capacity. All Soviet moves in the postwar period have had this character; they have faced us with problems which by themselves did not seem "worth" an all-out war[8] but which we were unable to deal with by an alternative strategy. We refused to defeat the Chinese in Korea because we were unwilling to risk an all-out conflict; we saw no solution to the Indo-Chinese crisis without dangers we were reluctant to confront. A doctrine for the graduated employment of force might reverse or at least arrest this trend. Graduated deterrence is thus not an alternative to massive retaliation but its complement, for it is the capability for "massive retaliation" which provides the sanction against expanding war.

[8] See, for example, Thomas K. Finletter's letter to the *New York Herald Tribune*, December 22, 1955.

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V

A doctrine for the graduated employment of force would enable us to escape the vicious circle in which we find ourselves paralyzed by the implications of our own weapons technology. The idea that the most effective strategy is the thermonuclear bombardment of cities is a legacy of World War II, when we could attack production centers without fear of retaliation. Because the destructive power of individual weapons was then relatively small, a decisive victory on the battlefield could be achieved only by using quantities too large to stockpile; munitions and weapons had to be supplied out of current production. Under these circumstances it made sense to attempt to win through attrition, by bombing production facilities. The destructiveness of modern weapons, however, makes attrition the most wasteful strategy. Under conditions of nuclear plenty, existing stockpiles will probably suffice to achieve a decision; nuclear weapons may therefore be more decisively employed on the battlefield or against military installations such as airfields than against production centers.[4]

Moreover, while the growth of the Soviet strategic air force and atomic stockpile should cause us to revise our concepts regarding air warfare, the introduction of nuclear weapons on the battlefield will shake the very basis of Soviet tactical doctrine. No longer will the Soviets be able to rely on massed manpower and artillery as in World War II. On a nuclear battlefield, dispersion is the key to survival and mobility the prerequisite of success. A great deal depends on leadership of a high order, personal initiative and mechanical aptitude, all qualities in which our military organization probably excels that of the U.S.S.R. To be sure, there are many types of aggression to which nuclear weapons offer no solution, either for political or military reasons—civil war and guerrilla actions, for example—and we must retain a conventional capability to deal with them. The fact remains that the most fruitful area for current strategic thought is the conduct and efficacy of limited nuclear war, the "war gaming" of situations in which nuclear weapons are used by *both* sides, and a consideration of what would constitute victory in such a war.

The graduated employment of force, however, presupposes a capability which is really "graduated." If we build our whole

[4] For application of these ideas to the conduct of a military campaign, see Richard C. Leghorn, "No Need to Bomb Cities to Win Wars," *U. S. News & World Report*, January 28, 1955.

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strategy around "absolute" weapons of megaton size, professions of limited objectives will be meaningless and any use of nuclear weapons is likely to touch off an all-out war. The possibility of keeping a limited nuclear war limited depends on our ability to extend the range of low-yield weapons of a kiloton and below, and to devise tactics for their utilization on the battlefield.

At the same time, a doctrine for the graduated employment of force and the renunciation of unconditional surrender should not be confused with the acceptance of a stalemate. The flexibility of our diplomacy will increase as our military alternatives multiply. And militarily, the notion that there is no alternative between total victory and the *status quo ante* is much too mechanical. If the military position of an enemy became untenable and if he were offered choices other than unconditional surrender, he might accept local withdrawals without resorting to all-out war. If S.A.C. retains its retaliatory capacity, the other side may decide that amputation is preferable to suicide. In these terms the calculus of risks by which a limited nuclear war is expanded into an all-out thermonuclear exchange is almost the same as that by which a limited conventional war is expanded into an all-out war. Whether we can obtain local adjustments will thus depend on: 1, the ability to generate pressures other than the threat of thermonuclear war; 2, the ability to create a climate of opinion in which national survival is not thought to be at stake in every issue; 3, the ability to keep control of public opinion should a disagreement arise over whether national survival is at stake.

But is it possible to bring about a climate in which national survival is thought not to be at stake? Pressures severe enough to cause withdrawal may, after all, be severe enough to be thought to threaten survival, especially in a régime like that in Soviet Russia. On the other hand, the problem is not how to reassure the Soviets, which is probably a well-nigh impossible effort, but how to give effect to the one interest we presumably have in common: that we both wish to avoid all-out thermonuclear war. Given this attitude, total war is likely in only two contingencies: if the Soviets see an opportunity to achieve hegemony in Eurasia by peripheral actions which we are not able to deal with by a graduated employment of force; or if the U.S.S.R. should misunderstand our intentions and treat our every military move as if it were the prelude to an all-out war.

It therefore becomes the task of our diplomacy to convey to

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the Soviet bloc that we are capable of courses other than all-out war or inaction, and that we intend to use this capability. Fortunately, the imbalance in our national strategy has been caused less by our diplomacy than by our military policy. Indeed, our difficulty has been precisely the fact that our moderate pronouncements have seemed incongruous in the face of an all-or-nothing military policy and that our diplomacy has been deprived of flexibility because "massive retaliation" has had as its logical corollary the slogan "there is no alternative to peace." A modification of our military doctrine would, therefore, go a long way towards creating a framework of limited objectives; the next step would be to convey this change to the outside world. Others have suggested details of such a diplomatic program.[5] Possible measures might include proposals for conventions regarding open cities, greater publicity for tests of low-yield nuclear weapons, and a high-level pronouncement which defines as precisely as possible what is meant by the "graduated" employment of force.

Such a program should be distinguished sharply from the Soviet "ban the bomb" propaganda, however. We cannot afford even the implication that nuclear weapons are in a special category, apart from modern weapons in general, for this undermines the psychological basis of the most effective United States strategy. If nuclear weapons were outlawed, Soviet superiority in manpower would again become a factor and its stockpile of conventional weapons would place Eurasia at the mercy of the Soviets, at least in an intermediary period while we adjusted our procurement, training and organization. "Ban the bomb" proposals, moreover, distract from the real security problem which is Soviet aggression, a fact that American diplomacy should not permit the world to forget. The diplomatic and psychological framework for the graduated employment of force is created not by "ban the bomb" proposals but by defining the conditions of its use. To be sure, a diplomatic program for the graduated employment of force will not inevitably prevent an all-out war; if the Soviets feel strong enough to knock us out by a surprise attack, they will presumably do so. But it may prevent an all-out war caused by our failure to develop alternatives or by Soviet miscalculation or misunderstanding of our intentions.

Moreover, while the Marxist philosophy has heretofore im-

[5] For example, Rear Admiral Sir Anthony W. Buzzard, *Manchester Guardian*, November 3, 1955.

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parted great flexibility to Soviet policy we may be able to use it as well to give effect to a policy of graduated deterrence. The belief in inevitable triumph is after all as consistent with tactical withdrawal as with an effort to fill every power vacuum. All of Soviet history testifies to the fact that this is not a régime for last stands if other alternatives present themselves. One need only study the abject efforts of the Politburo in the months before the German invasion to come to a settlement with Hitler to realize that if confronted with superior power the Soviets do not hesitate to apply Lenin's dictum, "One step backward, two steps forward." And this tendency is supported by all of Russian history. Russia has always been less able to apply force subtly than massively; she has always been more vulnerable to wars outside her territories than within, and to limited rather than all-out war.

The strategic problem for the United States, then, can be summed up in these propositions:

1. Thermonuclear war must be avoided, except as a last resort.

2. No power possessing thermonuclear weapons is likely to accept unconditional surrender without employing them and no nation is likely to risk thermonuclear destruction except to the extent that it believes its survival to be at stake.

3. It is the task of our diplomacy, therefore, to make clear that we do not aim for unconditional surrender, to create a framework in which the question of national survival is not involved in every issue. But equally we should leave no doubt about our determination to achieve intermediary objectives and to resist by force any Soviet military move.

4. Since diplomacy which is not related to a plausible employment of force is sterile, it must be the task of our military policy to develop a doctrine and a capability for the graduated employment of force.

VI

The discussion up to this point has been primarily concerned with the impact of our diplomacy and of our military policy on the Soviet bloc. Its impact on our allies and the uncommitted nations is no less important. The truism that the contemporary crisis cannot be solved solely by the exercise of power should not be confused with the notion that power plays no rôle in contemporary affairs. Peace has never been maintained except by making aggression too costly; the benefits of diversity which the

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free world still enjoys are due to the shield afforded by American military strength. For this reason alone, the quest for an adequate American military doctrine concerns not only us but also the rest of the world.

There can be little doubt that our system of alliances is undergoing a crisis. Many reasons for this exist: the Soviet peace offensive, the domestic problems of France, the economic stagnation of Britain, Canada's increasing sense of vulnerability. But surely one fundamental cause is the absence of a unifying military doctrine. The argument most frequently advanced for our coalition policy is that we require overseas bases. But whatever sense this policy makes to us, it is not persuasive to countries who want above all to avoid another round of bombings and occupation. Our allies realize, moreover, that in an all-out thermonuclear war the ground strength of our NATO partners will be almost irrelevant; in terms of the doctrine of massive retaliation our allies see little military significance in their own contribution. The growth of the Soviet atomic stockpile compounds these difficulties. Heretofore, a nation threatened with attack would generally resist because the potential destruction was insignificant compared to the consequences of surrender. But now, when most of our NATO partners consider the outbreak of a war as leading inevitably to national catastrophe, our system of alliances is in dire jeopardy. It can be restored, if at all, only by two measures: one, by a military doctrine and capability which makes clear that not every war is necessarily an all-out thermonuclear war, even in Europe; two, by measures such as the air defense of NATO, which reduce the sense of impotence felt by our allies in the face of the threat of thermonuclear war.

The problem with respect to the uncommitted nations, particularly those newly independent, is more complicated. Where our NATO partners suffer from a perhaps excessive awareness of the reality of power, the former colonial states seem hardly conscious of its existence and nature. This is understandable. The leaders of the newly independent states achieved their positions by distinguishing themselves in the struggle with the former colonial Powers. But the independence movements almost without exception provided a poor preparation for an understanding of modern power relationships. Based on the dogmas of late nineteenth century liberalism, especially its pacifism, the independence movements relied more on ideological agreement than on

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an evaluation of power factors. Indeed, the claim to superior spirituality remains the battle cry of Asian nationalism. Moreover, the bad conscience of the colonial Powers and their preoccupation with European problems gave the struggle for independence more the character of a domestic debate than of a power dispute. To be sure, many of the leaders of the newly independent Powers spent years in jail and suffered heroically for their cause. It is not to deny the measure of their dedication to assert that the results achieved were out of proportion to their suffering. Empires which had held vast dominions for hundreds of years disappeared without a battle being fought.

And if it is difficult for the leaders to retain a sense of proportion, it is next to impossible for the mass of the people. On the whole they were involved in the struggle for independence only with their sympathies; to them the disappearance of the colonial Powers must seem nothing short of miraculous. Moreover, most of the people of the newly independent states live in pre-industrial societies. It would be difficult enough for them to grasp the full impact of industrialism; it is too much to expect them to understand the meaning of nuclear technology. It is therefore understandable that in most former colonial areas there is an overestimation of what can be achieved by the power of words alone. Nor is this tendency diminished by the rewards that fall to the uncommitted in the contest for their allegiance waged by the two big power centers. There must be an almost overwhelming temptation to defer the solution of difficult internal problems by entering the international arena, to solidify a complicated domestic position by triumphs in the field of foreign policy.

But however understandable, it is a dangerous trend. If this were a tranquil period, nothing would be involved but minor irritations. But in the present crisis, the dogmatism of these newly independent states makes them susceptible to Soviet "peace offensives," and their lack of appreciation of power relationships may cause them to overestimate the protection afforded by moral precepts.

The power chiefly visible to the newly independent states is that of Soviet or Chinese armies on their borders. The United States must counter with a twentieth century equivalent of "showing the flag," with measures which will permit us to make our power felt quickly and decisively, not only to deter Soviet aggression but to impress the uncommitted with our capacity

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for action. This does not mean "rattling the atom bomb." What it does require is greater mobility and a weapons system that can deal with the tensions most likely to arise in the uncommitted areas—tensions which do not lend themselves to the massive employment of thermonuclear weapons: civil war, peripheral attacks or a war among the uncommitted.

To be sure, this is an ungrateful and indeed an unpopular course. But we will not be able to avoid unpopularity. In the short run, all we can hope for is respect. Moreover, condescending as it may seem, we have an important educational task to perform in the newly independent countries on the subject of power in the nuclear age. Within a generation, and probably in less time than that, most of these states will possess nuclear power plants and therefore the wherewithal to manufacture nuclear weapons. And even if this should not prove the case, the Soviets may find it advantageous to increase international tensions by making available nuclear weapons, on the model of their arms deal with Egypt. But nuclear weapons in the hands of weak, irresponsible or merely ignorant governments present grave dangers. Unless the United States has successfully established ground rules for their graduated employment, many areas of the world will begin to play the traditional rôle of the Balkans in European politics: the fuse which will set off a holocaust.

VII

One of the difficulties in the nuclear period has been our tendency to treat its problems primarily as technical. But power is meaningless in the absence of a doctrine for employing it. The debate provoked by Mr. Dulles' interview in *Life* has again emphasized this dilemma: the enormity of modern weapons makes the thought of war repugnant, but a refusal to run any risk would amount to giving the Soviets a blank check. Our dilemma has been defined as the alternative of Armageddon or defeat without war. We can overcome the paralysis induced by such a prospect only by creating other alternatives both in our diplomacy and in our military policy. Such measures require strong nerves. We can make the graduated employment of force stick only if we leave no doubt about our readiness to face a final showdown; its effectiveness will depend on our willingness to face up to the risks of Armageddon.

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NATO: STILL VITAL FOR PEACE

By General J. Lawton Collins

SINCE the Geneva "summit" conference, questions have been raised as to whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has outlived its usefulness. Is it outmoded in these days of possible thermonuclear war? Is it sufficiently flexible and viable to meet the new threats posed by the "atomic stalemate" between East and West? These and other similar questions have arisen in the minds of responsible men. They deserve forthright answers. This article will attempt to provide them.

First of all, it might be useful to refresh our memories as to how NATO came into being and what are its major objectives.

In June 1945, following the collapse of Nazi Germany, the war-weary nations of Europe turned to the newly-created United Nations with the hope that further wars might be avoided. This organization of 50 nations, backed by the weight of world opinion, seemed to make it unlikely that any nation would again try to dominate the world. But Communist Russia, using the techniques of Hitler, was already embarked on just such a threatening program. Europe, disarmed and exhausted, stood by helplessly during the years 1945–47 as the Soviets swallowed up or subjugated Poland, East Germany, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. Finally the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 caused the United Kingdom and several of the dwindling number of free countries of Europe to sign at Brussels a mutual defense pact on March 17, 1948.

The Government and people of the United States had been following with growing concern the developments in Europe. We had already taken action through military and economic means to help save Greece and to bolster the defenses of Turkey. But being still leery of "entangling alliances" in peacetime, we had been loath to unite formally with the Brussels Pact Powers. However, the collapse of Czechoslovakia, dramatized by the deaths of Foreign Minister Masaryk and President Beneš, coupled with incipient threats to Norway and Denmark, finally galvanized us into action. On June 11, 1948, the Senate passed the Vandenberg Resolution which led to our participation in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is important to note that this Resolution was sponsored by the Republican leader

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of the Senate, under a Democratic administration, and that it was adopted by an overwhelming majority, 64 to 4. It represented the bipartisan determination of the United States to take coöperative action to halt the imperialistic encroachments of militant Communism before it was too late to avoid war.

After several months of preparatory work, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, in Washington by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Later Greece and Turkey were invited to participate and in 1955 West Germany joined also.

The objectives of NATO were twofold: first, to create a political organization of states which would establish an atmosphere of stability and mutual confidence and stiffen the resistance of the European countries to the subversive internal penetration of Communism; and, secondly, to create a military organization of sufficient strength to convince the Soviet Union that any further aggression in the North Atlantic area would lead to a general war and ultimate Soviet defeat.

Most of the countries which had been absorbed into the Soviet Union or subjugated as satellite colonies had not been taken over by the overt use of Soviet military force but through infiltration and exploitation by Communist minorities. However, the threat of overwhelming military power was always back of this Communist penetration. While the military forces of the West had been almost completely demobilized following World War II, the Soviets had retained on an active footing some 175 divisions and over 20,000 combat airplanes. Today, despite their recent talk of reducing the personnel strength of their forces they still maintain 175 divisions on an active war footing and have over 20,000 operational military aircraft. Moreover, 80 percent of their aircraft are now jets and they have strengthened their bomber forces materially. They have also embarked on the construction of fast modern cruisers and have approximately 400 submarines in contrast to the 75 which Hitler possessed when he launched World War II. These air, land and sea forces have been largely modernized and remain a military threat that can be balanced in Europe only by the combined efforts of all NATO members.

The NATO Powers recognized these facts. Hence, while Article 2 of the NATO Charter points out that the political, economic and cultural relations of the member countries should be

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strengthened, the real core of the Treaty, designed to meet the greatest immediate peril, resides in Article 5, which states:

> The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, *including the use of armed force* [italics added], to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. . . .

Thus the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a defensive military alliance. It is the shield behind which its members can pursue economic, political and social progress.

For the United States to accede to such a military alliance in peacetime represented a radical change in its traditional policy, established by George Washington, of not engaging in "entangling alliances." The fact that the American people fully supported the NATO Pact is evidence that they had learned that in this modern age our fate is inseparably linked with that of free Europe. In two world wars we had waited to participate in the defense of Western Europe until the free countries of that region were almost overwhelmed. This time we were determined to give fair warning to a potential aggressor that in the event of attack against NATO Europe we would be in the fight from the very beginning.

We have subsequently reinforced our commitment on this score by stationing in Europe the equivalent of six American divisions, powerful Air Force units and the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which is based in the Mediterranean and earmarked for support of NATO. The United Kingdom later made an even firmer and equally unprecedented commitment when in 1954 it agreed to station indefinitely on the Continent, under NATO command, four Army divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force.

These political and military commitments of the United States and the United Kingdom, combined with the American economic and military aid programs, have been of vital importance to NATO. The physical evidence of support from the two major Powers outside continental Europe has provided the essential psychological stiffening which has assisted some of the smaller countries to resist the domestic inroads of imperialistic Communism.

It must be remembered, however, that as late as 1951 American and British troops were on the Continent simply as part of

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the Allied forces of occupation in Germany. NATO regional planning groups had been established to correlate *national* European defensive plans. But no unified command had been established, occupation troops were not disposed for defense and no provisions had been made for a supply system to support them in possible combat.

The world tensions engendered by Soviet belligerence came to a head with the Communist-inspired attack across the 38th Parallel in Korea on June 25, 1950. It was realized then that a tighter military organization would be required in NATO if similar Communist attacks were to be prevented in the NATO area. Negotiations to this end were begun at once, but it was not until December 1950 that General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed by the North Atlantic Council as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) with responsibility to develop an integrated command and joint defensive plans.

General Eisenhower and his staff proceeded at once to create the necessary field commands in northern, central and southern Europe; to lay out the essential military supply lines; to establish vital communications; and to integrate the defensive plans for employment of the growing army, navy and air forces committed to NATO by member countries.

This historical background[1] has been spelled out in some detail to emphasize: (1) that while NATO has important political, economic and cultural aims its initial development was in the form of a defensive military alliance; (2) that the form of this alliance was not something preconceived on the part of the people of the NATO area, but was forced on them by the relentless pressure of Communist imperialism; (3) that its military form was evolved slowly and steadily, albeit reluctantly, to meet a definite and growing Russian military threat.

NATO was born of dire necessity. It was not the creature of an idle, passing fancy. It was put together bit by bit after much soul searching and with much toil. The threat that led to its creation still exists, both in the form of the Comintern, with its tentacles of Communist subversion in every NATO country, and in the threatening might of great Soviet military force subject only to the autocratic will of a handful of men in the Kremlin. At least until this threat is genuinely dissipated, NATO will re-

[1] For further details see "NATO—The First Five Years, 1949–1954," by Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

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main, on sound political and military grounds, essential to the maintenance of peace.

It goes without saying, of course, that the political, economic and cultural ties which link the nations of NATO should meanwhile be strengthened as intended by Article 2 of the NATO Charter. This is not only desirable in itself, but it is also required in the face of the steady Soviet economic development which has made possible the new Soviet economic offensive in the Middle East. A number of the NATO countries are members of the European Coal and Steel Community. All the European partners in NATO are also members of the Organization for European Economic Coöperation, along with such neutrals as Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. The United States and Canada, although not members of the O.E.E.C., participate in its work. There are many practical difficulties to the attainment of still further political and economic accord in NATO. The North Atlantic Council is actively engaged in studying them.

II

Let us now examine NATO's capacity to meet the changing conditions of the atomic era.

Even our very brief historical résumé has indicated that NATO has adjusted itself to difficult and varying political, economic and military conditions. The inclusion of Greece and Turkey three years after its formation greatly strengthened its south flank but was an extension of responsibility not easily accepted by all NATO countries, some of which were loath at the start to extend the zone which all members are committed to defend. The admission of Western Germany was accepted by France despite three German invasions within 70 years. The European member countries of NATO showed both courage and flexibility in creating the Organization of European Economic Coöperation to help solve the economic difficulties which resulted from World War II and which were greatly complicated by the military demands of NATO. Even more striking are the adjustments in American public opinion which has turned from traditional isolationism to acceptance of the NATO alliance with all that it entails in money, manpower and personal sacrifice. Such examples are only illustrations of how each of the member countries has from time to time subordinated its own national traditions and interests to the more far-reaching demands of NATO policy and well-being.

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There is built into NATO, moreover, the political and military machinery to provide for necessary changes in constitution, procedures and commitments. The supreme authority in NATO, the North Atlantic Council, is in permanent session in Paris. The permanent representatives of the 15 nations, all experienced men of ambassadorial rank, meet regularly two or more times each week to consider current problems. The Foreign Ministers, usually accompanied by the Defense and Finance Ministers, meet with the Council normally twice a year to review basic policies, adjust them to meet new conditions and rechart the course of NATO as occasion demands.

So much for the political aspects of NATO. What about the flexibility of its military planning? Has this planning taken into account the effect of new weapons, supersonic aircraft and guided missiles on the conduct of war?

The answer is a firm and unequivocable yes. I do not mean that solutions have been found to all of the many problems which have arisen as a result of the advent of these new weapons, but that the problems have been and are under continuous study by a number of agencies. While he was Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Eisenhower initiated studies of the effect of the new and devastating weapons on warfare as we then knew it, and the Chiefs of all the U.S. Services have since intensified them. At that time, the United States was the only NATO nation with full nuclear information, and security regulations, based on our Atomic Energy Act of 1946, restricted somewhat (and continued to do so until recently) the availability of this information to other NATO planners. Therefore, of necessity, much of the work had to be done by American personnel. To assist in overcoming this difficulty, a number of brilliant young officers on the U.S. Army General Staff who were engaged in these studies were transferred to SHAPE in 1951. This selected group had originally been operating in Washington under the supervision of General Gruenther, who just prior to his appointment as General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff at SHAPE had been the U.S. Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. These officers formed within SHAPE the nucleus of a special study group, since strengthened and expanded by General Ridgway and General Gruenther. Both commanders kept this study group working continuously to devise new strategic and tactical concepts and techniques in order to meet the ever-changing pattern in new weapons.

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The original strategic concept for the possible employment of NATO forces was relatively simple. If war came it would be initiated by the Soviets. The forces immediately available to SACEUR would have to make the maximum possible use of defensive obstacles and new weapons to delay and disrupt the Soviet advance, while additional reserve units were mobilized and a stand finally made behind such natural obstacles as the Rhine or other appropriate river or mountain barriers. While these actions were going on, the enemy was to be subjected to attack by the United States Strategic Air Command (S.A.C.), armed with the devastating power of atomic bombs.[2] S.A.C. would not be under NATO command, but plans for its employment in support of NATO would be coördinated with SACEUR. The naval forces of the Supreme Allied Command in the Atlantic would support SACEUR through appropriate offensive operations and keep open the sea lanes between Europe and Canada and the United States, whence were to come the bulk of reinforcements in men and matériel which would insure victory.

NATO was thus to provide the shield which would prevent the rapid conquest of Europe while S.A.C. delivered its crippling blows not only against the Soviet forces but against their lines of communication, airfields, depots, factories and other war-making potential. If war came, both NATO's shield and S.A.C.'s counteroffensive power would be essential to victory. More important, to the extent that each could be strengthened, the Soviets might be convinced they could not possibly win a shooting war and thus might be dissuaded from launching it.

So far, well and good. But all this was before the Soviets developed their own atomic bombs. What of the day in the not too distant future when the Communists might have sufficient bombs and means of delivery to be able to launch a crippling blow against NATO Europe and America? Is the NATO organization sufficiently flexible to meet this new threat? Can it adequately adjust its defenses? The problem of adjusting our defensive concepts and techniques to possible atomic war has been under intensive study, as I have indicated above, for several years. All the answers have not been found, and probably never will be, but sound adaptations are possible.

In the event the Soviets ever should decide to attack Europe

[2] Throughout this article the word "atomic" will be taken to include both atomic and *thermonuclear* weapons.

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their only chance of success would be to overrun its vital areas rapidly. One would logically assume that they would attempt to seize the great productive capacity of Europe with the minimum of damage to plants and skilled manpower in order that both might be put to their own use. With continental Europe overrun, they would have picked up control of almost as much industrial capacity as they now possess and 200,000,000 of the most able people on earth.

If such an attack could be slowed down and checked by NATO land, sea and air forces, then the bombing forces available to the support of NATO could so pound the vitals of the Soviet Union and such colonial satellites as actively supported it that the attack would be brought to a halt before any key areas were lost. Then the tremendous matériel and productive resources of the West would insure victory.

Of course the Soviets might endeavor to destroy the West's counteroffensive potential by initiating the war with surprise atomic attacks against NATO's airfields in Europe, against S.A.C. and R.A.F. Bomber Command bases, atomic energy installations and selected industrial production and supply facilities of the United States, Canada and Europe.

To meet such a threat Canada and the United States are establishing an early warning and air defense system that will greatly improve our ability to meet and counter a potential surprise attack. This system is of direct benefit also to NATO Europe, since time and space factors are such that to have any chance of attaining surprise, with its attendant advantages to an aggressor, the Soviets would have to launch their planes against the American continent ahead of the initiation of any attack in Europe. Thus, the North American early warning and air defense system might provide the alert essential to Europe.

More importantly, if we can convince the Soviets that they cannot gain the surprise which is essential to any hope they might have of "knocking out" the United States, then they may be convinced that it would be folly to initiate a war which is bound to result in their own atomic destruction.

To add to this conviction, it is essential to complement the Canada-U.S. system by creating as effective an air defense system as possible within NATO Europe. This is in process of development, although touchy questions of sovereignty, national prestige, organization and finances must still be worked out.

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The defensive air strength of NATO in Europe has improved tremendously since 1949. At that time the air forces available for the defense of Western Europe consisted of only a few hundred obsolescent Second World War propeller-driven aircraft, while today they number in the thousands and are largely jet fighters and bombers. The Soviets would unquestionably attempt to destroy by surprise attack as many as possible of these airplanes and the fields from which they operate. This would not be an easy task, since today, in contrast to the 15 fields available to NATO in 1949, there are now approximately 125 NATO airfields; and the number is being increased. To hit all of these fields simultaneously would be practically impossible. An air alert system is being developed which should insure, given a minimum of warning, that at least part of the NATO tactical aircraft stationed on these fields could get into the air.

But attacks on NATO airfields in Europe will not safeguard the Soviet Union from the devastating counter air offensive which would be launched at once from the widely scattered S.A.C. bases around its periphery. S.A.C. and its far-flung bases thus add greatly to the deterrent power of NATO by complementing the air forces immediately available for the defense of Europe.

But what about the chances of preventing Europe from being overrun on the ground when the Soviet Union and its colonies have such a tremendous preponderance of land and tactical air forces as well as a growing atomic weapons stockpile? In answer to this question I can, of course, give only my personal views.

First, I should like to repeat that we have every hope that the defensive strength of NATO in Europe, coupled with the retaliatory strength of S.A.C., will continue to prevent a war from taking place. The following is, then, a discussion based upon the possible misfortune that a war should take place.

I am convinced that, when applied tactically—that is, on the battlefield—atomic weapons will help the defender much more than the attacker. So far as I know, all analyses and atomic experiments to date indicate that human beings, for all their frailties, can sustain and survive an atomic explosion better than material things—*provided* the men are dug into the ground or placed under other adequate shelter. Soldiers thus dug in and dispersed provide poor atomic targets.

Since a defender has no intention of moving forward, except in counterattack, he can and should dig in, or otherwise shelter his

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forces, in dispersed groupings while awaiting the aggressor's attack. Even if the enemy precedes his attack with a preliminary bombardment, using atomic weapons, the bulk of the defending forces can survive.

The defender can greatly enhance his chances if he is deployed in depth back of such natural obstacles as rivers, mountain ranges or hill masses. Gaps in such positions can be strengthened by artificial obstacles, minefields, barbed wire, tank traps and the like. Dispersed to the rear of such obstacles, covered by a light screen of observers supplemented by a reasonably effective intelligence system, the defender could afford to "sit back" and await the attack.

The enemy may similarly disperse and dig in his forces, but to get ahead *he must move*. Furthermore, if he is to make any rapid progress through or over the defender's obstacles, he must *concentrate*. When he concentrates he at once presents a highly profitable target for the defender's tactical atomic weapons. Actually, the defender can pretty well figure ahead of time the areas in which the attacker will have to concentrate both men and equipment—the places where he must build bridges, defiles in the available routes of approach, and the like. The defender can then place his atomic weapons—artillery, rockets, guided missiles, or supporting aviation—in dispersed positions from which they can quickly bring devastating fire on the attacker's concentrations.

The aggressor can thus be placed between the horns of an atomic dilemma. He cannot break through the elastic defense unless he concentrates; but if he does concentrate he faces atomic destruction.

If the attacker does succeed in establishing a bridgehead, or an "airhead" by airborne attack, these will again present concentrated targets which should be hit by the defender's atomic weapons as quickly as discovered. Such strikes should be followed up by the defender's mobile counterattacking forces, which are held in dispersed positions until required for such purposes. Following a counterattack the defender should again disperse.

If the defender is prepared ahead of time to make an attack by air—when the attacker makes his first offensive move—on the aggressor's airfields, on the key points on his communications lines and on his supply and command installations, then the aggressor's hopes of a rapid breakthrough of the defender's deep zone of defense can be thwarted. Such an elastic defensive system,

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in which dispersed but highly-mobile infantry and armored forces are integrated with readily available and mobile means of delivering atomic fires, could not be cracked in a hurry by any attacker, no matter how powerful or numerous. Certainly the forces available to the Soviets in East Germany and their other European colonies could never do it successfully. The development by the United States of the atomic shell, bombs and missile warheads with various means of delivery has made possible the establishment of some such defensive system in Europe. The entry of Germany into NATO will provide the necessary additional depth and strength to the land and air forces of Central Europe.

At sea, fortunately, the fleets available to the support of NATO far outweigh the Russian Navy, though the latter has a large number of submarines and increasing cruiser strength. It might take some time to destroy or neutralize the Soviet submarines, but there is no doubt this could and would be done. The Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, is responsible for planning for the employment of all NATO high seas fleets with the mission of securing the sea lines of communications between Europe and the North American continent. His forces are also charged with supporting SACEUR's defense of Europe.

It cannot be said that a modern integrated land, air and sea defensive system such as I have described above has been completely implemented in NATO. There are gaps, serious gaps, in the current system, but they are all susceptible of solution if the Western allies will stick together and work toward the common end. New equipment, installations and procedures are expensive and some of the NATO countries feel that they have about reached the financial limits of what they can expend for defense.

In the months and years that lie ahead it may be necessary to concentrate largely on meeting the requirements for survival in the opening phase of a possible future war. It would be unsafe to assume that strategic atomic bombing would not be used by both sides. The side that could better survive the relatively brief opening phase of intensive atomic exchange would be certain of ultimate victory—pyrrhic though that would be. NATO must, therefore, concentrate primarily on such deterrents as counteroffensive airpower, and the requisite minimum forces in being to provide the essential land, sea and air screen to protect NATO Europe, Canada and the United States.

Some who are skeptical of NATO's value argue that it is only

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a question of time before the Soviets acquire an atomic bomb stockpile of sufficient size, together with long-range means of delivery, to balance effectively the retaliatory power of S.A.C. and the U.K. Bomber Command. The result, it is held, would be an atomic stalemate. In fact, say some people, the "summit" conferees tacitly admitted at Geneva that neither East nor West would ever start an atomic war. If not an atomic war, then as a corollary it would follow that there would be no general war of a shooting kind. And if not, then why go to the expense and worry of maintaining any but nominal military forces and installations in NATO?

Perhaps we can best analyze this problem by the old technique of *reductio ad absurdum*. If the countries of Europe could count with certainty on the peaceful intentions of the Soviets, perhaps they could do away completely with their military forces and trust to the power of S.A.C. alone to prevent war. But without well-organized and disposed land and tactical air forces to oppose them, the Soviet Army might someday, while on their annual manœuvres, simply keep on going across their boundaries to the west and south. With nothing to oppose them, they could overrun Europe in a matter of days—without employing a single atomic bomb. We could then imagine their saying to the Americans: "Now come and get us." Would we in that case assume the awful responsibility of initiating atomic warfare in order to "liberate" Europe? Would we bomb Paris, Milan, the Saar, the Ruhr? For the United Kingdom and the Western Hemisphere the alternative would be economic and political isolation with almost inevitable world war. For Europe the alternatives would be continued occupation and subjection to Communist dictatorship or "liberation" by destruction. Needless to say, no one believes that NATO Europe would deliberately reduce itself to the absurdity of such dreadful alternatives.

Therefore a reasonably effective screen on land, sea and in the air must be built by NATO. Such a shield must be strong enough, in conjunction with the retaliatory power of S.A.C. and the growing power of the R.A.F. Bomber Command, to convince the Soviets that they cannot possibly achieve their objective of Communist world domination by war. Although NATO has made great progress in devising such a shield it would be fatuous to imply that it has solved all of its military problems or to indicate that there are not many areas in which improvement must be made.

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Meanwhile NATO will continue to serve as a very vital element in the maintenance of peace. Indeed a true gauge of its effectiveness as a deterrent to Soviet aggression is provided by the Russians themselves through their constant endeavors to bring about a weakening or dissolution of the alliance. They well realize that any weakness in NATO means a corresponding strength for the U.S.S.R. and, therefore, Russian efforts to disrupt the solidarity of the Western alliance have multiplied in direct proportion as the strength of that alliance has increased.

The latest Soviet tactic to weaken NATO has been to try to drive a wedge between the United States and the European members of the alliance. This effort has consisted of shrewd attempts to convince the European partners that the struggle in the world today is an American-Soviet affair from which other nations can stand aloof. Atomic stalemate and peaceful coexistence are among the catch-phrases which Soviet propagandists have devised to scare or to lull the war-weary people of the world into accepting the Trojan horse of neutralism.

The struggle is not between the United States and the U.S.S.R. alone—it is between the people of the Free World, who are dedicated to the concept of the dignity of the individual and the liberty of all people, and the leaders of the Communist world determined to impose their imperialistic slavery on all mankind. For a country to accept neutralism is to invite disaster as long as the Kremlin adheres to the principles of eventual world domination as advanced by Marx and Lenin or as temporarily modified by Khrushchev and Bulganin. A country giving up the protection of NATO would soon be welcomed into the arms of the Russian bear which crushed Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and has embraced Poland, East Germany, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The unified strength of NATO has proven itself an effective deterrent to both overt and covert Communist aggression. It is still sufficiently flexible and adaptable to meet the new wiles of Soviet propaganda. It would be sheer folly for the members of NATO to weaken the ties which have bound them together and which thus far have insured peace. If freedom is to live, NATO must not die.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION

By Fritz Erler

WHEN the Nazi régime collapsed in 1945 and Germany was occupied by Soviet, British, French and American armed forces the Potsdam Agreement determined the four zones of occupation. The principle of a German state under four-Power control was thereby established. The Allied Control Council was to have supreme power over the entire country, with German central administrations exercising responsibility, under Council authority, for such special departments as finance, railways and the post office. France, however, did not join in these agreements since she was opposed at that time to the restoration of a German state centralized in any respect, just as later she fought against allowing similar political parties to form in each of the three Western zones for fear they might one day unite across the zonal borders.

Each occupying Power tried to mold its zone in its own image. From the organization of the police force down to the choice of movie programs the various parts of Germany received their political institutions, press, cultural life and even ideals for bringing up their youth from the respective zonal authorities. The more the zones conformed to the ideals of the different occupying Powers the more, of course, they became estranged from each other.

In the Soviet zone this process was carried out most effectively. Early in 1946 the Communist Party destroyed the independence of the Social Democratic Party and changed its name to "Socialist Union Party" (S.E.D.). The authorities forced the other existing parties (Liberals and Christian Democrats) to become mere satellites and they invented new parties which had no independence at all. Now all the so-called political parties in the Soviet zone are under effective Communist control. The constitution of 1950 exists only on paper. As in all dictatorships, elections are neither free nor secret. The electorate has but one single list of names to which to say "yes" or be silent. The usual sorts of pressure produce the well-known 99.9 "yes" votes.

While the Soviet zone was being bolshevized the Western Powers established German authorities in their areas at the municipal, regional and Länder level—first by appointment, later through

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free elections. The recognized political parties were really free and entered into open competition. Since 1946 the Christian Democrats (C.D.U.) have reinforced their position until today they control about 40 percent of the votes, followed by the Social Democrats (S.P.D.) with about 30 percent, the Free Democrats (F.D.P.) with about 12 percent, and some smaller groups. In the West the Communists began with 10 percent and have sunk since to less than 5 percent, so that they are no longer represented in the Federal parliament.

From 1945 to the middle of 1947 only the legislation of the occupying Powers and that of the 11 Länder existed in West Germany; after that, the legislation of the Economic Council for the British and American zones was added. This explains why after the Federal Republic was founded in 1949 it had such difficulty in really merging the various parts of the country. New principles had to be established, for the Nazi laws were totalitarian in concept and the laws of the Weimar Republic no longer fitted present conditions, while the laws of the occupying Powers were, as said, very varied. If this difficulty has existed in the Federal Republic, one can imagine the problems that would follow reunification with the Soviet zone.

Though the policy of Moscow has decisively separated the Soviet zone from the Western zones, administratively the Communists have followed Western decisions step by step. The West was first in carrying through a tough but necessary currency reform. Only after that did the Soviets bring out the Eastern Mark (DM-Ost) in their zone. The Basic Law for the German Federal Republic was launched in 1949. The "Constitution" of the so-called German Democratic Republic (D.D.R.) dates from 1950. The military agreements concluded at Warsaw between the Soviets and their European satellites, including the German Democratic Republic, came after the Federal Republic joined NATO. It may even be that compulsory military service will not be introduced in the Soviet zone before it has become a fact in Western Germany. Soviet Russia is trying to prove systematically that it is not her policy but Western policy which has split Germany in two. Today nobody believes it; but that may change if reunification remains out of reach indefinitely.

Today reunification means the integration of the Federal Republic, Berlin and the Soviet zone. Actually, however, under international law the Germany which was at war with half the globe

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has been split up into much more than three pieces. There are: 1, the Federal Republic; 2, the D.D.R.; 3, West Berlin; 4, East Berlin; 5, the Saar; 6, the territories under Polish administration (beyond the Oder and Neisse); and 7, Northeast Prussia, annexed by the Soviet Union. This "Balkanization" of Germany cannot last forever. It is bound to be a continuous source of unrest in Europe. A great people cannot be deprived of its natural right to live together under a single roof. In the meanwhile, however, Germany has become the advance post of both the great military blocs. Here the Cold War assumes its most violent forms. Here the intelligence services and propaganda organizations of both sides are busily at work.

Following the Korean War, the Cold War led to the decision that Germany should be rearmed. This decision was made on both sides. Now we face the fact that there will be two German armies, each belonging to a military alliance hostile to the other. Who dares to deny that this is a tragic situation regardless of the reasons that brought it about?

The Geneva Conferences were watched by the German people with some hope and much skepticism. There was one constructive result: the leading Powers recognized the dangers of an unlimited armament race, particularly a race in atomic weapons, and have since been trying to relax international tension. But this is possible only if the Cold War is ended, and it will continue as long as Germany is split. No lasting peace is possible in Europe while the heart of Central Europe is cut in two. The two parts of Germany will menace each other. No solid house can be built in an earthquake area.

The German people will favor the side that does the utmost to restore their unity, not with words—words are cheap—but in action. This may involve exhibiting more activity, elasticity and willingness to take risks than at present. There is no such thing as a policy without risk; all we can do is choose the lesser of two risks. The German people must be made to feel certain that the problem of their unity is in better hands with the democracies than with the Communists. We must not repeat the bad experience of the past, when the democracies surrendered to Hitler's blackmail what they had denied to the Weimar Republic—and much more. The Soviets today are speculating on a rebirth of the unholy alliance of Communism and German nationalism, as it existed in the death struggle of the Weimar Republic in 1931 and

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again in 1939 before the outbreak of the Second World War.

In the Soviet zone the Communists put their hopes on the younger generation. The uprising of June 17, 1953, proved that the vast majority of the population is against the Communists and that the present régime would not stand a chance in free elections. But the steady stream of refugees migrating westward, totalling more than 300,000 annually, deprives the Soviet zone of the most active elements in the struggle against Communism. The more passive elements which remain behind lose hope for reunification and thus for liberation; they adjust themselves to the régime in order to safeguard their existence and that of their children. Each year a new batch of young people finishes school. Those who are 35 today were 12 when Hitler came to power, which means that half the population has had no personal experience with democracy in action. Under Communism they feel as though they were under a foreign Power; but since they have not been brought up in a democratic way of life they do not know what it is to feel that one is a citizen responsible for oneself and for the community. The longer reunification is delayed the more chance the Communists have to profit from this development. It is true that they lose an important economic force each year through the migration to the West, but in compensation their zone gains in uniformity and political reliability. If this process continues, the zone will be lost in the long run for the side of freedom.

But how can Moscow's grip be broken? No Germans, except for a very few Communists, are willing to sacrifice West Germany's political freedom for the sake of unity. Both the government and the opposition are in agreement that the goal should be unity *and* freedom. But it must be attained by peaceful means only. A war would not unite the German people but destroy them and perhaps all civilization as well. Neither Germany nor any other nation would wish to lose its life for German unity. Thus reunification can be accomplished only by agreement, which means agreement among the four Powers who defeated, occupied and split Germany and whose armed forces are still in Germany. All four of them have to agree. A peaceful solution cannot be reached by three Powers and the Germans against the Soviet Union or by the Soviets and the Germans against the West. A solution must be found which is acceptable to all four Powers and to the Germans.

The present policies of East and West on this problem are irrec-

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oncilable. Each is trying to achieve a dominant position in the part of Germany which is on the other side. Since this cannot be done without a war, both sides must revise their positions. The only part of Germany which has a freely elected government should take the initiative in developing proposals which might be acceptable to all concerned. After all, the Germans are the most interested element. If they get the impression that their own government in West Germany is laggard in this respect, democracy as such will lose ground.

The common denominator obviously cannot be an invitation that one part of Germany be handed over unconditionally from one military bloc to the other. The United States would never tolerate a Soviet command on the Rhine and in the Ruhr, quite apart from the fact that the Germans themselves would not want that. On the other hand, the Soviets would not agree to see General Gruenther take command on the Oder even if the Germans wanted that, which they do not. The desire of all concerned for security must be observed, and this means not what one side conceives to be security for the other but what each side feels would constitute security for itself. After a long struggle even Dr. Adenauer has recognized that there is a Russian anxiety about security. The Russian feeling may seem nonsensical when one thinks of the 175 Soviet divisions posed against the few NATO divisions in Europe. But the Soviet leaders remember that German troops marched as far as Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad even when the United States was a Russian ally. They are frightened about where German troops might be able to march if *they* had the Americans as allies. Present-day facts do not support this fear, but the memory of past events keeps it alive. In those days Russia suffered a heavy psychological trauma. The cruel deeds of our criminal leaders still live on into the present and produce evil consequences. Indeed, similar considerations affect our relationship with our French neighbors, as the dispute over E.D.C. showed.

For these reasons the claim that a reunited Germany should be a member of NATO is as much of an obstacle to reunification as would be a Communist demand that reunited Germany must be bolshevized. The suggestion that a reunited Germany should have the right to decide freely about joining military alliances would have the same effect, for if Germany were reunited and could exercise this right she would join the Atlantic Pact. We know that, and so do the Russians. We must therefore develop a proposal

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which faces this question seriously and does not evade it. What has to be discussed is the military status of a reunited Germany. The Western Powers did this at Geneva when they proposed that zones with limited armed forces should be established on both sides of the Iron Curtain. If that does not hamper the freedom of decision of the future German government, a discussion about participation or non-participation in a military alliance cannot hamper it either. In actual fact, all that is needed is a temporary solution for the period between reunification and the ratification of a peace treaty by a freely-elected all-German government. This treaty should finally determine Germany's military status and should be signed by all parties to it, including Germany.

With these ideas in mind the German Social Democrats for a number of years have been proposing a collective security system for Europe. The idea has made its way gradually until now it can be found in various forms in Soviet as well as Western proposals. A military alliance is always directed against an outsider. That is true also of a defensive alliance such as NATO, which everybody knows serves as a defense against the Soviet Union only. A system of collective security, however, does not mark a certain state as a potential aggressor while there is still peace. It therefore does not add to international tensions but relaxes them. It includes the potential aggressor without naming him and tells all members: "Whoever among us attacks one of us will meet with the collective opposition of all the rest." This principle is found in the United Nations Charter, but on account of the veto in the Security Council it has never been realized on a global basis. It might serve, however, as a guide in solving the German question; for this purpose a security system without a veto would have to be created.

The view was once expressed by George Kennan that the four Powers would not need to go beyond committing themselves not to enter a military alliance with Germany. One obstacle to reunification might thereby be removed, but that would not be enough. Germany and her neighbors cannot find security by creating a vacuum in the heart of Europe. Germany must be prepared, if attacked, to contribute to her own defense with her own (probably limited) armed forces within the framework of a general security system. But she should not have been already serving in time of peace as a barracks for one bloc against the other. She might allow the West to install a radar line on her Eastern borders

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and the Soviets to install one on her Western borders. That would be no threat to either and would provide protection for both against surprise attack, as well as compensation to them for having given up strategic positions. By her free choice Germany would be a partner of the free world economically, socially, culturally and politically, even though—for the sake of liberating 17,000,000 of her people—she would no longer be a formal military ally in NATO.

The government of the Federal Republic must decide whether or not to further reunification by developing a policy along the above lines. The situation as we see it should be explained to our Western friends. Only after a common program has been worked out will it be possible to ascertain the Russian position towards it. Contrary to what many people think, no such investigation has ever taken place. The Soviet Union has never been asked if it would agree to German reunification provided it could be certain that the reunified country would not be a member of a military alliance.

Now that diplomatic relations exist between the Soviet Union and the German Federal Republic it will be possible for Bonn to make the investigation. The Federal Republic cannot do anything without, or against, the Western Powers. It cannot win the confidence of the Russians at the price of losing that of the West. It must preserve Western confidence in a democratic Germany and win Russian confidence in the practicability of peaceful coexistence with such a Germany.

The Federal Republic cannot tear up valid international contracts. The Social Democrats fought against ratification of the Paris Agreements but as democrats they respect the decision taken by the duly qualified majority. Those Agreements, however, bind only the Federal Republic, not a reunified Germany. They are not damaged by our discussing with our Western partners whether a reunified Germany should not have another status than that provided in the Paris Agreements. The Agreements themselves even contain a reservation providing for an adjustment in case reunification makes it necessary. Article 10 provides: "The Signatory States will review the terms . . . in the event of the reunification of Germany, or an international understanding being reached . . . on steps towards bringing about the reunification of Germany. . . ."

In 1952 the Soviet Union would in all probability have agreed

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to reunification under the sole condition that Germany would not join a military alliance with the United States. American superiority in atomic armament was so great then that the Soviet Union would have paid a price to prevent such an alliance. Nobody, of course, can prove this. But it is incontestable that no attempt was ever made to approach the Soviet Union on the subject. Meanwhile the world has witnessed the development of an atomic equilibrium. Doubtless the United States is still on top, but each side knows that an atomic war would destroy it. Today the Soviet interest in getting Germany out of the Atlantic Pact is not sufficient in itself to bring about reunification. The toughness of Western policy has led to an increase in the Soviet price for reunification. Soviet Russia is no longer so much afraid of a German-American alliance. But this does not mean that she will agree to add her part of Germany to the alliance. It simply means that some further interest of Russia has to be found in order to persuade her to release the Soviet zone. Only then will it be possible to settle the military status of Germany along the lines developed above.

Why should the four Powers be interested in bringing about German reunification?

The West must know that if 17,000,000 people now living under Communist domination could gain their freedom this would be a supreme historic accomplishment. Also, London and Paris would sleep more soundly if Russian troops and air bases were moved back a few hundred miles. Peace could be organized on a more solid basis if Germany no longer figured as a source of unrest. Also it would then become possible to create a healthy Europe because its heart would again be working. And, finally, democracy can be stabilized in Germany only when the people are no longer divided.

On the Soviet side it will be important to find an interest overbalancing the loss of the Communist régime in the Soviet zone. Moscow must decide whether friendship with the whole German nation is not worth much more than the domination of only a part and the hostility of all. Of interest to Soviet Russia also would be the removal of sources of unrest along her borders and the removal of hostile military alliances from her door. Further, however, Germany will have to investigate, together with the Western Powers, whether the Soviet Union has any economic requirements which we might meet without surrendering vital

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interests. Finally, the Soviet Union at present seems to be interested in a policy of relaxing tensions. Such a policy is bound to fail if tensions increase in Germany. Whether these various motives, taken together, will tempt the Russians can be discovered only if the Federal Republic conducts the necessary talks, in full accord, of course, with the Western Powers.

Even if an interest in German reunification could be stimulated among the Russians one must keep in mind that a Great Power has to be careful not to lose face with its own satellites. Reunification of Germany in freedom means the end of the Communist régime in the Soviet zone. It is by no means sure that even in return for substantial rewards the Soviets would agree to let the Pankow régime disappear. Even if they agreed to give up Communist domination of the Eastern zone they would probably let it occur only gradually and in a manner which would make it appear that the local Communist government agreed. Furthermore, before the all-German elections were held, the Soviets would have to be persuaded of the necessity of making changes within the zone which would provide the population with a legitimate democratic representation. Various useful ideas exist as to how this might be accomplished, but one thing cannot be done, and that is to talk with the Communist bosses in Pankow about how to bring about their own removal. This can be discussed only with Moscow. The Pankow bosses will gradually give up their positions only under Soviet compulsion. Under no conditions can one drop the idea of having really free and secret elections for an all-German parliament and an all-German government. The subject to be discussed in this connection is how and when to carry this through in actual practice.

The Soviet Union has raised the question of what might be the internal political structure of reunited Germany. On this point Article 146 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany provides: "This Basic Law shall become invalid on the day when a constitution adopted in a free decision by the German people comes into force." Since neither the Soviet zone will be annexed by the Federal Republic nor the Federal Republic by the Soviet zone, the two will have to grow together; the furnishings of the new all-German house will be decided by its inhabitants in free elections. If the Federal Republic were simply extended to include the Soviet zone, that would mean cheating the population there of their rights of decision. They should not be made to ac-

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cept what others have decided but should join in making the decisions.

Various powerful elements in both the west and the east of Germany have little interest in seeing the country united. In the Soviet zone the Communists do not want to lose their power. In Western Germany various branches of industry fear the competition of the Soviet zone, though others see advantages for them in a larger all-German market. Again, certain political and social groups have acquired influence as a result of the abnormal conditions of the division. On the other hand, German Protestantism and German Social Democracy, which were born in central and eastern Germany and in Berlin, have played only a small part in Western Germany where the majority is Roman Catholic and conservative. The fact that both will breathe with only one lung so long as Germany is divided explains why they support reunification so strongly. It is interesting that Western Germany today is about evenly divided between Roman Catholics and Protestants, whereas in the old Germany the ratio was one-third Catholic to two-thirds Protestant. The fact is of some importance in a country where Catholicism is a political as well as religious force.

The two most active groups pressing for reunification are not important in numbers but are nevertheless effective, namely, those who resist the Communist régime inside the Soviet zone and the refugees who have fled from there to Western Germany and who long to return to their old homes once they have been liberated. Even the refugees, however, do not believe that everything which has happened in the Soviet zone since 1945 can be undone. The Communists talk about their so-called social achievements there. Unfortunately no attempt has ever been made to find out what exactly they mean. They themselves probably mean, among other things, the Communist terrorist machine based on the People's Police and People's Courts. But there are other respects in which Communist propaganda will probably find more acceptance among the people of the Soviet zone if we fail to handle them sensibly. The German people, as I have said, must certainly decide for themselves how their country is to look. Nevertheless, the political leaders of Western Germany have both the right and the duty to say how they visualize the future. Let me give three examples.

1. Agricultural reforms made an end to the large estates in the Soviet zone. Tens of thousands of farmers were settled on those

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estates. The efforts of the Communist bureaucracy have reduced them almost to the status of farm hands; so many regulations have been forced on them that in practice no free ownership of land remains. Reunification cannot mean that these farmers will be driven from the land they now theoretically own and that the former big landowners will be reinstated. On the contrary, the East German farmers will have to be made owners of their properties in fact. The problem of how to compensate those who lost their living through the agricultural reform is another thing. They will have to be given the chance of a new start—in agriculture again if they wish—in accord with the principles of a legal state.

2. The so-called "people's enterprises" do not in reality belong to the people but are owned by the Communist planning bureaucracy. In these enterprises the workers are exploited to a larger extent than in many privately-owned undertakings. Many such enterprises are large industrial plants which were completely destroyed in the war or were afterwards dismantled. The workers have rebuilt them at the cost of great sacrifices. Unlike what happened in Western Germany, they received no help from the occupying Power but in fact had to pass on part of their product to Russia. They would not understand it if the installations they have built up from nothing should now be handed over to the former stockholders who in 1945 possessed nothing but a heap of scrap iron. Formulas will have to be found which will release these enterprises from the Communist grip, transform them into living parts of the economy of a free society but at the same time allocate a share of them to those who created them. The old Carl Zeiss concern in Jena might serve as an example. Since 1906 it had belonged to the workers, but in spite of that it was seized by the Communists. There are the tens of thousands of small and medium-sized private enterprises, on the other hand, which the Communists destroyed without any reason and which must be given a chance to resume their old work.

3. Today in the Soviet zone children can enter high school and vocational schools regardless of their parents' financial status. Tuition is free. Those who go to the university even have their living expenses paid by the government. On the other hand, it is habitual for government agents to snoop into people's private opinions. Parents have to pretend that they are "reliable" from the Communist viewpoint and a student must join actively in the organizations of the régime on pain of losing his place. Reunifica-

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tion will have to break the Communist privilege of mind-control but not reinstate the old privilege of the bank account.

What can be done now? In the diplomatic field, the West German government should take the initiative in working out with the Western Powers the line to be followed and should then use the new wire to Moscow to discuss the concepts arrived at in common.

Meanwhile, everything possible must be done to prevent the split from becoming wider. The desire for freedom must be kept alive among the people of the Soviet zone. We must avoid creating an iron curtain against them but instead poke as many holes as possible through the Communist Iron Curtain. It is to our interest that as many people as possible and as much news and merchandise as possible should pass back and forth between the two parts of Germany. The more traffic there is, the more Communist violence and Communist monopoly of opinion lose their effectiveness among the people of the Soviet zone and the more they will come to know what a free society really looks like. Increased trade relations can also help to raise the standard of living in the Soviet zone, while cultural exchanges keep alive the feeling of "belonging together," of being members of the same community of European culture. We must not be afraid of these contacts. The Communists are able to propagandize in the West in any case, either openly or by camouflaged means. The exchange is useful for us, then, if only to achieve some counter-effect in areas under Communist domination. Moreover, we need to know more about what conditions really are in the Soviet zone; if we accept our own propaganda we shall be helpless every time we touch reality. We should not shy away from intellectual argument with people in the Soviet zone; indeed we should actively seek it, especially with the young generation there.

In all these fields we should press forward, making concrete demands on the Pankow régime. The existing agreements about interzonal trade, postal service and railroads must be developed further—but not so far as to constitute recognition of the Communist bosses as a government. That must not happen, for it would break the psychological resistance of the people. As a means of making progress the Social Democrats proposed that at Geneva the four Powers should assign certain questions for settlement by the German authorities in their name. Unfortunately the suggestion was passed on only in a distorted form.

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The Paris Agreements gave the Federal Republic sovereignty, and Moscow has stated that the Pankow régime is sovereign too. This raises the danger that the four Powers may avoid trying to bring about German reunification even though they assert that they still have that responsibility. Germany will achieve sovereignty in the true sense of the word only after she is unified and has signed a peace treaty. She does not seek more sovereignty than her neighbors wish to maintain. She is prepared to transfer the same amount of sovereignty to collective European institutions as do other nations.

The policy of reunification to which the Western Powers are pledged must again be made believable. The failure of the Geneva conferences has almost destroyed confidence in it. Evidence will also have to be given that people are prepared to make sacrifices for it. The West German economy, for instance, should prepare a generous aid program to bring the retarded Soviet zone up to the standards of Western Germany as soon as possible after reunification. We can establish the sincerity of our intentions only if we avoid the inferiority complexes which democracies sometimes feel toward totalitarian Powers. We must not be afraid of either the Communists or the neo-Nazis. The latter are of no importance anyhow; and the best method of fighting Communist infiltration is an active policy.

We must show that military considerations are not an obstacle to reunification. Military bases in a foreign country are valueless if the population regards them as a political mortgage. In addition, the reunification of Germany will create a new military situation for which a suitable strategic concept can be developed by friendly negotiation.

The Saar question must be handled in such a way as to prove that the West is really serious about German reunification. The Russians feel that our requirements regarding free elections are hypocritical and they will not take them seriously if the Western Powers fail to start the process of reunification with an area which they themselves have severed from Germany and which the Soviet Union cannot prevent them from reuniting to Germany. In this respect the Saar plebiscite was a good argument that free elections must also be held in the Soviet zone.

Germany's permanent borders can be fixed only in a peace treaty. For the moment reunification means simply the integration of the present four zones of occupation. The Oder-Neisse

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Line is not involved. No German government has a right today to make decisions about borders and thus prejudice the eventual peace treaty; those decisions must be made by freely elected representatives of the entire German people. From the legal point of view Germany continues to exist with the borders of 1937. Every German knows that the eastern frontier cannot remain as temporarily defined. But he also knows that things will not again be exactly as if Germany had not started the war and lost it. These matters have to be dealt with soberly; the time to do it will be at the peace conference with German representatives included.

Would the reunification of Germany mean renouncing interest in the freedom of the states of Central and Eastern Europe which have been under Communist domination since 1944? Certainly not. However, unless we want a world war—and none of us does want that—they can regain their freedom only step by step. During a conference of the European Movement a Czechoslovak representative warmly supported the reunification of Germany even if the other nations could not be liberated at the same time. He saw that there was a better chance of freedom gradually returning to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland if these countries had as their neighbor a whole and healthy democratic Germany rather than a segment of Germany forced to operate as a Soviet satellite.

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STABLE INSTABILITY IN FRANCE

By André Siegfried

WITH the results of the latest French elections fresh in mind, but without going into detail about them, I should like to discuss here the conditions in which the French people vote and their underlying concept of government. International opinion—and American opinion in particular—is always interested in what is happening in France since she is one of the cornerstones of the European structure. Moreover, the presence of France in North Africa could not be ended without grave peril to Western civilization. In addition, the question is often asked how it happens that a people held to be so intelligent govern themselves so badly. French politics always seem something of an enigma. Why should they be so incomprehensible to foreigners, especially to Americans? First, because Europe is not America—and though this fact is obvious, it must be stated at the very start. Secondly, because a "parliamentary régime" is not a "presidential régime" and the difference lends itself to a host of misunderstandings when comparisons are drawn or interpretations attempted. Finally, because France is France, the prisoner of a long past through which she has evolved in a political climate peculiarly her own.

Thus, while the elections of January 2, 1956, can be explained in part by current circumstances, they cannot be fully understood unless one keeps in mind certain constants which manifest themselves regularly from one election to another, regardless of the specific issues raised or the parties involved. Changeable as she seems, France is actually one of the most stable countries in the world in reactions and basic tendencies, so much so that some persons even reproach her for this at the very moment when her superficial instability is giving cause for grave concern.

II

It must always be remembered that the Frenchman, the man in the street as well as the intellectual, is above all an individualist. But, it may be argued, there are individualists everywhere; this is scarcely a Gallic monopoly. The answer is that the individualism of the Frenchman is Latin in essence, which means that he has a capacity for stating problems clearly and for seeing in

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any solution the principle involved and the direction in which it leads. This quality of mind, admirable in itself, becomes a serious liability in politics, since it prevents ready adjustment by compromise. Every argument becomes a matter of principle; the practical results are relegated to second place. Further, since every Frenchman has his own individual outlook, there naturally must be a great number of political parties. A simple yes or no answer does not satisfy the French. This means that each party inevitably develops within itself a left, center and right faction. As a result, government can function only through coalitions, and these are especially precarious because they are founded on such subtle combinations. Thus the means often obscures the ends. I should like to point out that this political game is intelligent; contrary to what superficial observers might believe, it always makes sense. Perhaps it is even too intelligent, if it can be called politically intelligent to separate intelligence from effectiveness. As to all this the French are held to be blithely indifferent, ready to sacrifice practical considerations for a principle even when expediency counsels the opposite. From this point of view French politics certainly are interesting; speaking for myself, I wish they were less so.

History seems to have aggravated the conditions in which France chooses her leaders and formulates her basic political ideas regarding authority and freedom. Indeed, from the time the Revolution posed this fundamental dilemma France has never succeeded in resolving it. The reason is that she won democracy and freedom through a long struggle against reactionary régimes which only in the last extremity would acknowledge the sovereignty of the people, the supremacy of the elected assemblies and the complete secularization of the State. This struggle has produced a democratic tradition which will admit that only the elected assemblies truly represent the popular will. The French left thus inclines to suspect that any administration which governs with authority is reactionary; it fails to distinguish clearly between arbitrary rule, discredited by its abuses, and the authority essential for governing at all. Even necessary restraints upon freedom are accepted reluctantly.

True, France has gone through one experience of how to solve the problem of authority within a democracy, that of Bonapartism; but it was achieved at the expense of freedom. It accounts for the French mistrust of the presidential type of régime in

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which the chief of state has broad powers. Americans do not share this mistrust, for Washington was not Napoleon.

As for the secular state, it was achieved in France against the constant opposition of the Roman Catholic Church. Indeed, the Church has never fully recognized it. This explains why the question of clericalism or anti-clericalism, especially in relation to the schools, always figures in French political thinking, even if only in latent form. Today it still—or rather again—poisons the relations of parties which on other counts would get along together quite well. This is no minor problem.

Because the French mind senses political orientations so easily —almost instinctively—it naturally considers that concepts of right and left have essential significance. Democracy triumphed through the left; reaction is expressed through the right. France, which has no conservatives of the English type, takes an incurable delight in extrapolating tendencies. The French see everything in terms of a watershed, the two sides of which slant away so steeply that one cannot maintain a foothold at the top but must necessarily fall down on one side or the other. The terms "right" and "left," which do not mean much to Anglo-Saxon Americans, have dynamic and passionate force in France; they contain the threat of a return to the past, the promise of the future. The concept of the left as cherished by its militant adherents is singular, almost childlike, akin to what inspires a Moslem as he looks toward Mecca. It is a rule of faith with them always to vote left; in fact, they believe that the further to the left they are the most effectively they will be resisting reaction. No one, not even the rightist, wants to be considered to be on the right.

One must distinguish here between a political left and a social left, for the two do not coincide; those on the political left are not necessarily on the left in a social sense, and vice versa. With the political left we are back in the atmosphere of the nineteenth century, facing the question whether the French Revolution, with all its consequences and particularly the separation of Church and State, will be accepted. On the right there is a minority which has never supported this program. There is also an anti-parliamentarian right which has its origins in Bonapartism but was rejuvenated in the twentieth century by an infusion of Fascist philosophy. It is as hostile as ever to rule by the assembly. The "defense of the Republic" must be undertaken at one moment against a return of the old régime, at another against a

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dictatorial offensive of the Boulanger type. At the same time, there is a growing division into right and left in the social sphere. This is an inevitable result of the industrial revolution, the growth of the labor movement and the increasing claims of the Socialist state. In this area, the issue of freedom passes over to the right, whereas in politics it found its champions on the left. The result is an overlapping of positions which further complicates a game already quite complicated enough. For we find social moderates who are politically on the left, and people socially liberal whose Catholicism draws them toward the political right.

France thus is burdened with the weight of her past, and the burden is the heavier because that past has never been entirely resigned to being extinguished but every once in a while crops up again, if not in its earlier form, then in a new one. In 1940, for example, Marshal Pétain, in his "National Revolution," called to his aid the most reactionary traditions in our history. In 1945, when France faced the task of drawing up a constitution, this recent experience was bound to weigh heavily in the decisions that had to be made. Is it any wonder so many ghosts haunted the men who were striving to establish a Fourth Republic?

III

The Constitution of 1946, the charter of the Fourth Republic, reflects all these anxieties. Since it was the work of a leftist majority it provided for a National Assembly elected by universal suffrage and with virtually unlimited powers. The cabinet was to be simply its delegate, always subject to dismissal. This was indeed the parliamentary régime in the democratic tradition of 1793, where the elected deputy is the sole true representative of the people. Chosen by the sovereign power, the deputy soon comes to believe that he himself is that power, so much so that he considers it little short of a scandal if an appeal is made to his constituents to revoke the mandate they have given him.

If in 1945 the Communists who then formed part of the majority coalition had had their way, there would have been no President of the Republic and no second chamber, only the single Assembly without any counterbalance, and the cabinet would have been merely its executive committee. When the referendum of May 1946 demonstrated the public's preference for a system which put certain restraints on the power of the Assembly, it was agreed that there should be a President of the Republic and

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a second chamber, the Council of the Republic. But the spirit of the Constitution was such that these modifications did not seriously affect the dominance of the National Assembly. The Council of the Republic, with only the negligible power of a suspensive veto, in no way corresponded to the Senate of the previous régime, and the prerogatives of the President of the Republic were jealously limited. A strong executive able to counterbalance the power of the National Assembly was not wanted. Thus France deliberately turned her back on the type of presidential régime favored by General de Gaulle. Even though the leftist majority was drawn almost entirely from the ranks of the Resistance, it feared a possible dictator in the person of the liberator himself.

It must be remembered that this was a period when the political temperature was at a fever pitch which could not last. The authors of these institutions meant them to be uncompromising, but in practice a sort of law of equilibrium has tended to correct their excesses. Nor is this kind of adaptability out of keeping with the French national mentality. The President of the Fourth Republic has become an essential element of the régime just as the President of the Third Republic was. Elected for seven years, presiding by right over the Council of Ministers, and having the responsibility of designating the President of the Council, he plays a rôle of influence rather than authority but still one of great importance. In short, he is president in the European rather than the American sense. As for the Council of the Republic, a limited revision has increased the importance of its suspensive veto so that it can at least make its existence felt. Nevertheless, the régime continues to be what its authors intended—a parliamentary régime with power centered in the Assembly.

Professor Philip Williams in his "Politics in Post-War France,"[1] the best book on the Fourth Republic, calls attention to the similarity between this Constitution and the English system with its all-powerful House of Commons, its king who reigns but does not rule and its House of Lords which has virtually no real prerogatives. These institutions have brought England ministerial stability and stable parties. How is it, then, that analogous institutions in France produce exactly the opposite result? The explanation of this is in part psychological, in part due to a difference in circumstances.

Take, for example, the multiplicity of French parties which is

[1] New York: Longmans, Green, 1954.

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so often the cause of reproach. The difficulty is that too many questions of fundamental importance on which the various parties have cause to disagree have come up for decision at one time. The nineteenth century bequeathed to us the problem of *dirigisme* versus free enterprise and that of separation of Church and State. Problems more urgent still, most of them resulting from the Second World War, now have us by the throat: European integration, German rearmament, the pro-Russian or pro-American orientation of our foreign policy, the colonial crisis. The fact that these problems, distinct in themselves, have arisen simultaneously increases the difficulty of forming a stable majority. A majority can be found on each of these problems taken singly—E.D.C., for example, or the separation of Church and State—but when it comes to obtaining a majority which will agree on all these questions at once the task becomes truly formidable. Yet this is just what must be done if the cabinet is to reach decisions binding upon all its members, representing different parties in the coalition. The Socialists and Popular Republicans may agree on a social program, but the Socialists oppose the subsidies for Catholic schools sponsored by the Popular Republicans. Gaullists and Catholics may be together on the school question, but not on the question of European integration.

Such divisions are in large part responsible for the cabinet instability which has become tragically characteristic of the French parliamentary régime. Unfortunately this instability follows logically from the circumstances described above. The moment the cabinet is considered the delegate of the Assembly majority, any change in the center of gravity or composition of that majority necessarily involves a cabinet shake-up. The process is a little like the way a skipper trims his sails as the wind changes. If the cabinet is not overthrown it comes apart; certain ministers refuse to associate themselves with some measure they do not approve. Actually the disadvantages are not as serious as they appear to foreign observers. When there is a cabinet crisis, certain ministers change or the same ministers are merely shifted around; but no civil servant is displaced, and the day-by-day administration continues without interruption. Furthermore, as the same ministers hold over from one cabinet to another, they form as it were teams of government. This leads to the paradox of stable policy with unstable cabinets. Our international critics nevertheless have a strong point when they complain that the represent-

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atives of France in diplomatic negotiations are hardly ever the same from one year to the next.

How, despite such a capricious régime, does France survive and even prosper (for she is not in a state of crisis)? To understand it, one must remember that two parallel traditions have been maintained since the eighteenth century: a political tradition characterized by constant variations and affirmations of principle without fundamental regard for practical effects; and an administrative tradition originating with Napoleon characterized by permanence and solidity. The two do not obey the same rules or the same spirit, but the second is no less national than the first.

IV

In spite of all this French politics do not lack continuity. If instead of considering each cabinet individually one classifies them by groups having the same general complexion, one begins to discern periods of continuity which to a certain extent counterbalance the instability of the separate cabinets. Since the Liberation there have been three such periods. During the first, from 1944 to 1947, the majorities were based on the coöperation of the Communists, Socialists and Popular Republicans (Catholic left). When Ramadier excluded the Communists in May 1947, a new tripartite régime was formed, more toward the center this time, embracing the Socialists, Popular Republicans and Radicals. The electoral system of 1951 was devised in order to consolidate this combination against both Communism and Gaullism. The system must be understood if the results of the 1956 elections, held under the same rules, are to be interpreted correctly.

Under this system, all seats go to the ticket winning 51 percent of the votes in a department or section of a department. If no party wins a majority, the seats are distributed among all parties in proportion to the number of votes received by each. However, if two or three parties declare that although they are retaining their separate identities they are forming an electoral alliance, they are considered as a single party for the purposes of the election and are allowed all the seats if their pooled votes total more than 50 percent of the votes cast. This system puts a premium on coöperation between parties and works against isolated parties, for example, the Communists, who in the 1951 elections won a relatively small number of seats in proportion to their voting power. In the 1956 elections, the divisions between

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the center parties were too great to permit an effective rapprochement, with the result that the Communists without getting more votes than before picked up more seats. Viewed in this aspect, the elections take on quite a different meaning.

Despite the existence of a strong Gaullist element to the right, the tripartite majority régime, based on the center, could have maintained itself in power after the 1951 elections if the question of subsidies to the Catholic schools had not arisen to separate the Socialists from the Popular Republicans. This made it necessary for a governing majority to look for support further to the right, even to the Gaullists; and this in turn drove the Socialists toward the left and revived the idea of a popular front. But any alliance between parties as different as the Independents on the right and the Popular Republicans, socially oriented toward the left, was bound to be precarious, the more so because they were not in agreement on the problem of Europe and German rearmament, just then coming to the fore. Governmental instability increased, but suddenly two circumstances cleared the air. For one thing, prices, which had been rising constantly for ten years, began with the Pinay régime in 1953 to be stabilized, while American and European prosperity began to be reflected in the French economy. For another, the strong personality of Mendès-France emerged, and he assumed leadership of a new majority oriented toward the left. But could a left majority be constituted without the aid of the Communists, or a center majority without the Socialists and the Radicals who follow Mendès-France? A split ensued in the center of the Assembly between the parties and the leaders—Mendès-France and Edgar Faure—who had lately been coöperating. Faure called for the dissolution of the Assembly in December 1955, hoping to obtain clear guidance from the people as to the direction in which French policy should move. But as the dissolution took place without any change having been made in the electoral system, and as no alliance was made among the deeply divided center parties, the seats were distributed proportionately.

Under the system as it functioned in the 1956 elections, the voter cast his vote less for individuals than for parties. This abstract concept may be pleasing to the French mind, but it separates the voter from reality. As a result, the balloting was more like a census than an election. On the essential issues the electorate did not give any clear indication of its opinion.

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Three spectacular results demand attention: the gain of some 50 seats by the Communists (their number rose from 95 to 144); the sudden eruption onto the scene of 51 Poujadist deputies on the extreme right; and the adoption of an intransigent position by the Republican Front, which chose to place itself on the left side of the watershed, in opposition to the former majority of Edgar Faure. These results will appear less startling to foreign observers if they will recall the analysis presented earlier in this article. Once again the French have been true to their traditional psychology; no really new currents have appeared. It would be too much to draw from this election any definite conclusions as to French tendencies, whether reassuring or otherwise. From the point of view of public opinion, no clear-cut indications appear. However, from the tactical and governmental point of view, the new distribution, not of votes but of seats, raises difficult problems.

The Communists have 144 seats in the new Assembly as against 95 in the old, but it will be seen that they have little reason to crow if it is remembered that the 25 percent of the votes they garnered throughout the country represents no increase in their actual voting strength. Their gain of nearly 50 seats is due solely to the fact that in the absence of an alliance among the center parties, the Communists, unlike five years ago, are represented proportionally to the votes they obtained. French Communism appears to have reached its ceiling long ago, and it can be concluded that France is not going and will not go Communist. Nevertheless, there were 5,492,000 Communist votes, and the foreigner wonders how it is that so many Frenchmen vote that way. It is generally agreed that France is not at present in a state of economic crisis; prices have not risen for two years, nominal and even real wages are unquestionably increasing and there is no unemployment. If the French were Anglo-Saxons, this situation would surely have been reflected in the elections. In France, nothing of the kind.

As I stated above, the Frenchman votes more for principles than for practical considerations. Does this mean that there are more than five and a half million Communists in France? Clearly not—and this is the strangest paradox of all: we know that from two-thirds to three-quarters of those who vote Communist are not themselves Communists and have not the slightest desire to see a Soviet régime established in their country. Why, then, do

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they react as they do at the polls? For complex reasons, among which principle, class interest, protest and political manœuvring all play their part. Many people vote Communist because they think Communism is on the left, and as a matter of principle they always vote left. If we could prove that Communism was on the right, the Party would unquestionably lose a large part of its support. Then, too, it gets the votes of many wage earners who believe that it is the party of the working class and so is in the best position to defend their interests. These voters reason that the more the Communists are feared the more they are listened to. To these must be added the very poor, the ill-housed, the wretched, who feel that any change must be for the better and who consequently see no danger but only possible good in voting for the Revolution. In addition, many women vote Communist because they believe that Moscow favors peace—a fact which should cause Americans to reflect on the ineffectuality of their propaganda. All of these people, whether militant adherents of a principle, well-meaning innocents or rascals who should know better, are playing a dangerous game, for the deputies whom they help to elect do not represent them but a foreign Power.

The success of the Poujadist party is rather easier to explain in so far as it sheds a strong light on certain very French forms of discontent. Poujade is an agitator, unquestionably possessed of a dynamic personality, who for several years has been exhorting the small merchants to protest, by direct action if necessary, against the highhandedness, tactlessness and all too real lack of consideration shown for the taxpayers by the fiscal authorities. To a great extent Poujadism is a result of deflation, or at least of the end of inflation, for the movement did not develop until after prices had levelled off. As long as prices kept rising, middlemen, not excluding black marketeers, enjoyed a spectacular and easy prosperity. Stocks increased in value overnight; cost prices hardly had to be calculated. As for taxes, which were payable on income received the year before, by the time they became due the currency had been still further devalued and the burden had become that much lighter. Once prices were stabilized or declining, this beautiful paradise vanished. When it is further taken into account that improved methods of distribution have been achieved at the expense of the middleman, it will be understood why the small merchants fear that their very existence is threatened. And as Keynes has said, "Men will not

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always die quietly." It was therefore easy for a man like Poujade, demagogic and persuasive, to incite an element among the taxpayers who were the more ready to rebel because the fiscal authorities treated them so cavalierly. In France the civil service is always only too ready to think of itself as the heir to Louis XIV.

We have long been familiar with movements of this type. They almost always originate among the lower middle classes and are generally on the extreme right, in the tradition of Bonapartism, Boulangism, anti-Semitism, anti-parliamentarianism and, one might say today, Fascism, although in France the term is somewhat confusing. Thus the movement, in so far as it embraces elements other than the small merchant class from which it sprang, has in it something of General Boulanger, of Drumont (the anti-Semite), of Colonel Laroque (Croix de Feu), even of Maurras. Doubtless its supporters also include more than one Gaullist or Vichyite. The "national malcontent" is a very French type—demanding, complaining, opposing because of temperament as much as circumstance. Realizing that Poujadism is a part of this tradition, we shall do well not to exaggerate its significance. At the same time we would make a mistake not to take it seriously, for although it certainly does not imperil the régime it is nonetheless symptomatic of a basic malaise. Even if they do not know exactly what they want, 50 Poujadist deputies can, by joining their votes to those of the Communists, increase the difficulty of constituting a parliamentary majority.

France has always suffered from extreme leftist and rightist minorities which do not participate in good faith in the exercise of republican government. To constitute a majority with the aid of the Communists would be to resurrect the Popular Front, a mortal peril to the Republic, as Socialists and Radicals are well aware. But to constitute a majority with the aid of untrustworthy elements on the extreme right would only encourage the formation of just such a popular front under the false pretense of "defending the Republic." This is to be feared above all else. Numerically the center commands a majority, exclusive of Communists and Poujadists. The partisan and personal rivalries which separate the Republican Front from the groups in the center and on the liberal right make the consolidation of this majority very difficult. Yet the exigencies of a situation which is serious to the point of real danger make it imperative.

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THE RÔLE OF AMERICAN BOOKS ABROAD

By Dan Lacy

IN the postwar decade the United States has been deeply concerned with problems of international communication and particularly with the flow of information and ideas from this country abroad. Our efforts in this field have had two principal objectives. The first has been to counter Soviet propaganda and bring other countries to a fuller and therefore, we hope, more friendly understanding of the United States and its policies. The second has been to make technical knowledge available as a means of assistance in economic development abroad.

Massive though our program has been, it has generally been conceived in relatively narrow and short-run terms. The effort at political persuasion has been concentrated largely on immediate issues. Technical assistance has been devoted primarily to providing the skills for particular projects and programs rather than raising the general level of economic competence. In general, all overseas information efforts have been in the charge of agencies with rather specific and limited purposes and under pressure to produce immediate results. Hence there has been a tendency to rely for communication primarily on ad hoc missions and made-to-order materials: broadcasts, press stories and specially prepared pamphlets and films. Since books constitute a more generalized medium of information, one less easily controlled and more slow to produce results, they have been used less.

Recently there have been evidences of a marked change of emphasis in this regard. Vice President Nixon, on his return from his first visit to the Orient, is reported to have stressed inexpensive books as the foremost of the information needs of the United States in the area. In the State Department *Bulletin* for October 17, 1955, Nelson A. Rockefeller, then Special Assistant to the President, stated: "Because we have so long delayed a really major effort in this field of books, a major program is now absolutely necessary."[1] And in the terse language of the President's Budget Message of last January appears this significant sentence: "Overseas libraries will be expanded, and increased emphasis

[1] Mr. Rockefeller's statement was made originally in a message to a conference on "American Books Abroad" sponsored by the National Book Committee last fall.

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will be given to supplying books to foreign readers at low prices." This shift in emphasis has already been reflected in increased allotments for the use of books by the United States Information Agency and the International Coöperation Administration.

In part, of course, this more intensive concern with books is simply a response to the extensive Communist use of books, pamphlets and leaflets as propaganda materials. Visitors abroad have been repeatedly struck by the ubiquitous presence in many countries of editions of Soviet works, translated and well bound, at prices obviously below the cost of production, and by the profusion of free or inexpensive Communist pamphlets. Less apparent but probably more important has been the major Soviet effort at international cultural exchange over the last few years, which has placed large quantities of Russian scientific and technical works and general literature in libraries and universities in Europe, Asia and, in less degree, Latin America. More direct and strident forms of open propaganda through printed materials have generally been left to local Communist Parties in order to avoid the onus of direct Soviet interference in local affairs.

Although the apparent success of this Communist propaganda effort has been one reason for the demand that we try to offset it by similar methods, the fact is that the greater emphasis on the use of books is primarily a result of a changing conception of the objectives and appropriate techniques of an American program for increasing international communication. It is being more and more recognized that the position taken by this or that foreign government with respect to major international problems is not determined by short-run sparring over the interpretation to be placed on particular events but rather by their own basic attitudes and long-range evaluations of the world situation. Perhaps the difficulty of manipulating public opinion in other countries to support predetermined American positions is also being understood; and with that is coming acceptance of the idea that the best hope for a unity of purpose lies in a candid sharing of fundamental values and concepts from which a common approach to problems can arise.

Similarly, aid in the process of economic development is now generally accepted as being a very long-term undertaking, which must include a massive program of general scientific, medical, engineering and administrative training and a vastly enlarged educational effort. There has been a significant shift of emphasis

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from short-range demonstration projects to longer-range efforts to help build up the research and teaching resources of institutions in less developed countries.

These converging purposes—to combat the Soviet use of printed propaganda and to address efforts at international communication to broader and more lasting subjects—have thus combined to demand a more effective use of American books. The possibility that the United States Government will undertake to do this means that careful thought should be given to determining the proper rôle of American books abroad and how it can best be realized.

II

Let us begin with a sober look at the limitation on books as a means of international communication and at the difficulties in the way of their use. In the first place, more than half the adult people in the world cannot read a book, and of those who do read, only a small minority read English. For most of the world's people a hard-cover book is an impossible luxury and to procure even a paperbound book involves an imposing expense. In most areas outside Western Europe, only the largest cities are likely to have adequate bookstores, and in many important countries the whole machinery of local publishers, dealers and libraries by which books are brought to readers hardly exists. Dollar shortages, tariffs and other commercial barriers combine with the inadequate organization of the book trade to impede further the flow of books, as does the absence in most foreign countries of any ready means of learning about American publications.

Perhaps the most important limitation is one that exists in the United States as well: only a minority even of those who can read well and have access to books are in fact readers of books, especially of serious books. To read a serious book requires thought and sustained attention in a degree to which most persons are unaccustomed; a book is therefore not likely to be read unless it serves a significant personal need or interest. The bare mention of these difficulties makes it clear that American books, with rare exceptions, cannot directly reach really mass audiences abroad.

The audience that can be reached, however, is of major importance. In Great Britain and the dominions, American books in either the original or British editions circulate as freely as they do here. In Western Europe and Latin America the use of Eng-

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lish by scholars, scientists, engineers and political leaders is far more widespread than the use of any foreign language here, and the facilities for producing translations are good. English is increasingly becoming a *lingua franca,* especially in those parts of the world where newly formed nations lack a common tongue. In the Middle East and Asia, where obstacles to the use of books are particularly formidable, it is a safe guess that there are 10,000,000 people who read English reasonably well. This is a large audience in itself, and one likely to grow. More important is the fact that it includes most of the men who control the governments and the economy of the area and most of those whose creative thought provides intellectual leadership and transmutes Western knowledge to meet Asian needs. The Soviet Union enjoys no such advantage.

Moreover, in just those countries in which language, literacy and economic barriers make the wide dissemination of books most difficult, the resulting scarcity itself affords a special opportunity. In the great hunger for books in such a country, for example, as Indonesia, every worthwhile book we can help make available assumes a special—even unique—importance, an importance much greater than that of any one publication competing for attention among the abundance in London or Paris. It is cause for concern that in some countries this demand for reading matter in English is being supplied in part by the unsold remainders of rather sleazy publications, including salacious illustrated magazines, bought up at a fraction of a cent above their waste-paper value and dumped abroad for local currencies at prices within reach of a large audience.

Although there are severe quantitative limitations on what American books can accomplish abroad in reaching a mass audience, almost the only limit to their ultimate potential contribution to the technology and the thought of other countries lies in the degree to which their content shows itself valuable to their people and is able to pass directly into their own intellectual life. The following sections attempt to suggest some of the principal elements in a program to realize that potential.

III

A first element in such a program should be to remove as far as possible the obstacles that now lie in the way of a larger purchase of American books by foreign institutions and individuals.

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The volume of American books exported, after allowing for price changes, is at least three or four times as large as it was before World War II. Sales to countries other than Canada and the Philippines have increased by an even larger ratio, and the increase to Asia and the Near East has been many-fold. All told, about $40,000,000 worth of American books, at wholesale prices, are exported annually, and this figure does not include British editions of American books. If to this figure are added the costs of internal distribution through bookstores and libraries, the cost of British and other foreign editions, and the cost of translations, it is probable that the people of other countries spend close to $100,000,000 annually in importing, translating, publishing and distributing American books—a sum larger than the total appropriations of the U.S.I.A. and out of all proportion to the perhaps $5,000,000 which this country spends annually on its overseas libraries and other book ventures abroad. The $100,000,000 figure is particularly impressive when we consider that nearly half of it must be paid in scarce dollars and that a higher proportion is paid by newly developing countries whose imports must be confined to objects of the most urgent need. It is itself evidence of the extraordinarily useful rôle of American books in those countries.

But the imports would be very much larger if American books were better known and more conveniently available at prices reflecting the general price structure of the country and if there were no commercial barriers or currency restrictions. The principal single obstacle to larger imports is simply the dollar shortage. Through the Informational Media Guaranty Program, the United States Government is able to deal with the currency problem in certain countries, such as Israel or the Philippines, by buying for dollars the payments in local currencies received by American publishers and exporters. In many countries, such as Burma, however, currency difficulties remain a major and almost impenetrable barrier. One has only to contrast imports of $670,000 by Israel with $20,000 by Turkey or $1,570,000 by Brazil with $30,000 by Argentina to see how dramatically a solution of currency difficulties can affect the situation. (These are Commerce Department figures, which by omitting shipments of less than $100 underestimate actual imports by 25 percent to 50 percent, but they are roughly comparable country to country.) A continuance and improvement of this program and the extension of it to other countries are essentials. It is also necessary to devise eco-

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nomical means of using the foreign currencies acquired in ways—such as financing translations—that will reinforce the program without aggravating the currency problem.

A second highly desirable step would be ratification by the United States of the Florence Agreement on the Importation of Educational, Scientific and Cultural Materials. In exchange for similar concessions from this country, other adherents would thereby be obligated to remove tariff barriers on American publications and to make available the dollar exchange needed by libraries and educational institutions to purchase them.

Except in Great Britain and the Dominions, however, even in countries in which there are neither tariff nor currency barriers, the sale of American books is principally confined to ready buyers: libraries, research institutions, government agencies and individual professionals, many of whom order them directly. Except for inexpensive paperbound books there is relatively little sale to individuals at large and almost no active effort to cultivate such a market. The reason is that this would require promotional efforts out of all proportion to the recompense from increased sales for many years. The organization of the American book export trade, though it has been materially strengthened in the postwar period, is not yet adequate to undertake a major overseas sales effort. Yet the development of a wider use of American books by individuals abroad and the promotion of books through exhibits, displays and reviews are of material importance to the government and ultimately to the industry. Obviously, then, a third major need is for a joint effort by government and industry to deal with the cost of selling books by consignment (which is necessary if they are to be stocked abroad); to undertake promotional efforts that go beyond what is commercially practical (including the preparation and wide circulation of lists of current American books of foreign interest); and to invigorate the whole export effort, especially in Asia and the Middle East.

If there is to be an expansion of sales beyond the established institutional market some reduction in price will often be necessary. A true mass market cannot be reached except by the radical price reductions possible only in the case of large paperbound editions. For many books, obviously, there will be only a limited institutional market whatever the price. But in the case of some titles a reduction of 20 to 40 percent may offer the opportunity of expanding distribution from a single copy in a university

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library to a dozen among individual scholars and leaders. Various possibilities exist of arranging lower prices for export copies to this limited group. Reduction of the overseas postal rate on books to the levels authorized by the Brussels Postal Convention, a step taken by almost every other major publishing country, would itself permit price reductions of from 5 to 10 percent.

A relatively simple coördinated effort of this sort to remove barriers, increase promotion and enlarge the opportunities to buy would probably enable other countries to increase their imports of American books by at least 20 percent, representing an investment on their part of an additional $8,000,000 to $10,000,000. The rate of increase in the crucial Asian and Near Eastern countries would probably be much larger. Such an increase would be particularly important in view of the fact that every copy would be selected and paid for by a reader or institution abroad; this would assure that it had a direct relationship to their interests and needs.

IV

But even if the possibilities of exporting American books by these methods were exploited to the full, the potential rôle of American books abroad would be only partially fulfilled. In most countries they would still be available to only an élite of education and means. Further measures are necessary to make a relatively limited number of books of wide interest available in languages and at prices that can reach the literate public generally.

Several hundred American books are now translated annually into the major languages of Western Europe, but these naturally are titles, usually of fiction, which seem likely to command a wide sale. There is almost no opportunity for the translation of a serious work of history, biography or public affairs which is of interest outside the audience able to read English but which does not seem likely to attract the thousands of readers needed to justify commercial publication. Such books, basically important for international cultural and intellectual relations, can usually be published abroad in translation only with a subsidy. However, such a subsidy need not be large and can be granted by paying for the rights and the translation or by buying a specified number of copies for free distribution, or both.

The United States Information Agency has a very efficient

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program for giving this sort of assistance and annually aids in the translation of 600 or more titles. Though general cultural works have not been omitted, there has been an understandable emphasis on books of specific political relevance. An important and useful field of activity by foundations would be to give similar assistance for works of broad and lasting value in fields outside the Government's special range of interests.

Translation into the Asian tongues presents a different problem altogether. The university professor or student, the physician or the engineer has been compelled to learn a Western language in order to master his field, and is more likely to read English easily than his European colleague. But if there is less need to translate works for such persons, there is an appallingly vast need to do so for others. The everyday needs of Europeans for educational materials, for technical knowledge and for general information can normally be met in abundance from books of their own countries. Not so in Asia, where one who has not learned a Western language is barred from access to most of the whole body of Western knowledge and professional skills. There is an urgent need to produce and distribute translations of many hundreds of works covering the basic fields of knowledge.

But in the face of this great need the capacity for producing and publishing translations is very small. In most of Asia there are better facilities for printing than one would expect, yet these are barely adequate for current output and would be completely swamped by any publishing program of the needed size. There has been no regularly and adequately paid employment which would attract and develop a body of competent translators. But an even greater obstacle in most of Asia is the absence of a publishing industry capable of organizing and carrying out a large-scale program of translating material and distributing it. Marginal assistance to an already efficient publishing industry such as exists in Europe is therefore not the answer. Any program aimed at making American books, or any books, really useful in many Asian countries must begin with building up the machinery to produce and distribute them.

The principal American effort in this direction has been Franklin Publications, a non-profit publishing house with offices in Cairo, Tehran, Lahore, Dacca and Djakarta; it produces works in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Urdu, Bengali and Indonesian. All of its books are issued in collaboration with local publishers,

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who are given an opportunity to learn modern methods of book production and distribution. The Ford Foundation has recently made a grant of $500,000 to a South India book trust to foster the development of an adequate publishing industry in the Dravidian language group. Such moves deal realistically with the basic problem of making books useful in most of Asia, but they are comparatively limited in size and range. It would be especially desirable for technical assistance funds to be used to enlarge the work of Franklin Publications in technology and economics, and for grants like that of the Ford Foundation to be made in other countries.

Inexpensive books capable of wide popular sale are needed, however, in English as well as in translation. In India, indeed, a serious book can probably be read more widely in English than in any of the Indian tongues. The rapid expansion of inexpensive paperbound publishing in the United States has already done much to meet this need. But books can be sent abroad in the 25 to 50 cent price range only if they are part of an edition printed for the American market in quantities of at least 100,000 or more. In other words, the availability of really inexpensive American books for users overseas is now merely a by-product of meeting the often quite different demands of the American market. A carefully planned program of government aid is needed to make possible the publication and sale abroad in English of especially important books at mass-market prices. This aid should be scaled so that it covers only the gap between the actual domestic sale and that normally required for a mass edition.

A special need is for materials simple in language and in their assumptions of a knowledge of Western life, but adult in interest and conception, for the use of those newly literate in English. In many Asian countries, such as Indonesia, there is an intense effort, almost a national movement, to learn English as a means of self-improvement and a key to Western knowledge; but there is little for those who acquire the skill to practise it on, and it may soon be lost in discouragement. Russia has responded more quickly than we in sending English-language materials to Indonesia, where—by our default—it finds a large and eager audience. We have much experience in the United States in the production of materials of this general character; at not too great an outlay of funds we could produce a very superior series of short adult books, adapted for the proper level of ability in English and the

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appropriate areas of interests, and published for wide sale at very low prices.

v

It is well to remember, however, that the rôle of John Locke's "Treatises on Civil Government" in helping to shape the political philosophy of the American Revolution was achieved not by a mass edition but through the few copies read by men like Jefferson, Adams, Mason and Madison and popularized in the brilliant political pamphlets that came from their pens. The important influence which Thoreau's "On the Duty of Civil Disobedience" is said to have had on the history of India came not from any wide distribution in that country, where it is indeed little known, but from the fact that a single copy seems to have come into the hands of Mohandas Gandhi when he was a young lawyer in Africa.

This is not to exaggerate the influence of Thoreau and Locke. On the contrary, it is to suggest that the restive colonists in America and the masses in India could be moved only by men of their own time and place and situation and that Locke and Thoreau attained meaning for them only as their ideas found a place, transmuted to the immediate need, in the proposals of contemporary leaders. And equally now it would be a naïve illusion to suppose that any American book, however widely translated or how cheaply sold, will itself significantly determine the responses or shape the thinking of another people. It is in India and by Indian thinkers that the economic and social and political problems of that country will be met and its future shaped, and it is Indian books written in that country that will make those solutions known and win support for them. And this is true for every other country as well.

Of all the things we attempt to do with American books abroad, the most important will be to see that through them whatever contributions we have to offer of knowledge, theory, method or insight are readily available to the leaders and scholars of other countries as they may need them in trying to work out the solutions to their own problems. This does not call for wide circulation of any single book, but it does call for extensive resources for putting just the right book in the hands of the leader or thinker who needs it.

The most useful machinery for this purpose we have now is the 160 United States Information Service libraries abroad. These

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are collections of 5,000 to 20,000 books and 100 to 500 current periodicals, well organized and usually administered with high professional skill. The value of the books as individual volumes is multiplied by their being brought together in organized and currently maintained collections and supplemented by a competent reference service. Their usefulness abroad, though for a time seriously damaged by the timorous retreat by the State Department before Senator McCarthy's assaults in 1953, is enormous; indeed, it literally cannot be measured, since it finds expression through so many thousands of indigenous channels. It is important that these libraries be maintained and strengthened and that their real rôle should never be sacrificed either to short-run propaganda considerations or in a quixotic attempt to reach mass audiences directly at the expense of the quality of the expert services rendered to productive writers, thinkers and leaders.

But in the long run an even more important resource will be in the universities abroad, and particularly in Asia and the Middle East. Here are the centers of research and teaching where gather the economists, political and social scientists, engineers and researchers in medicine and the sciences on whom will rest the principal responsibility of applying the generality of Western knowledge to the particular problems of their own countries. Here are indeed the natural centers for the reception and dissemination of ideas from abroad. And the students as well form a group of special interest—intelligent and intense, displaced from traditional patterns, anxiously seeking new integrating principles, likely to pass quickly to positions of power and leadership—but prone also, if not integrated into their societies, to turn in their frustration to Communism. The intense sense of nationalism and the drive for economic development also find a focus in many Asian universities.

Books are badly needed in these rapidly growing institutions, the slender resources of which are already strained to the utmost. A high proportion of the remarkable increase in foreign expenditure for American books has been devoted to building up their holdings, but even so only a beginning has been made. The fact that English is read in almost all universities and is, indeed, the principal language of instruction in many Asian universities provides us with a special opportunity. Hitherto the United States has done little to meet this need. Some foundation grants in the postwar years were devoted to replacing damaged or destroyed

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collections; American libraries have sent duplicates abroad through the United States Book Exchange or directly; and the United States Information Agency has made token gifts of books to foreign universities, usually as good will gestures. But the only consistent efforts to help in building up foreign university collections have come under the Finnish War Debt Program, the India Wheat Loan Program and the program of technical assistance through university contracts recently enlarged by I.C.A.

The Finnish and Indian programs provide that payments on the Finnish war debt and a part of India's interest payments on the wheat loan shall be applied to cultural exchanges. These have resulted in an annual allotment of funds up to $65,000 in the case of Finland and from $250,000 to $400,000 in the case of India for the purchase of books for university collections. The technical assistance contracts administered by American universities sometimes include provisions for building up the library holdings of the beneficiary foreign institution in agreed fields. The allocation of an additional one to two million dollars a year to more general programs for assisting foreign university libraries to develop their collections of materials from this country would be perhaps the most effective single project that could be undertaken.

Even well-developed library collections, however, do not provide a fully satisfactory answer to the need of the individual scholar to own and use materials in his special field. An enormously useful foundation or government project would be to make it possible for American learned societies, particularly in the social sciences, to elect a considerable number of distinguished foreign scholars to honorary life membership, this to include receipt at no charge of the society's journal. This alone would permit a familiarity with contemporary trends in professional thought in economics, political science, sociology and international relations and would lead to a much greater and more effective use of books reviewed in the journals, particularly if the honorary membership also included a modest annual allowance to cover the purchase of a few individual books of special importance.

VI

As this discussion suggests, the proper use of books is not as instruments of propaganda in the meaner sense of the word. If it

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were the function of our information program merely to persuade other people to adopt a predetermined set of American views, books could play only a limited rôle. For by its very nature, a book becomes primarily the tool of its reader to serve his own ends rather than of its author or publisher or distributor to achieve theirs.

But the character of our foreign policy objectives is such that in the long run it is probably less important that the thought of another country should accord with ours—granted common ultimate values—than that it should be successful in meeting that country's own political and economic needs. Hence in forming policy with respect to the total flow of information abroad, we can rightly be more concerned with its utility in meeting those needs than with its persuasiveness in winning adherents to an immediate point of view, desirable as this may be. In a program so conceived, books obviously play a central rôle as a vehicle for the extensive and diverse range of knowledge and ideas that must be conveyed.

But the machinery of the book program should clearly reflect these distinctions of function. It will do more harm than good if, in effect, it says: "These are the ideas we want to get over. Find or write some books that say them convincingly and then buy or print up some big editions and see that everybody can get a copy in his own language cheap." An effective book program abroad—like a successful publishing or library program at home—must begin with the books that the potential users need and will read, and from there it must aim to consider how they can best be provided at places, in languages, at prices and under circumstances that make them most useful for our common purposes. This requires a broad, flexible and varied effort, but if it is undertaken with wisdom and skill, it can achieve an influence out of all proportion to the cost.

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GOA AND THE INDIAN UNION

The Portuguese View

By Oliveira Salazar

A NUMBER of events which have occurred during the last two years have drawn the attention of the world to Goa; and there is no doubt that the repercussion of those events is disproportionate to the size of the territories at stake and to their economic value. I shall endeavor to show some of the reasons why Goa rouses curiosity or sympathy in face of the Indian Union's claim to integrate it into its own territory and under its sovereignty.

What in Portugal is called the "State of India" is a unit of territories, some with access to the sea, others encrusted in the Indian Union, with an area of some 4,000 square kilometers and a population of only 600,000. Administratively the territories constitute a Province of Portugal consisting of three districts —Goa, Damão and Diu. As the capital and most important district is called Goa, this name is often used for the whole. It will not be possible to understand the formation of Goa, spread over 600 kilometers or more on the West coast of the Indian subcontinent, without going back to its origins and bearing in mind the political situation in the Hindustan peninsula in the early sixteenth century.

The Portuguese navigators discovered the sea route to India by way of the Cape of Good Hope in 1498. From contemporary documents it may be taken that a threefold motive took the Portuguese to the Orient—commercial, political and religious, the last closely linked to the political. In this way the trade of the East with Europe, which had been carried on via Suez and the Mediterranean, was diverted, and a new route was opened to it through the Atlantic, with the result that Lisbon became a mercantile emporium. This was to spell decay for the Italian Republics and the decline of Turkish power. To weaken the latter by threatening the security of Turkey from the rear, in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, and thereby relieving the pressure on Europe, was held by the Portuguese at the time to be more effective than the frontal resistance which had long been the strategy of the Powers of the West. Lastly, "to spread Christianity," to

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promote missionary activity among the peoples, to bring to them the message of Christ, was, as it were, an imperative for the Portuguese nation, as faithfully interpreted in the orders of the Kings. When one reads, for example, the letters of Afonso de Albuquerque (1507–1515) and of Dom João de Castro (1538–1548), one is struck by the breadth of their political conceptions, by the daring and at the same time the realism of their plans, and by their eagerness to carry to the East the faith, the culture, the soul of the West. In essence, the enterprise revealed itself to be more idealistic than utilitarian: the monopoly of trade, so long as it could be maintained, was but the essential fountain of the resources needed to achieve the other two objectives.

The conquest of new lands, the subjection of new peoples, were not among the designs of the Portuguese. Doubtless the question was more than once broached in the councils of the Crown, and divergent points of view were debated there; but the general line of policy for India underwent no considerable change in this respect. It can well be understood that for the ends mentioned no more should have been needed than to occupy a few strategic points for support of the fleets which patrolled the seas and protected the new trade routes. It was natural also that such land support should have been obtained by cession from the small local kingdoms in exchange for services rendered.

In the maze of feudal-type sovereignties among which Hindustan was divided, rivalry and strife among the small kingdoms and family disputes for the succession were constant. In fact, in Goa the Portuguese were the allies of the Hindus against the Mohammedans whose dominion and acts of oppression weighed heavily on local populations eager for liberation from their yoke. In the treaties negotiated with the local rulers, Portugal was content with permission to build a fortress and with such territory as was necessary for its defense; with recognition, as was the custom of the time, of the sovereignty of the King of Portugal through payment of a token tribute; and with freedom for missionaries to preach the faith. Given in exchange was the friendship of the King of Portugal—that is, the safety of the seas and ports and the freedom of commerce which his fleets guaranteed. No restrictions were imposed on local life and local institutions: these were such as existed, and they were left to their own natural evolution, influenced, of course, by the presence of the Christian and socially more advanced West.

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Thus, what was called the Portuguese Eastern Empire was an empire entirely *sui generis*—a sea empire which would cease with the seizing of commerce by competing nations and with the weakening of the sea power by which the commerce was canalized and protected. It may be said that the Empire came to an end when Portugal ceased to enjoy supremacy in those two factors. How, then, was the Eastern Empire lost while Goa remained Portuguese?

II

In the small stretches or pockets of territory which provided support and reserves for the fortresses and trading ports, the local populations continued to live with their customs, their officials and even their own authorities, though mingled with a large number of traders, troops, builders, shipbuilders, craftsmen, members of religious orders and numerous missionaries from Europe, some in transit, many of them permanent residents. Afonso de Albuquerque's "policy of marriages," which was designed to implement the idea of linking the people to the land through the creation of permanent interests and the setting up of legitimate family life, gave rise in time to a population in which Portuguese blood had widely mingled with that of local elements. At the same time, the Christian atmosphere, the Western culture, the transplantation of other customs and institutions, the spread of the language, the political relationship with a European country of standing, helped in the formation and deep rooting of a people which was perfectly differentiated from the ethnic groups of Hindustan.

Surprisingly, the adversaries of racial discrimination sometimes seek to classify Goans according to color, language, dress or religion. Some are Christians, others Hindus and still others Mohammedans. But what above all needs to be noted in Portuguese India is the mentality, the outlook on life, the spiritual atmosphere. No qualified traveller passing into Goa from the Indian Union can fail to gain the impression that he is entering an entirely different land. The way people think, feel and act is European. There may be no geographic or economic frontier but there is indubitably a human one: Goa is the transplantation of the West onto Eastern lands, the expression of Portugal in India.

From an early date this development had important conse-

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quences from the political and juridical standpoints. From the sixteenth century onwards, the regulations, royal letters and instructions dispatched overseas—and they were concerned with India in particular—provided for the expenditure of effort and money with a view to the integration of the different peoples in the Portuguese community. It is worth quoting a report submitted to the King by the Council of India early in the seventeenth century. One reads therein: "India and the other lands overseas with whose governments this Council is concerned are not distinct nor separate from this realm, nor yet do they belong to it by union, but they are members of the same realm as is the Algarve and any of the provinces of Alentejo and between Douro and Minho . . . and thus he who is born and lives in Goa or in Brazil or in Angola is as Portuguese as he who lives and is born in Lisbon." Several instructions were inspired by this concept and the same deep roots gave birth to the Law of 1761—passed when the United States had not yet attained independence—whereby the natives of Portuguese Asia were declared to be perfectly equal before the law to the Portuguese born in the Kingdom. This applied not only to Indians, whether Christian or not, but also to the descendants of Europeans and to Mohammedans.

It will thus be understood why the Goans do not anywhere consider or call themselves Indians but *Portuguese of Goa;* why they attend schools either there or in the metropolis; why they freely enter the professions; why they exercise public functions from the bureaucratic to those of the administration of justice; why they are appointed to commands and placed in positions of authority; why many of them become judges, ministers of state and governors of overseas territories; why they are represented in Parliament in perfect equality with all other Portuguese and without the slightest trace of racial discrimination.

This is the sociological, juridical and political reality with which the Indian Union is faced in the territories of Goa and which throws light on the character and development of events that have taken place there.

III

The Indian Union acquired its independence in August 1947 when Great Britain transferred to the governments of the two new dominions the powers till then it had exercised. Despite certain obscurities which may surround it, the process of inde-

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pendence reveals clearly the two following claims. The first was that India should have a constitution which should comprise the whole of British India—that is, the provinces directly administered by Great Britain and the numerous Indian States governed by princes regarded as British subjects.

The second claim is revealed by the determination of the leaders of the Congress Party to designate the new state as the Dominion of India—not the Dominion of Hindustan, as suggested by the British. This was undoubtedly so that it might more easily be considered as the legal inheritor of the contractual obligations of undivided India and of her representation in the United Nations and in other international bodies which she automatically joined by the very reason of her creation.

Failure attended the plan for an India politically entitled to represent the entire subcontinent, and two new states arose—the Indian Union and Pakistan. (Ceylon and Burma obtained their independence from the British Government separately and directly.) But the basic idea of the unity of India as a geographic expression and of her representation by the Indian Union continued to inspire the acts of the rulers of the Indian Union irrespective of the legal texts and beyond the moment when it ceased to be a political and juridical reality.

It was on the basis of this covert and veiled premise that the Government of the Indian Union approached Portugal in 1950 requesting that negotiations be opened with a view to the transfer of Goa to the sovereignty of the Indian Union. The Portuguese Government refused to negotiate the cession of the territories and peoples concerned on the constitutional grounds that the territories of Goa, Damão and Diu were an integral part of the Portuguese nation and that the State could nowise alienate any part of the national territory or of the rights of sovereignty which it exercises (Article 2 of the Constitution). Such was the counterpart of the process of integration which had developed and become defined in 450 years of common life. The constitutional text, after all, expresses no more than the political impossibility of a state voluntarily amputating itself, as though it did not constitute a moral unity.

Besides, and apart from the fact that there was no foundation for the request, to have assented to negotiation would have been to accept as legitimate the idea that the Indian Union represented India. This aspect of the problem is of the utmost gravity.

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To confer on the Indian Union the political representation of the geographic expression, India, is to undermine the very basis of the independent existence of Pakistan, if not of Ceylon and Burma, for all of these states could then be held to be illegitimate incrustations in the territory of the Union. The dangers of such a conception can hardly escape them, since their independence would acquire in the eyes of the Indian Union the same precariousness and illegality of which the Union accuses Portugal in regard to her Indian State.

Thus did the so-called Goa question arise. Once the diplomatic process had been exhausted, the question took on other aspects, all conducive to the exercise of external pressure for the purpose of forcing Portugal to accede to negotiations for the cession of Goa or of creating such unbearable conditions of existence for Goa that it would itself surrender.

IV

The Goa question is an artificial creation. It did not, of course, exist during the period of British rule; it did not exist even during the period after 1885 when the Indian National Congress adopted self-government as its main objective. Goa already enjoyed wider prerogatives within the Portuguese State than the Indians claimed for themselves from Great Britain. It would have been incomprehensible for the Goans to be associated, or to associate themselves, with political action which, in relation to Portugal, would be retrogressive and which, in relation to Britain, would not make sense. A "Goa question" could not arise; it arose in some minds only when the dream of independence created the false idea of the unity of India and of her possible territorial aggrandizement at the expense of preëxisting sovereignties.

It took time and a persistent campaign of incitement for the claim to spread from the restricted circle in which it had arisen to wider fields in which the press found it easy to exert its influence. The Goans remained aloof, and it would be a mistake to think that even among the people in the Indian Union there is any conscious or deep yearning for the territories of Portuguese India. Neither the masses nor the educated classes outside politics evince any interest in the question. Beyond its frontiers, notwithstanding the efforts employed to gain approval and support for its claims, the Indian Union failed to create among independent minds an atmosphere of support, of sympathy, or even

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of understanding, either when it claimed the *right* to Goa or when it denied Portugal the right to be with Goa in India.

The positions officially taken up by the Indian Union in defense of its "right" to Goa have varied with the circumstances, with the clarification of the problems involved, and with the theses successively maintained. I propose to mention the most salient, not in order to discuss but to classify them:

Goa is an internal political question for the Indian Union—a thesis which now appears to have been abandoned.

Goa is, for the Indian Union, a question of external policy with serious international implications (an allusion to the Anglo-Portuguese Treaties of Alliance and to the North Atlantic Treaty).

Goa is a domestic question for the Goans, who ought to be put in a position to decide their own destiny by the principle of self-determination: to be independent or to be integrated in the Indian Union. No other alternative is possible because, even if the Goans themselves wish to remain linked to Portugal, the Union (as has been officially declared) will not tolerate it.

Obviously, the Goans are given no real alternative under the last-named thesis since, once Goa's connection with Portugal had been severed, it would be deprived of the possibility of independent existence or of the power to resist absorption by the Indian Union. It may be added that this thesis is presented in the field of abstractions and outside the realm of the possible, for, in so far as plebiscites are concerned, it is well known that the Indian Union went back on the engagement it had entered into with France and has not, as yet, seen its way to carrying out that to which it bound itself with Pakistan.

But the question has also been formulated thus: that Portugal has no right to be in Goa. This argument is based on the accusation of "colonialism," which Goa—the residue of a colonial empire—was held to represent. It is well known how sensitive some countries are to this accusation; conversely, also, how in Asia, where great independent states have arisen in the last decade, anti-colonialism is still a strong sentiment, capable of instilling some degree of cohesion in various peoples pending the development of positive factors of union and solidarity. The sentiment is understandable, but this does not mean that the justification for the accusations should not be examined in each case.

Colonialism is an economic and political system which is susceptible of objective examination. It occurs in the field of reality;

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it may be said to be reducible to figures, to concrete facts and legal statutes. It has been argued that it implies a sovereign power foreign to the subjected territory; an economic enterprise for the benefit (to a larger or smaller extent) of the colonizing Power; political or military advantage; discrimination as between citizens and subjects, with their different rights; and, above all, the absence of political rights of the colonial peoples and their inability to intervene in metropolitan affairs. But it is not solely a matter of advantages, with no counterpart in the expenditure of wealth and in sacrifices. In fact, when it is conscious of its mission the colonizing country ensures peace, is responsible for maintaining order, organizes life, promotes economic development, invests capital, provides education, raises living standards and, as has been seen, even leads them to become worthy of independence. It may well be asked whether the same end would be reached as quickly in any other way.

To determine whether or not Goa is a case of colonialism, let us examine each of these elements as they relate to it.

Financially, Goa has always been a burden on the metropolitan treasury and almost from the beginning was considered by many to be ruinous for Portugal. It seems that the passage of the centuries was to confirm what Dom João de Castro wrote in 1540: the fortresses and castles absorbed the revenues of India and "such wealth as comes from Portugal." This situation has not changed even in our own times; Goa absorbs its revenues and, in addition, large subsidies from the metropolis.

From the economic point of view, neither the metropolitan people nor the metropolitan capital exploit Goa, nor do they enjoy any special privileges. In trade, the metropolitan share in Goan imports and exports has, on account of distance, been modest.

Juridically, there is no distinction between the Portuguese of Goa and the Portuguese of the European continent, the adjacent islands and the rest of the overseas territories. The Goans enjoy all rights, have access to all posts, carry out all functions and earn their living throughout the Portuguese territory.

Politically as well as legally Goa is an integral part of the Portuguese nation; as a province it enjoys administrative and financial autonomy. The Goans take part in the formation and working of the central organs of sovereignty on a basis of equality with all the other Portuguese nationals.

This is the situation, and it is indeed a remarkable one in view

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of the form which usually characterizes colonial expansion in the world and of the utilitarian and materialist ideas which in many places dominate political action.

Peoples have each their own character and do not all react in the same manner. The Portuguese have always revealed the tendency to create a morally united motherland with territories and peoples which in time would become incorporated in the nation; at no time was an impediment to this seen in racial or religious differences or in the dispersal of lands. Inclination of the spirit? Sentiment of the heart? Human fraternity? The truth is that the peoples in question have demonstrated throughout history the same living solidarity with Portugal as the branches of a tree have with its trunk and roots.

In the period during which Portugal was under Spanish domination (1580–1640), resistance to the Dutch and British in the East was carried on almost exclusively by the resources and people of Portuguese India herself rather than with support from the Kingdom. The struggle in Brazil against the Dutch, not to speak of the restoration of São Tomé and Angola, was the work of the Brazilian settlers rather than of the forces sent from the mother country. Thus was the spirit of a community asserted and consolidated. These are facts which give rise to problems in the sense that they create duties. The Portuguese Government has repeatedly affirmed that the problem of Goa is above all a moral one.

V

From what has been said it will surely be possible to see why the Portuguese Government is morally and juridically unable to negotiate the cession of Goa and, consequently, is in duty bound to defend it. It has also been found that the Goans have no wish to be freed from Portuguese sovereignty, first, owing to patriotic feeling, and secondly, for reasons of their own interest. This has created certain difficulties for the Indian Union.

The foreign policy of the Union is based on a professed pacifism reflecting ideological motives and the circumstances of its internal life. The treaty with China known as the Treaty of Tibet defined the fundamental principles which, in the opinion of both Powers, ought to regulate international life and ensure peace among nations. And among these principles—a version of those of the Charter of the United Nations, to which the Indian Union belongs—is that of peaceful coexistence.

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Since Portugal is not prepared to take hostile acts which might excuse aggression by the Indian Union, any military action or simply "police action" on the part of the Union against Goa would negate the moral basis of its position and discredit its policy. Therefore, the Government of the Union has sought desperately to achieve the cession of Goa by other means. It has failed within the scope of its avowed policy of peace because, even giving pacifism a very wide interpretation, the acts of the Union or of its agents always result in the negation of one or another of the Tibet principles or of the principles of the United Nations.

It is not worthwhile to give here an account of those acts, proclaimed by the Union to have been peaceful but regarded elsewhere as acts of aggression against Goa and the Goans. Presumably they are known. Yet they are part of a long history of bad neighborliness, of campaigns conducted by the strong against the weak for coveted territories.

To none of these acts has the Portuguese Government responded with the slightest act of retaliation, even where such retaliation would have been particularly hurtful to the Indian Union. Portugal has confined herself to organizing defense within her own territory and to counteracting the effects of the worst measures taken by the Indian Union against the persons, property or interests of the Goans. At this moment the hope of the Union is that the measures adopted will finally exhaust Goa and force it to surrender. The attitude of Portugal is to make the necessary sacrifices but without placing an inordinate strain on her energies, in order that the situation may be maintained indefinitely if necessary.

VI

So far I have dealt with the case of Goa as a conflict which has brought the Indian Union into opposition with Portugal over a restricted territory. But these aspects of the problem are no more than the foreground wherein this and many other questions are developing in Asia. Behind the Indian Union's claim is the backdrop of the whole question of Europe's relations with Asia and eventually Africa.

During the last centuries, Europe dominated Asia economically and in part politically. That this was done solely for European profit can hardly be said with justification; however this may be, a basic nationalistic reaction throughout Asia as a whole has

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developed and is putting an end in our time to a historic period in which the conduct of the affairs of Asia was led by Europe. The process continues. Japan has lost the leadership of the movement, but it goes on. The objective to be attained is the independence of the peoples and their organization into states free from European interference; the basic sentiment is against the extinct colonial régime and, by extension, against the white man who symbolizes it. Such reactions are not wont to maintain just measure; they will go beyond the limits of what wise men consider prudent. From this grave complications are arising.

The first is this: the East comprises communities or states not exclusively Asian in origin; it includes those with European roots and influences—Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, to mention only the chief ones (since Goa might also be included). Anti-Western feeling, a hatred of Europe and of the West in general, unjustified though it is, engenders suspicion among some of these peoples. In any case, it will not be possible to establish complete solidarity on so negative a sentiment.

States at the outset of their independent existence cannot straightaway show the cohesion or internal unity of the old nations. Their heterogeneous character and the contrasting levels of civilization among their people are at present a cause of fragility and a source of internal difficulties. The huge areas, the many tens or hundreds of millions in which their peoples are counted, provide the basis for their becoming Great Powers, but their strength cannot yet be proportionate to the size of their territories and their peoples. This state of affairs creates inhibitions and fear of a return of the West. Though real, these fears are groundless; history is neither undone nor remade. But in relations between peoples fear acts at times like hatred. To weaken the West by every means thus appears to Asia to increase its own strength.

The colonial past of these countries has not sufficed for the rational organization and methodical exploitation of all their enormous potential wealth. Abundant capital and ample technical assistance are essential to them. In order to effect a saving in the time necessary for the internal formation of both, recourse will have to be had to the countries which still retain capitalist and industrial superiority. This, in turn, gives rise to the fear that, through close economic coöperation, the door to political domination will be opened once again.

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In this atmosphere, the slogans of unhealthy propaganda are developing miasma-like. Russia, whom Asians fear (possibly because they recognize that she practises colonialism in the vast territories of central Asia), offers to aid in the "liberation" of other peoples and takes the lead in the struggle against "capitalist imperialism," trying to force into partnership with her those who need that capitalism to live.

These symptoms may disappear, indeed in time they doubtless will disappear provided retrogressive factors do not intervene. Asia has always been a world of hermetic civilizations. To open the Asian continent to wide contacts with the West is held above all to constitute a violation of the will of its peoples, who are led to believe that the advantages do not compensate for the disadvantages. There has been, it is true, interpenetration of cultures, more extensive and more profound in some cases than in others. But certain principles in the social structure and culture of the Asian peoples have remained intact. The problem is this: Left to themselves, how will they react before the great problems of life? And how will they finally organize their own lives?

The dominant classes in Asia were educated in Europe; their outlook is Western. They have imported Western institutions into most of the Asian nations. These nations belong to and take part in the work of world organizations. On the other hand, the world is advancing in the direction of uniformity. Herein lies the difficulty. Is there not a possibility that ancestral habits of thought and action may break through the veneer of Westernization? The question is put. No answer is given.

European positions in Asia having been almost entirely liquidated, we now see the new states preparing indiscriminately to instigate subversive movements all over Africa, as if conditions were identical in the various regions of that continent or similar to those prevailing among the Asiatic peoples who have gained their independence. Since Bandung, this movement is quite openly led by the Indian Union.

Apart from the four or five independent states which are to be found in Africa, and apart from the Mediterranean seaboard of that continent where there is a movement to hasten the process of evolution toward a system of autonomous governments or associated independent states, it may be said that Africa lives and must continue for an unforeseeable time to live under the control and guidance of a civilized state. Notwithstanding the

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political experiments which Britain has recently promoted in limited areas, the major sections of Africa consist of territories which depend on European states and lack the conditions necessary for existence as independent, democratic nations. Public administration and the guidance of labor is unavoidably in the hands of a small minority of Europeans. Their tasks cannot be abandoned or handed over to the indigenous elements indiscriminately and all at once. Transfers of sovereignty are conceivable there, but not the abandonment of it. Herein is the problem.

Asiatic anti-colonialism seeks above all just now to arouse the sympathy and solidarity of the Mohammedan peoples, themselves engaged in finding solutions for certain concrete problems. The Indian Union is aware of the facts, but it mistakenly thinks that its interests are to be served by precipitate movements to organize African colored communities into independent states.

The whole East Coast of Africa (including Madagascar) and South Africa provide an important field for Indian immigration and settlement. The real interest of a country like the Indian Union, which is saddled with an extremely dense population, would seem to be to promote the peaceful diversion of some elements of its population, which in turn would become a source of revenue and contribute to progress at home. For this, however, it should neither seek to take advantage of the prevailing stability in those areas to promote a clash with the rights or interests of the ruling country, nor to take the place of the Europeans, but on the contrary to collaborate with them. That is to say, emigration from the Indian Union should not have any political objective as now appears to be the case. If any subversive acts tending to bring about the expulsion of the white man should succeed, it is doubtful if the claims of the Indians would be respected. When, therefore, Russia supports Asian efforts to oust the Europeans from Africa, she knows that she will not merely weaken Europe but at the same time may perhaps nullify the expansionist ambitions of the Indian Union. Not all who loudly proclaim anti-colonialism are conscious of what it would mean in Africa if it were to be put fully into practice. The West cannot be absolved on the ground of ignorance.

VII

But to go back to Goa. If this case of Goa is to be brought to an end, at least as an acute crisis and source of conflict between

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Portugal and the Indian Union, there would seem to be only three possible ways out, one of them violent, the other two essentially pacific.

The violent decision would be for the Indian Union to undertake integration by force; that is, for the Indian Union to make war on Portugal in Goa. It cannot be doubted that she has the means to take possession of Goa against such resistance as the Portuguese forces there might be able to offer. In view of the inevitability of this result and the small territorial and economic value of the Province in relation to the remainder of the Portuguese Commonwealth, many will ask themselves why Portugal should resist. The reason is that such is Portugal's moral duty.

Of the peaceful solutions, one would be for the Indian Union to *ignore* Goa. As a solution it is unnatural, because the territories are neighbors, the inhabitants have affinities and trade and other interests are reciprocal or interlocked. Nevertheless it is a possible way out, although in violation of the United Nations Charter, since there can be no good neighborliness where the existence of the neighbor is ignored. Apart from this, no problem would be created for the Indian Union by Goa's disappearance from the field of Indian preoccupations. Trade, navigation, transit, immigration, transfers of funds—all would disappear. There could be no more assaults, invasions, organized terrorism, press attacks, marches, aggressive mass meetings. Purely and simply Goa would not exist as far as the Indian Union was concerned—as though it were wiped out in some great cataclysm. (Certain consequences, to be sure, such as those resulting from the fact that many tens of thousands of Goans live in the Indian Union, would have to be faced.)

The third and only genuine solution of the problem, in so far as it can be solved between two responsible states, would be open negotiations on all those points at which proximity and intercourse create risks or can give rise to friction. The Portuguese Government has singled out some such points; others may be of interest to the Indian Union. And if there were no other thought on either side than "to live and let live," it would surely be possible to find formulas for peaceful if not amicable relations—points at which interests converge and solutions for existing or possible disagreements. I believe that only along this route will the Indian Union grow in stature, consolidate its position and bring credit to its announced policy of peace.

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INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

By Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit

AFTER eight years of independence India's foreign policy still gives rise to grave doubts in the Western mind. The reason for this is the acceptance of old definitions rather than an appreciation of the country's background and its human aspirations. The word "neutrality" as applied to India's foreign policy has little meaning. Like a hundred other oft-repeated words it has become blunted with use, and can be related to India only in the context of her past and present policies. What does neutrality—or, as we prefer to call it, non-alignment—mean and why does India follow this path?

As in dress, there are fashions in political outlook and behavior and the individual who wears last year's model at a gathering is regarded not only as eccentric but something approaching a freak. India, it would seem, has entered the elegant international drawing room in old clothes and is an embarrassing misfit among those already assembled there. Why does she continue to embarrass the leaders of society when they have pointed out to her that she would be far more acceptable if she were fashionably in step with them?

In our assessment of the world situation, we, like other nations, find ourselves confronted by two alternatives. One is the belief that peace can be maintained by building up military might and held in balance by an armaments race. The other is the view that it can be preserved only by peaceful means, that the armaments race endangers its preservation, and that no stone must be left unturned to lessen the tensions that exist in the world. To us it seems logical that the latter is the surer way to safeguard the peace. Our approach to peace might then be called "neutrality" if such a nebulous word can be used to define a policy which since its inception in an independent India has been both active and dynamic. In essence our neutrality is the unjaundiced outlook we choose to apply to all international issues, believing that if we approach a problem with a calm mind our vision will be clearer and the result more fruitful. It is true that in an atomic age of cut-and-dried formulas and decisions backed by the authority of power such a policy has the disadvantage of not fitting neatly into any prescribed formula. It reserves unto

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itself the right to judge each question as it arises on its merits, but it has the great advantage of being free from prejudice and fear.

This particular approach to peace is not new to India. It is her traditional outlook, both philosophical and historical. Philosophically it took shape as early as the sixth century B.C. when Gautama Buddha condemned violence in all its forms and sought through the example of his own renunciation a solution to human suffering. The religion he inspired spread far beyond India's borders into Ceylon, China, Japan, Indo-China and Siam. Buddhist civilization linked the countries of Asia, giving them a common heritage, much as Christianity binds the Western world today and has done since its early remarkable spread over Europe.

Historically the peaceful approach found its most celebrated exponent in the Emperor Asoka in the third century B.C. In the process of waging a series of bloody wars to extend his domain, he became suddenly conscious of the futility of war. At the height of his military glory he renounced war as a method of conquest and adopted the Buddhist creed of non-violence both as a national and international policy. The inscribed pillars he had erected all over India and the edicts he had carved on rock faces bear witness to his repentance and compassion for all living things. From then on his relations with neighboring countries were confined to the missionaries he sent abroad to spread the teachings of the Buddha.

The message of the Buddha created the culture patterns and led to the meditative approach of Asia for a thousand years after Asoka. It was responsible for the peace that generally prevailed among the Buddhist countries of the ancient world and continued into very recent times. It is a noteworthy fact that the countries of Asia have through the centuries of their recorded history maintained for the most part cordial relations with one another. Their contacts have been commercial, cultural and religious. Scholars, missionaries and travellers have followed the ancient caravan routes bearing messages from their lands or in search of knowledge from other lands, and those who recorded their travels have left detailed accounts of the welcome and honors they received as guests in strange countries. Among them were the two Chinese pilgrims, Fa Hien in the fourth century A.D. and Hiuen Tsiang in the seventh century A.D., who walked

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across Central Asia into India in search of authoritative Buddhist works. Hiuen Tsiang, an eminent scholar himself, studied for many years at the then already historic Buddhist University of Nalanda, famous throughout Asia for its high standard of learning. There has been no history of prolonged and painful conflict between the Asian countries as there has been in the Western world, where the countries of Europe, relentlessly divided, have carried on an almost unceasing struggle for power and supremacy, and where numerous religious wars, wars of succession and wars over trade have been fought. While conflict has been the general rule throughout European history, and peace has been confined to periods between wars, in Asia the reverse has been the case. Because of this background the Asian nations, now independent, can renew their old cultural contacts with ease, regarding each other as peaceful neighbors rather than as potential enemies. There has been no inherited legacy of conflict to mar their present outlook.

It has been our special fortune to have in our midst in recent times a noble son of India and a great interpreter of our traditional approach. But an approach, however revered, must find its flowering in visible examples if it is to have a practical value for the people who subscribe to it. Mahatma Gandhi has been for us that practical example, bringing politics to the more humble and more human level of individual behavior. Gandhi made India's destiny the individual responsibility of every citizen. He believed in a very literal sense that human beings were the nation and that the behavior of every individual ultimately molded the fate of his country. The fact that his insistence on ethics and his creed of non-violence brought freedom to India by means of a unique revolution indicates that his were not the dreams of a visionary. On the contrary he proved that the peaceful approach still had a dynamic significance for our own era, that bloodshed was not the only way, even in an age of violence, for a nation to conduct its struggle for independence. By casting out antagonism from his own view and insisting that his followers do the same, he laid the foundations for the coöperation that continues today between free India and Great Britain. We value this contact with Britain because in a world so sadly divided friendship between nations is a thing to be guarded and nurtured. But more even than the contact, we value the approach that has made it possible. We are convinced not merely that it can prove

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an asset on the wider international plane but that it is the only method that will guarantee a lasting peace.

At the recent session of the Congress Party in Amritsar, our Prime Minister voiced this conviction while moving a resolution in honor of the 2,500th anniversary of the *parinirvana* (death) of the Buddha. He pointed out that the question facing humanity was whether or not it stood by the message of the Buddha and of Mahatma Gandhi both in the national and international spheres. It was a choice, he said, between peace and the hydrogen bomb.

In an earlier period the accepted definition of neutrality was passive—a state of "no-war." But now the uncommitted nations are more positive in their approach. They wish to participate fully in all activities which promote peace and for this reason they are willing to assume considerable responsibility in international affairs. India is an active member of the United Nations and willingly offers her service when it is needed to ease tension and promote good will. It was in this hope that she accepted the responsibility of the chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea and more recently the chairmanship of the Supervisory Commission for Indo-China. Thus her chosen rôle demands that she exert herself in whatever capacity offers itself in the interests of peace. Her neutrality itself implies involvement in its cause.

Can India's rôle have a real influence on the peace of the world? The answer does not lie with India alone. So long as the approach to peace lies through military pacts and greater weapons of destruction India's rôle must remain limited and world peace continue to remain just beyond reach.

This is the policy to which we adhere for two reasons. Firstly, because our need for peace is imperative. It is not merely desirable or preferable, it is a vital necessity and a daily prayer. We have problems to face in India that would tax the energies and resources of a nation far better equipped and developed than ours. We need peace not in order to become more powerful or more prosperous, but in order to exist. We need it in order to eat, to be clothed, and housed and made literate. We need it for these basic unadorned reasons and we will not jeopardize their realization by even a remote word or action that might add to the unhappy tensions that already exist.

Secondly, we choose this way because we reject completely

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the psychology of threat and its by-product, fear. We do not subscribe to the widely-held belief that the affairs of nations can be successfully conducted on a military level. In the world's recent history there is abundant evidence to prove that neither threats of superior force nor displays of armed might have been able to create the climate in which peace can take root. The great malady which affects humanity today is fear, born of tensions following the armaments race. Fear is a bad counsellor and reduces those who fall within its grasp to a state in which no positive action is possible. To keep fear at its lowest ebb even if it cannot be wholly eliminated is India's ceaseless endeavor.

In a world of conflicting ideologies there is, to our way of thinking, no civilized method of living in harmony with those who disagree with us but that of peaceful coexistence. To this end we uphold the Pancha Shila or five principles, first so named in the preamble of our treaty with China regarding Tibet, signed in 1954, but since then accepted by other countries as a code of international morality. Coexistence is one of the principles incorporated in *Pancha Shila,* the others being respect for the territorial and integral sovereignty of others, nonaggression, noninterference in the internal affairs of others and the recognition of the equality of others.

Because of our faith in the efficacy of this outlook we remain in the Commonwealth—an example that an association of nations can exist, mutually beneficial to one another, without necessarily having an identity of opinions. Because of it, too, we support the United Nations as a focal point of international relations, and seek to enlarge its membership. This, also, is the reason why we support the entry into it of the People's Republic of China, for without Asia's largest nation in its councils the United Nations is not a truly representative body. In pursuance of our policy of peaceful coexistence we have urged the banning of nuclear weapons and the limitation of conventional armaments, and have deplored any pact or treaty that has been based on a military approach. Pacts such as those of Manila and Baghdad can only heighten the world's fever, not cool it.

The concept of coexistence has a special significance for the countries of Asia and Africa in their dealings with one another. For the first time in history they meet and discuss matters relating to themselves as independent nations. The Bandung Conference has highlighted the efficacy of coexistence, proving it

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both worthwhile and workable. At Bandung, despite differences in political status, policy and viewpoint, 29 Asian and African countries sought each other's aid and experience on a basis of mutual coöperation. Their policies ranged from membership in NATO to close alliance with the Soviet Union, but this did not come in the way of mutual respect and friendship. They agreed to provide each other with technical assistance, to promote trade and joint financial ventures, and to renew their ancient cultural contacts through the exchange of delegations. Alike, they deplored racial discrimination wherever it existed and supported the right of all peoples to self-determination. The most outstanding result of the conference was its unanimous declaration on the promotion of world peace. These Asian and African countries, some newly emerged to independence though they were, industrially backward, militarily insecure and financially poor, did, nevertheless, accomplish a feat of coöperation.

Among the issues agreed upon at Bandung was a unanimous condemnation of colonialism. Of this Goa is a flagrant example, for Goa is as much a part of India as Dover is British and Marseilles French. When Britain withdrew from India and France from her possessions of Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahé and Yanam it was hoped that Portugal too, recognizing the signs of the times, would similarly and gracefully withdraw. That she did not do so poses a situation for which there is no rational explanation. Premier Salazar has said that Portuguese rule must remain in order that Goa "might continue to be a memorial to Portuguese discoveries and a small hearth of the Western spirit in the East." Surely the Western spirit in the East should be associated with good will and not with a totalitarian régime harshly imposed on an unwilling people. The spirit of Britain that endures in India is that of her democratic institutions and traditions, her sense of fair play and her celebrated justice. The French spirit endures in her onetime possessions in India in the shape of a continued reverence for the French language and culture. The Portuguese, if they believe they are contributing to the cause of Western civilization in the East, are perpetuating a bitter and tragic farce. The East welcomes the West, but as a friend and equal, not as a master. In Goa today there is unhappy evidence of a dictatorial alien régime not accepted by the people.

Goans are Indians. Racially they are indistinguishable from the people of the neighboring districts of Bombay State. The in-

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habitants of Daman and Diu are Gujaratis. According to the Portuguese census statistics of 1951, European settlers numbered 517, those of mixed blood 562, and Indians 636,153. Their mother tongue is not Portuguese but Konkani in Goa and Gujarati in Daman and Diu. Not more than 8 percent of the entire population has even a slight knowledge of Portuguese. Less than a third of the population is Roman Catholic, and even these have more in common with the five million Catholics elsewhere in India who enjoy full religious freedom than with the Portuguese. It is significant that whereas the Archbishop of Goa is a Portuguese, the first Indian Cardinal is a Goan. There are more Goan officers in the Indian Army than there are Goan privates in the Portuguese army, and these privates can never aspire to any rank higher than that of a sergeant.

Goa is a part of the Indian economy and dependent upon it. Premier Salazar has himself admitted that Portugal's share in her trade is only 10 percent of imports and 1 percent of exports. Nearly the entire Goan middle class is dependent on India for higher education and for jobs. Over 150,000 Goans live and work in India and it is their remittances that have formed the foundation of Goan economy. Though the soil is fertile, only a third of the arable land is cultivated and the rice produced meets less than half the local demand. Despite recent mining of iron ore and manganese, the imports are four times greater than the exports. In 1952 the Portuguese, suddenly aware of their failure in these various fields, formulated a Six Year Plan, but in this Plan over 60 percent of the expenditure was reserved for the construction of airfields and the development of strategic communications.

Goa to this day has not been permitted representative government. The Governor-General is assisted by an Advisory Council of 12 members of whom seven are nominated and five elected by the wealthiest taxpayers. He submits to this Council as and when he thinks fit, referring any adverse vote to the government at Lisbon. A Legislative Council was established in March 1953 but no mode of elections has yet been worked out. Portuguese possessions in India elect two deputies to the Assemblies at Lisbon but the franchise is limited to about 3 percent of the total population. A strict censorship both of internal and foreign mail is maintained, and no criticism of the government, including that on purely local issues, is permitted in the press. All political

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activity is forbidden and the constitution and executive personnel of even social associations require official approval. Such repression cannot long continue in an age when the entire Asian continent is waking to freedom and self-expression. Issues that were once judged in terms of power and prestige can now only be decided in human terms.

The natural outcome of Portuguese rule has been an increased desire for freedom on the part of the Goans. In July 1954 a small body of unarmed Goans, supported by their people, succeeded in disarming the Portuguese police who were equipped with automatic weapons, and took over the administration of Dadra and Nagar Haveli in Daman. In the *satyagraha* that followed against the Portuguese authorities over 2,500 Goans, both men and women, Catholics and Hindus, were arrested and many subjected to brutal treatment. Nearly 500 are still in prison, 240 are serving long terms after summary trials by military tribunals and 14 have been deported to Portugal and her African colonies.

In August 1955 an unarmed band of Indians and Goans tried to cross the border into Goa to offer peaceful *satyagraha.* In the firing that followed 24 were killed, many more injured and 31 Indian nationals, one of whom was a Member of Parliament, were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The fate of these fellow-Indians naturally stirred strong feelings in India, but the government of India while sympathizing fully with Goan aspirations, stands by its principle of non-violence; it refrained from using military measures in the face of grave provocation and put a ban on the entry of the non-violent resisters to prevent further deterioration of the situation. Addressing Parliament on this question, the Prime Minister said that the problem of Goa would be tackled within the framework of India's peace policy, without resort to military measures.

The right of all peoples to self-determination is no longer a matter of opinion. It is an established fact which the United Nations Charter recognizes and which has been accepted by its member nations. Freedom is not a prize to be offered for good behavior or a commodity to be withheld for the pleasure or the profit of the ruler. If the word is to have any meaning it cannot be denied to any portion of the world's people for any reason whatsoever. The tremendous revolution that is stirring Asia and Africa has at last given the peoples of these mighty continents the opportunity of expressing themselves with newly-found con-

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fidence and dignity and they will be satisfied with nothing less than their birthright. This is not the time when any man can ride astride another or be his master. It is the time to bury false notions of prestige and act in terms of human welfare. We make a plea for the peaceful and friendly solution of this problem so that bitterness may cease and the dark shadow of conflict which threatens may be lifted. There is no alternative to coexistence but tragedy—tragedy as devastating for the powerful as for the humbler nations.

In conclusion, I should like to draw attention to one of the main factors which have contributed to the position which the West occupies in the modern world. It is great today because it has sustained a deep faith in man, the individual and his destiny, because it has worked for the uplifting of the human spirit and believed in its guiding power. Material power itself has developed because of this guiding force. What we need is a closer understanding between the nations of the world based on the working out in practice of the great proposition which America has given the world, that all men are created equal and possess inalienable rights. To forget this at such a time as we are passing through would lead to grave consequences. Since its inception in America, this proposition has become the common heritage of mankind and independent India has based her own constitution on it. Today she bases her foreign policy upon a similar concept hoping that, in the words of the Greek poet, it will help to "hold a hand uplifted over hate."

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

By Robert Cutler

DURING the Eisenhower Administration, the National Security Council has emerged as a mechanism of the executive branch of the federal government for advising the President on matters of high policy, equal in importance to the Cabinet. The solid establishment and effective functioning of this relatively new organ at the apex of government is a current phenomenon of America's political economy.

The National Security Council was created by the National Security Act of 1947 and first began to function in late September 1947. An account of its origin, characteristics, composition and current rôle has recently been given by Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.[1] Because it is Mr. Anderson's function to operate the Council mechanism for the President—as it was mine before his day—he is particularly qualified to tell that story. While it is not here necessary to repeat all that is there so clearly set forth, it will be desirable at the outset to summarize certain essential aspects of the National Security Council.

The Council, unlike the Cabinet, had from its birth the legislative sanction of an Act of Congress. Under its statutory charter, the Council is concerned only in policy matters affecting the security of the nation. The Cabinet, by reasonable accommodation, handles other vast policy areas such as Agriculture, Labor, Post Office, Interior, Health, Education and Welfare, Civil Service, much of Justice and Commerce, and so forth. The Council's purpose is to integrate the manifold aspects of national security policy (such as foreign, military, economic, fiscal, internal security, psychological) to the end that security policies finally recommended to the President shall be both representative and fused, rather than compartmentalized and several. The Council's rôle is advisory only. It recommends; it does not decide. Whatever security policy may be finally approved by the President, after such modifications or rejections of the Council's views as he may determine, is the policy, not of the Council, but of the Chief Executive.

[1] "The President and National Security," *The Atlantic*, January 1956.

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The individuals who now regularly attend Council meetings and who come as ad hoc participants for particular items on the agenda are those to whom—because of their offices, knowledge and capacity to contribute—the President would be most likely to turn for advice in the field of national security. The Chairman of the Council, President Eisenhower, has made it clear that he regards the Council as a "corporate body," consisting of officials who are advising the President in their own right and not simply as the heads of their respective departments. And he expects the Council members to "seek, with their background and experience, the most statesmanlike answer to the problems of national security, rather than to attempt solutions which represent a mere compromise of agency positions."

Statistics are not, of course, a criterion of value, but they provide a useful quantitative measure. As of January 20, 1956, the National Security Council had been in existence a little over eight and one-quarter years. During this period the Council held 273 meetings and at them took 1,508 separate policy actions. Of these totals, 128 of the meetings were held and 699 of the policy actions were taken in the five and one-quarter years of the Truman Administration and 145 of the meetings and 809 of the policy actions were recorded in the three years of the Eisenhower Administration.

To illustrate a point which is made later on, let me add one more statistic. The Eisenhower Administration on January 20, 1956, completed 156 weeks in office. During its first 115 weeks, the Council met 115 times (compared with 82 Cabinet meetings for the same period). In the 41 following weeks—which included, of course, the long period of the President's absence in Denver and his subsequent stay in Gettysburg—the Council met 30 times (in comparison with 27 Cabinet meetings for the same period).

These figures point up certain things that must be understood if one is to appreciate the operation of the National Security Council mechanism.

Fundamentally, the Council is a vehicle for a President to use in accordance with its suitability to his plan for conducting his great office. The Congress provided the vehicle, but it is in the President's discretion to do with it what he wishes.

The National Security Act of 1947 not only defines purposes and functions of the Council; it also designates certain persons who will be members of the Council—the President, the Vice

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President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. There is serious doubt in some minds, certainly in mine, whether Congress has the Constitutional power to direct or require the Chief Executive to take counsel with particular advisers in reaching decisions on particular subjects. But this Constitutional question has never been pressed. Each President to whom the Council vehicle has been available has found it useful and convenient.

Mr. Truman and General Eisenhower availed themselves of its convenience in very different ways. But a peculiar virtue of the National Security Act is its flexibility. Within the Act's broad, far-sighted bounds, each President may use the Council as *he* finds most suitable at a given time. There was not intended, nor can there be deduced, any invidious comparison by stating the comparative statistics given above. On the contrary, the comparison illustrates the Act's flexibility.

During the 1952 election campaign, General Eisenhower referred in two major speeches to the National Security Council. He proposed, when elected, to give vital significance to its operations, to use it as a principal mechanism for aiding the Chief Executive in making decisions on matters of high and necessarily secret policy. Candidate Eisenhower looked forward to a Council which would be a continuous, positive and generating force.

When he became President, General Eisenhower transformed the Council into a forum for vigorous discussion against a background of painstakingly prepared and carefully studied papers. He likes nothing better than the flashing interchange of views among his principal advisers. Out of the grinding of these minds comes a refinement of the raw material into valuable metal; out of the frank assertion of differing views, backed up by preparation that searches every nook and cranny, emerges a resolution that reasonable men can support. Differences of views which have developed at lower levels are not swept under the rug, but exposed. In fact, it is the particular task of the Special Assistant to the President to sharpen and make more precise and provocative any divergences that may exist so that the pros and cons can be accurately discussed and explored before the President at the Council meeting. In devising policy under our democratic form of government, reasonable accommodation may be required, but never soft compromise.

Vigor characterizes the exchange of views at the Council table.

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But there has not cropped up from such vigor any wrangling or bitterness or hurt pride at failure of a certain view to prevail. The fair, sensible temper of the Chairman, his obvious and sincere search for constructive interchanges, invest the meetings with a high quality. In such a climate, little or selfish advocacies seem out of place.

President Eisenhower is at home in this kind of operation. The old soldier is accustomed to well-staffed work. While I was Special Assistant, 95 percent of the matters to be considered by the Council at its weekly meetings were presented orally or visually on the basis of previously-circulated papers, the substance of which had been thrashed out at the next highest level over weeks, sometimes even months, of preparation. The Special Assistant acts as Chairman of the Council's Planning Board, upon which each Council member is represented at Assistant Secretary level and through which at its meetings three times a week passes all material to be considered by the Council. In the acid bath of the Planning Board, all points of view are represented, heard, explored and contested. There is in this process a guarantee against *ex parte* judgments, against imprecise guidance to the Chief Executive and against suppression of conflicting views.

Like every human instrumentality, the performance of the Planning Board depends upon its members' capabilities, their intellectual fibre and their willingness to work long, hard hours day after day. Each member is nominated by the department or agency head, and, when approved by the Special Assistant, is appointed by the President himself. The higher the calibre and quality of the men in the Planning Board, the better integrated are the ideas and the more succinctly and revealingly stated are the papers containing them upon which the Council will deliberate.

II

In praising the flexibility of the National Security Act earlier, I pointed to the Council's different use under Truman and under Eisenhower. This flexibility is also well illustrated by different utilizations of the Council by President Eisenhower himself. During his first two years in office, it was necessary to pick up and reexamine all the policies of the prior Administration which were still in effect at Inauguration Day. Were these policy directives still adequate and proper? If not, how should they be changed? This heavy load of reëxamination and often of restatement had

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to be carried simultaneously with the performance of exacting tasks in three other rings under the Big Tent. We were continually examining over-all national security policy; we were making recurring assessment and appraisal (as called for by the Statute) of "the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power;" and we were coping with the day-to-day crises and issues which are created as history evolves. Such a swelling volume of work required those 115 Council meetings during the first 115 weeks of this Administration.

But there came a time, following the end of its second year in office, when this Administration had accumulated a reservoir of basic policies and forward strategy. Mr. Anderson, in his *Atlantic* article, pointed out that these policies, "though not inflexible and always subject to constant review and revision from time to time, nevertheless [did] represent certain fundamental concepts and . . . identified guidelines for those departments in Government which are responsible for action." Against this background, it was possible for the Council to enter its second phase under Eisenhower. There would be less driving pressure; more time would be made free for discussion. The President looked forward to this second phase, not as a change of road, but as a turn in the same road and as an alteration in pace.

Soon after the second phase began, the President's illness occurred. For two months he was not in a position to preside over a Council meeting. But the Council continued to function during his Colorado vacation and his later illness, holding during these three and one-half months ten meetings, with the Vice President in the chair. The reservoir of accumulated policy guidance then stood the nation in good stead. Mr. Anderson puts it thus: "The heads of the various departments are in a position to carry on during such times with full knowledge of the continued validity of the broad policy concepts established by the President in the cumulative experience of the NSC. . . . The continued functioning of Government in such periods under a body of established policy exemplifies, in a real sense, the principle which John Adams wrote into the Massachusetts Constitution in 1780—that ours is a Government of laws and not of men."

When the Eisenhower Administration took office in January 1953, the Council was relatively young. For this reason, it was possible to mould its procedures to accommodate a maximum

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work-load and effective performance. Thus, a regular meeting day and hour (Thursdays at 10 in the morning) was early established so as to free a period in each future week from interference of other engagements. Likewise, a "forward" agenda was circulated weekly by the Special Assistant, with topics frequently scheduled months ahead in order to allow thorough, orderly study and preparation in the responsible agencies and then in the Planning Board. Again, there were circulated, well in advance of each Council meeting, a detailed agenda for that meeting and copies of the policy recommendations to be taken up under the respective items.

Except for a current intelligence briefing, which opened each Council meeting, and for occasional emergency items for which there was little or even no time for advance preparation, items were presented for Council deliberation on the basis of carefully staffed and carefully written documents. For convenience, a routine format for policy statements was developed. Thus, the busy reader would always know where to find the covering letter, the general considerations, the objectives, the courses of action to carry out the objectives, the financial appendices, the supporting staff study; for they invariably appeared in this sequence in the final document. Lastly, immediately after each Council meeting, the Special Assistant was responsible for drafting a brief record of action, summarizing what had taken place at the meeting; and, to obtain the benefit of the views of those who attended the meeting, circulated the draft to them before submitting it to the President. The record of action is a critically important document. When approved by the President, as presented to or as modified by him, it records the policy of the United States on the matters covered therein.

The standardization of these techniques made it possible for the Council to transact, week in and week out, an enormously heavy load of work.

The Cabinet also began gradually to change its character. At the outset, its loose informality stood in frank contrast to the Council operation, but it was soon found that many things were getting discussed at Cabinet meetings but not getting settled. With characteristic impulse to make any operation related to him as useful and effective as possible, President Eisenhower set about to reform Cabinet procedures. The Cabinet began to step away from an easygoing debating society toward an advisory

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body addressing itself to precise points. On its horizon, there appeared: a Cabinet Secretary; a pre-meeting agenda; advance circulation of papers to be discussed, presented in a standard format; meetings of representatives of the Cabinet members with the Cabinet Secretary; a post-meeting statement of decisions taken. The influence of the young brother, the Council, upon the operating procedures of the Cabinet has been striking and beneficial. I have stressed these operational aspects of the Council and their gradual infection of the ancient Cabinet's procedure because they have far-reaching effect.

The effective integration of all germane considerations bearing on a particular policy issue *requires* that the presentation of it to and discussions by the Council shall be on the basis of carefully staffed papers, prepared through a representative, searching procedure such as is now carried on by the Council's Planning Board. A principal danger at the top level of government is that the required discussion may be based on a presentation that is one-sided (however earnestly proposed) or that lacks a critical analysis in which all agencies freely participate at the formative stage. The complexity and variety of the agenda items presented at a single Council meeting underline the risk which may attend decisions based on inadequate, nonrepresentative preparation or on the failure of participants to have studied and grasped the material prepared for their advance consideration. Without adequate preparation, few men have the over-all perspective to deal with long-range security issues.

Of course, disadvantages attend the method of continuous presentation through carefully staffed papers. There is a tendency toward formality and stylization. There is eliminated the informal "kicking about" of a problem at the Council meeting. But these disadvantages are more than offset by the likelihood that a more sure, decisive result will be achieved when considerations are based on an exactly prepared and commonly understood statement of facts and recommendations. There is no question whatsoever in my mind that policy action is profitable when it is based on precisely worded, carefully studied and well presented written material. A goal of the Council under the present Administration is to achieve this type of operation.

When such a goal is achieved, the President has a working mechanism from which to obtain carefully integrated and representative advice. He also has in the Council an admirable refuge

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from one-sided pressure to decide some issue. An *ex parte* presentation may or may not present all the facts. An omission may come from ignorance or inadvertence or it may be partisan. But at the Council table all sides are present. Here, together in give-and-take argument, are the President's principal advisers, stating their views before each other and before the President, upon whom rests the burden of decision; questioning and being questioned; each having his free, full opportunity to speak before the die is cast. This kind of thing seems to me the quintessence of democracy in action, admirably suited to the genius of our free institutions.

It may be appropriate here to describe the functioning of another part of the N.S.C. mechanism—the Operations Coördinating Board, created by Executive Order in 1953. The O.C.B. arose like a phoenix out of the ashes of the old Psychological Strategy Board. The old Board had been premised on the fallacious concept of an independently-existing psychological strategy; whereas, in fact, it is the significant actions taken by government in and of themselves, the appropriate and most desirable arrangement of such actions, and the manner and emphasis of the publication of such actions to the world, that advance the struggle for men's minds and create a desirable climate of world opinion. The Jackson Committee was unanimous in recommending a subaltern agency which would strive, not for more or for independent planning, but for better dovetailing of the programs of the departments and agencies responsible for carrying out approved national security policies.

It was for such a coördinative purpose that the O.C.B. was created. Assume that the National Security Council sits at the top of Policy Hill. On one side of this hill, policy recommendations travel upward through the Planning Board to the Council, where they are thrashed out and submitted to the President. When the President has approved a policy recommendation, it travels down the other side of Policy Hill to the departments and agencies responsible for its execution. Each department or agency with a function to perform under such approved policy must prepare its program to carry out its responsibility. Part way down this side of the hill is the Operations Coördinating Board, to which the President refers an approved national security policy as its authority to advise with the relevant departments and agencies as to their detailed operational planning and as to coördinating the

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interdepartmental aspects of their respective programs. In no sense is the O.C.B. concerned with the making of policy. While it cannot make or negate programs to carry out a policy, it may assist in developing them. The Board is a coördinator and an expediter and a follower-up and a progress reporter. It is also authorized to initiate new proposals for action within the framework of national security policies.

It is apparent why the O.C.B. must have such functions and not the control of policy. I have seen it erroneously called the Operations *Control* Board. Its membership consists of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and certain others. Such officers are obviously without authority, individually or collectively, to interpose their views between the President and his responsible Cabinet members. The O.C.B. can assist, follow up, report; but it cannot initiate or change policy. And the language of the Executive Order is scrupulously exact to this effect.

It is true that the personalities, capacities and philosophies of those who compose the Operations Coördinating Board affect its transaction of business. But a similar comment is equally applicable to all human undertakings. As I have earlier remarked, the best functioning of the Planning Board depends upon its members' capabilities, brilliance of mind, soundness of judgment and devotion to princple. The O.C.B. is still the youngest part of the N.S.C. mechanism. It is intended to fill a vital rôle: to help "set the stage" by encouraging the most favorable arrangement of department and agency plans to carry out an approved security policy, so as to make the ultimate execution of that policy as effective a step as the United States can take in the area.

The question is often asked of me: Whence come the ideas for policy studies leading to recommendations by the Council? What is the genesis of a national security policy? The answer is as various as the world around us, as the events of today which go to make tomorrow the book of history. But one may divide the spectrum as follows.

At the one end is the mass of national security policies which had been approved under the Truman Administration. When President Eisenhower took office, there were something like a hundred national security policy statements in effect: some recent, some a year or so old, some (of a more administrative nature) dating back to early Council actions; some basic and world-

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wide, some dealing with regions or countries, some dealing with specific undertakings or relations or defensive elements; some as big as whales, some as tiny as minnows (but extremely sensitive minnows). As I have already pointed out, it was necessary for the new Administration to review as rapidly as possible *all* of these policies in accordance with their importance and the availability of time. In what ways should they be changed, modified, strengthened or superseded? This review naturally generated many ideas for new or changed national security policies.

Moving farther along the spectrum, we find the continuing review of *all* policies, including those approved by President Eisenhower. A national security policy is not created to be put in a glass museum case. As world events shift or take on new emphasis under more recent intelligence reports, there is need to subject policies to a fresh look. Periodically the Operations Coördinating Board reports to the Council on departmental and agency progress in carrying out currently operative national security policies, on its judgment of the adequacy or failings of such policies. In a few instances such progress reports are made by a responsible department or agency. These progress reports, which turn up at almost every Council meeting, provide another source of ideas for change or modification in policy. In addition, certain departments and agencies file annual reports with the Council indicating the current status of programs to carry out national security policies for which they have responsibility. These status of programs reports are a mine of information that may stimulate questioning.

The fluidity of the world we live in is paralleled by the continuous processes of the Council mechanism to keep its policy guidance responsive and up to date. Thus in the first three years of the Eisenhower Administration various basic and embracing policies of the United States, and policies affecting diverse areas of government, were annually under consideration as to one or more or all their phases.

Still further down this imagined spectrum is an area where history takes charge of the development of policy. A foreign leader dies; a war ends; a conference succeeds or fails; an ally makes a new and unexpected decision. There is no Cassandra to prophesy in advance that the consequent issue must be scheduled for Council consideration. Out of the unrolling of events gush forth the ideas, in fact often the urgent demands, for the formation or re-

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formation of security policy. It is in these frequently exigent circumstances that the value of the Council mechanism is perhaps best demonstrated. For it is possible to summon the Planning Board by telephone into almost continuous session for several long days before a Council meeting in order to bring integrated study and debate to bear on the intelligence and other resources pooled by the Board's participating departments and agencies. Day-to-day happenings in sensitive areas may call for constant and immediate testing of basic policies.

At the other end of this spectrum of ideas lies an area of comparative calm. The responsible departments and agencies, peering ahead, generate ideas, studies, questions for scheduling on the forward agenda of the Council. The agencies do not always agree on the timing or the priority of their ideas. It is for the Special Assistant, who has charge of the forward agenda for the President, to fit into the problems that crowd the Council docket one more that may seem entitled to admission.

The idea does not always come from a department or agency. In my own experience as Special Assistant, ideas have come direct from the President, out of his own rumination or out of some conference or outside communication; ideas have grown out of discussions in the Council or sometimes in Cabinet meetings; ideas have germinated in Planning Board discussions, perhaps on some other subject; ideas have come from an important official in the government. The source of the idea, if it is a good one, is not of consequence. It is the *idea* itself that counts.

What I have written above is not intended to create an impression that the National Security Council mechanism cannot be further strengthened and fortified. On the contrary, though much has been done, much remains to do. I march under the banner of Heraclitus—the only thing that is permanent is change. The Council operation which I have described will no doubt change; it can and will be improved.

Let us consider two recommendations for change in the Council mechanism, which have been frequently advanced to improve and strengthen its operations. One concerns the membership of the Council. The other concerns its permanent staff.

III

As stated above, the statutory members of the Council are the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secre-

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tary of Defense, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. Who else should participate directly at the Council table and be represented in all the lower echelons of the Council mechanism through which pass the proposed policy recommendations that ultimately reach the President?

The President, in recognition of the essential part which a strong domestic economy plays in the survival of our free world, has added to the five statutory members, as regular Council attendants, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Budget. Upon terminating the Foreign Operations Administration, the Director of which had been a statutory member of the Council, the President continued Governor Stassen, whom he had appointed his Special Assistant for Disarmament, in regular attendance. Also, there come to all Council meetings, in an advisory capacity, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence. There are also usually present the Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy and the Director of the U. S. Information Agency as observers. Finally, there always come the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and his aides, the Council's Executive Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretary. In addition to the 15 persons whom I have enumerated, there are invited the head or heads of other departments and agencies which have responsibilities or interests relating to a particular agenda item. Thus, the most frequent additional ad hoc participants in Council deliberations are Admiral Strauss with respect to atomic energy, the Attorney General on matters of internal security, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff of the Military Services, the Ambassador to the United Nations and the Secretary of Commerce on matters involving foreign trade.

The mere recapitulation of these numbers illustrates what was perhaps my most difficult and constant problem while in Washington. There is a universal desire to attend Council meetings. I do not ever recall an invitation being refused. On the contrary, there are many who strongly feel a need, if not a right, to attend. But there is a nice balance to be preserved. That is the balance between an attendance which will permit intimate, frank, fruitful discussion and an attendance which turns the group into a "town meeting." President Eisenhower is insistent that Council meetings shall be, *in fact*, a forum for vigorous, searching discussion as precursor to clear, incisive policy recommendations to him. Professor

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Edward Warren of the Harvard Law School used to teach his students that the "powwow element" of a meeting was invaluable. That element disappears when more than a certain number of persons sit about the Council table. Once this invisible line is passed, people do not discuss and debate; they remain silent or talk for the record. A restriction in the number who attend is less for security reasons than to make the Council into the valuable device which President Eisenhower intends that it shall be.

Should there, then, be more than 15 to 20 persons participating at the Council table? A recommendation has frequently been advanced that the Council would be strengthened by adding to its membership some qualified "civilians" who would be free of departmental responsibilities. In using the term "civilians," I do not do so in contrast to military personnel but as a short-cut expression for "persons not holding federal governmental office"—too mouthfilling a phrase to repeat each time.

The argument in favor of civilian Council members runs as follows: A few wise men, of broad gauge, divorced from the enormous administrative burdens carried by Cabinet members, would have time to think and to contribute a quality of guidance now believed by some to be lacking in the Council. This recommendation has been pressed by men far wiser than I, and it certainly merits—and has received—very serious consideration.

I have consistently opposed the concept that the Council would be benefited by including in its *regular* membership a small number of highly qualified civilians who are divorced from the responsibility of operating a department or agency. My opposition runs deeper than the increased number of persons at the Council table. By hypothesis, these men would be elder statesmen, "Nestors." I am fearful that the view of these Nestors would tend to be theoretical, because their views would not be tested by the responsible daily contact which a department head has with marching events and with the practicability of actions to cope with them. Furthermore, such views, because of the intellectual brilliance and "free time to think" of their sponsors, might tend to dominate the Council discussions.

Let me pinpoint what I think to be the essential virtue of the Security Council. It is that this procedure brings to the President the views of the very officials upon whom he will later rely to carry out his national security policy decisions.

While I reject the idea of civilian members of the Council in

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regular weekly attendance, I have always favored seeking "outside" advice and counsel through the appointment of civilians, on an ad hoc consultant basis, as advisors to the Council. While I was Special Assistant, we used such consultants on a considerable number of occasions, either with reference to basic policy or with reference to some special policy issue. These men in no sense represented special interests. They were carefully selected because of broad and diverse backgrounds of experience and as representative of segments of our country, both in terms of geographic location and individual occupations.

In deciding whether or not to use civilian consultants to the Council at a given moment and on a given subject three considerations must be weighed. 1. Is the time which will be consumed in educating them for their task and in obtaining for them the necessary top security clearances worth what may be the product of their labors? The briefing of such topflight people cannot be left to underlings. The cramped time-schedule of the top men in government must be invaded for the education of the consultants. Such demands on already overburdened officials may create more difficulties than the consultants' services could contribute. 2. How much damage to morale results from the employment, at the apex level, of expert "outsiders" who look over the shoulders and breathe down the necks of extremely busy officials charged with responsibility to the President for performance? 3. Will the views of a person, not informed by operating, departmental responsibilities, be sufficiently realistic to carry weight?

It is my opinion, on balance, that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages where the consultant's task is either a specific matter as to which he is particularly qualified or a general subject as to which his general knowledge, geographic location and occupational experience may well provide a useful contribution. This result may flow either from consultants acting as a group or committee or in certain cases as individuals.

The civilian consultant is, of course, not an executive in any sense. The things which he recommends may not be adopted or promptly acted upon by the executive branch. The mills of the federal government grind mighty slow. But the civilian consultant may well recall the ancient story of the princess who could not sleep because someone had placed a small pea under the mattress.

Would it be wise for each administration to develop a panel of

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civilian consultants? Under such a procedure, all members of the panel could be simultaneously cleared for security; and thereafter all would be available, as needed, for ad hoc limited service. Because the call would be for service limited in time, persons holding responsible civilian positions would feel able to serve on the panel. It should be possible to keep such a panel reasonably up to date on secret and sensitive information and intelligence necessary for effective performance when the members are called to duty. But there is at least one obvious disadvantage to such a procedure: the difficulty of selecting in advance, for such a panel, members who will be capable of handling the special and wholly unpredictable problems that may arise in future time.

IV

The National Security Council, as the top mechanism of government for aiding in the formulation of security policy, has a policy-planning function and a supporting-staff function.

The policy-planning function should be exercised through the Council itself and through its Planning Board, composed of top-flight personnel appointed by the President from the departments and agencies represented at the Council table. The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs is appointed by the President to insure that his views as to policy-planning are carried out. To that end, the Special Assistant presides over the Planning Board, acts as executive officer at Council meetings and is responsible to the President for operating the Council mechanism. The Special Assistant is a part of the Administration in power and should change as the Administration changes.

The supporting-staff function should be exercised through a high-calibre, permanent Council staff, not subject to change with political change. This permanent staff should consist of necessary administrative and secretarial personnel and also of what I call "think people." At present the permanent staff consists of 28 persons, of whom 11 are "think people." For the last six years the Council has been fortunate in having the same person as Executive Secretary, a man of keen, analytical intelligence and impeccable nonpartisanship. He, his deputy and the other nine "think people" on the staff are scrupulously non-political and non-policy-making. They form the backbone of continuity, the reservoir of past knowledge and the staff assistance required by the Special Assistant in discharging his responsibilities to the President. Each

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of them is assigned one or more specific tasks by the Special Assistant, but their principal task is to help him to cope with the inundating flood of papers that must be read, analyzed, dissected, digested, kept abreast of and channelled.

The separation of functions which I have just described is the development of the recommendations which I presented to President Eisenhower in March 1953, following a study made at his request as to how to make the N.S.C. mechanism more capable of carrying out effectively its statutory charter. My recommendations were derived from that study, from my service as a member of the Senior Staff (as the Planning Board used to be called) in 1951 and from my experience in operating the Council mechanism at high speed after January 20, 1953.

My study raised certain points upon which the views of those with whom I talked were not in entire agreement. One of these points was a suggestion that the permanent staff be increased by a considerable number. The increase upon which I settled, and to which the President agreed, was to add to the permanent staff a much smaller number: an increase of three "think people," scarcely an equivalent of the tripled work-load and tripled momentum.

Underlying some of the suggestions for increasing the staff lurks a difference in concept of the staff's place in the scheme of things from that which I have described above. The report of the Hoover Commission's Task Force on Military Procurement, June 1955, touched upon the Council mechanism. In the dissenting view of one Task Force member—for the majority report did not espouse this view—an increased staff was suggested to "evolve policy ideas for consideration of the Special Assistant and the N.S.C." Such a concept is obviously alien to that which I recommended to the President, in which I most heartily believe, and which is currently being practised. Under present practice, the policy-planning function is wholly reserved to the Council and to the Planning Board. The Planning Board members, like their chiefs on the Council itself, are dual personalities. They represent their respective agencies; but, in line with the President's concept of the Council, they are also members of an integrated body working up integrated policy recommendations for the Council to submit to the President. Distinct from such policy-planning is the work of the Council staff. This body furnishes the Special Assistant with administrative and analytical support in day-to-day opera-

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tions. It analyzes, summarizes and probes, from an unbiased point of view, the work produced in the departments and agencies concerned with a particular issue.

Now I conceive that a democracy draws greatest strength from the participation in the making of policies of those who are charged with responsibility for executing those policies. Therefore, I believe it fundamentally sound that the responsible departments and agencies of the Executive Branch should be the ones to carry the burden through the Planning Board of working on the formulation of policy recommendations.

An increased permanent staff, given an originating concern with the substance of national security policy, would, by reason of its location at the apex of government, drift into becoming itself a policy-maker. Because such a staff is divorced from operating responsibility, its product would tend less to reflect the hard realities of the field and more to speak in aloof theory. Since the Special Assistant has direct access to the President, an N.S.C. staff operation of the kind suggested would tend to intervene between the President and his Cabinet members, who are responsible to him for executing his policies. Grave damage could be done to our form of government were there an interruption in the line of responsibility from the President to his Cabinet.

The complex problems of national security require constantly informed analytical research. This quality can best be realized by the use of specially qualified groups, drawn from the operating departments and agencies and also from outside of government on a project-by-project basis. I do not think that an "outside" research organization permanently attached to the Council—even if it had a broad background and specialized talents—would be as well qualified to conduct the study and research required on each of the many and varied problems of national security. Those who are indoctrinated by the hard realities of actual, daily operations can make the soundest contribution to policy formulation.

An increased N.S.C. staff, however large or well-qualified, would not be able to settle certain basic problems which underlie the conduct of the federal government: the integration of still competing services into the Defense Department; the agreement by independent Chiefs of Staff upon strategic defense plans in the light of the advent of thermonuclear weapons; the jealousies and jurisdictional disputes which inevitably thrive at various governmental levels and which tend to perpetuate the existence

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of presently assigned functions; the "human equation" among the President's advisers; the requirement that people at the top of government frequently must make crucial decisions with great speed based on their background, common sense and operating responsibility.

For the foregoing reasons, I have opposed the interposition at the apex of government, responsive to the President's Special Assistant, of a large staff which would concern itself with the formulation of national security policy. The Special Assistant may need a few more staff assistants; each Special Assistant will carry his towering burden of work in his own way. But I would think it inadvisable formally to give him greater responsibilities or formally to increase his functional prestige. His existing power to speak for the President is all that any servant needs or should seek. Furthermore, the larger the staff, in connection with policy-making, the more work it makes for itself and the less work it does for its chief. A better way is to draw on the wealth of resources in the interested departments and agencies, bringing them toward rather than separating them from the hub of the wheel. Thus, in that time when the wheel must bear its burden, the spokes are stronger because of this participation in their fashioning.

In an incredibly short time, the National Security Council has assumed a permanent rôle in the executive branch of the federal government. As the Cabinet has developed through the decades, so the Council will continue to develop. Other Presidents may further vary its uses, and doubtless will. The technique is still in evolution, but the imprint of what the Council can do to help the Chief Executive has already been made. Through a long future, the National Security Council and the Cabinet will be twin channels through which policy recommendations flow to the President. It was President Eisenhower who built the Council into a well-proportioned structure of substance and strength. It was my fortunate duty to hold the spikes, but it was he who drove them home with his big hammer.

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FALSE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE JAPANESE ECONOMY

By Nobutane Kiuchi

CONTRARY to the common assumption, the real difficulties which Japan faces are to be found not in the physical sphere so much as in the failure to comprehend economic realities. Though Japan's physical problems cannot be totally denied, it has gradually become clear that her basic and most pressing difficulties are intellectual and psychological. To understand this is one of the keys to a clearer comprehension of the Japan of the present and future.

In the opinion of her own people, Japan's material difficulties are that the country is overpopulated, land is very limited and natural resources are scarce. To maintain her living standards Japan must import large quantities of food and the raw materials with which to manufacture industrial goods for export. She has great difficulty in maintaining her balance of international payments. She is lagging far behind other nations in developing manufacturing facilities, roads and other means of transportation, and she lacks the capital accumulation necessary to improve them and bring them up to date.

Individually these points are valid, but my reason for not taking them too seriously is my belief that the problems presented can all be solved in time. In fact, they are in a large measure being solved now. If they have not yet been solved adequately it is not for physical reasons but because of what I consider to be defects in intellectual outlook. Before discussing these defects, I should like to show how some of our difficulties are being solved at present. This is well illustrated by the achievements of 1955.

II

There are several erroneous conceptions about Japan's present international balance of payments: one is that she finds great difficulty in balancing her international payments; another is that she can get along only by Special Procurements;[1] and a third is that therefore she must make desperate efforts in order to live well without Special Procurements. The records of Japan's ex-

[1] By Special Procurements I mean goods and services furnished to the Security Forces of the United States Army in Japan and to the United Nations forces in Korea.

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ternal trade in 1955 will suffice to prove the error of these conceptions. Visible exports amounted to a little less than two billion dollars while visible imports were a little more than two billion dollars, and invisible exports were about $700,000,000 while invisible imports were about $300,000,000. Consequently, Japan's net gain was well over $300,000,000.[2]

It is true that invisible exports included more than $500,000,000 in Special Procurements. Therefore it may be contended that if Special Procurements had been excluded the balance for the year 1955 would have been in the red. But it should be noted that Special Procurements are quite different from grants. They require that Japan provide certain goods and services. Thus if we assume that Special Procurements had not existed, Japan's national economy would have been exempted from some of the requirements to import raw materials and would have been able to direct a larger part of her economic energies to promoting additional exports. Following this logic, even if we make the rather drastic hypothesis that Japan had suddenly lost $500,000,000 of Special Procurements in 1955, we can safely infer that she would have been able to balance her international payments.

Thus a fact to be concluded from the records of 1955 is that Japan is capable of balancing her international payments without Special Procurements. But we ought also to look into the nature of exports and the rates of their increase.

Japan's exports, following the so-called Korean boom, reached about $1,300,000,000 in 1951 and showed a slight decrease both in 1952 and 1953. This trend was reversed thereafter by deflationary measures of the government and in 1954 the total was about $1,500,000,000—an increase of about 30 percent over 1953. The people tended to regard this upward trend as a temporary phenomenon. But surprisingly, an increase of about 30 percent was recorded again in 1955, making a total of nearly two billion dollars in exports. Moreover, monthly figures during the same year continued upward, leading us to expect further increases.

Special note of this two billion dollar figure should be made for another reason. The Japanese government, beginning in 1955, has been sponsoring a Six Year Economic Plan. As a result of a

[2] *The Foreign Exchange Statistics Monthly* published by the Bank of Japan is most commonly used to examine Japan's international balance of payments. As its figures refer only to money payments and receipts, imports by credit, for example, are not included. Accordingly, this source shows a gain in foreign exchange of $494,000,000 for 1955, which is larger than the figure I quoted.

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revision of estimates at the beginning of last year, the export goal of the Plan for 1957 was raised to $1,880,000,000. In terms of its monthly average, however, this goal was achieved as early as last April. In August the planners revised the goal once again to $2,200,000,000 to be achieved in 1957. But this re-revised objective was met between October and December of last year. Now, it generally is assumed in making economic plans for Japan that her import needs play a decisive rôle. But for this very reason the estimate of her export possibilities is the most important factor in any plan. Therefore, these facts on export increases deserve the keenest attention.

To understand the significance of these increases we must know what items were exported where. Of the three different monetary areas, exports to the dollar area showed about 50 percent increase over the previous year, to the sterling area about 35 percent increase and to the clearing accounts area—generally known as the open accounts area—about 10 percent decrease. The proportion of exports to dollar, sterling and open accounts areas became 40, 35 and 25 percent respectively. In 1954 exports to the open accounts area constituted 35 percent, while those to the dollar area accounted for 31 percent. In 1951, exports to the sterling area were foremost, constituting 43 percent while those to the dollar area were only 23 percent. This proportional increase in dollar-area exports is a most noteworthy fact, for it has been widely believed that since the dollar area is the most difficult to export to, Japan's efforts should be directed towards the open accounts and sterling areas. Now the time has come when we can resolutely deny such a point of view.

What export items showed the sharpest increase? To compare the amount of each item exported with that of the previous year and to select only those exports which showed a rapid rate of increase would not give a clear picture of the situation. Before examining each item of trade, we must understand the characteristics of Japanese export. The outstanding characteristic is that Japan exports extremely diverse items. *The Foreign Exchange Statistics Monthly* of the Bank of Japan classifies all export goods into 92 items. Among these, 40 items amounted to at least $10,000,000 each, yet not a single export item amounted to as much as 12 percent of the total. Cotton textiles, the largest export, constituted a little less than 12 percent, and the next item on the list accounted for less than 10 percent of the total. Steel products

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(except for galvanized sheets) and artificial fiber fabrics ranked next to cotton textiles, accounting for only 9 and 8 percent respectively. It is true that textiles and fabrics of all kinds together accounted for 35 percent, but it should be kept in mind that they formed an aggregate of 14 different items each of which averaged more than $30,000,000 annually. Moreover, the importance of textiles and fabrics in Japanese exports is decreasing year by year. The ratio of these items to the total exports of Japan was 44 percent in 1951 while the 1934–36 average was 52 percent.

In addition to the diversity of export items, attention is called to the equally diverse destinations of Japanese exports. Japan sent her exports to 96 countries and territories in the dollar area, 76 in the sterling area and 17 in the open accounts area. By far the largest single market was the United States which accounted for about 24 percent of Japanese exports. Areas which took more than 5 percent were Hong Kong and the United Kingdom colonies. Argentina, Indonesia, Thailand, Formosa, the Philippines and Canada constituted from 2 to 5 percent, accounting in the aggregate for about 18 percent. This means that the remaining 45 percent of the total was directed to 180 countries and territories, with less than 2 percent to each.

In short, Japan's exports of exceedingly diverse items are scattered all over the world with the single exception of the United States. This diversity of items and destinations forms the strength of the Japanese economy. Thus, although in 1955 there was a sharp increase in exports to the United States and in the export of steel products, this does not preclude the possibility of an increase in other items and to other areas in future years. Therefore the correct answer to the what and where of Japanese exports is that diverse items were exported to diverse countries and territories with a resultant increase of 30 percent in total exports.

III

As shown above, the physical problem of balancing international payments, which the people considered paramount, has been solved at least temporarily. But because there is an inadequate appreciation of the favorable circumstances of Japan's economy, popular misunderstanding may reverse this favorable trend; at least it will work against a full enjoyment of the good effects of the present rise in exports.

How have Japanese exports been able to maintain an annual

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rate of increase of 30 percent since the beginning of 1954? The major reason is that she did away with the inflationary tendencies which existed up to the end of 1953, tightening bank credit severely and extending special favors to export finance alone. But the people, not recognizing this, attribute the expansion of Japan's exports solely to the prosperity of the world market, with the result that they are excessively anxious about the future of the world economy. They forget that the Japanese economy depends in large measure on what is done in Japan, and how it is done. These fears indicate an acute loss of self-confidence among the people and reveal their inability to think for themselves.

Unquestionably, world-wide prosperity is a factor in the expansion of Japan's exports, but it weighs much more lightly than the effects of the deflationary measures instituted by Japan herself. Partly due to their poor execution, however, the deflationary measures applied from 1954 on were a very painful experience. Therefore, it is strange that despite the bitterness of the deflationary period, the people tend to look for the causes of the export expansion solely in the prosperity of the world market. Surprisingly, both the average Japanese and also business people and financiers interpreted the deflationary policy adopted by the government in 1954 not as a remedy for the disequilibrium in foreign exchange payments but as a sort of moral admonition.

What caused Japan to adopt these deflationary measures? It was clear to everyone during the latter half of 1953 that the Japanese economy was under the influence of an inflationary mood and that the rapid decline in Japan's foreign exchange holdings had to be rectified before it got much worse. But strangely enough, almost nobody asked how this inflation was brought about. People looked on it as a natural phenomenon, something like rain, and without clarifying its causes inaugurated a sudden retrenchment of finance. The inflation at that time was not ordinary but unusual in that the problem lay in the gap between domestic prices and international prices. Japanese prices themselves rose only slightly. They were kept level in 1952, and in the following year wholesale prices rose only 6 percent. But during this period prices on the world market kept declining. Although Japan should have been able to keep pace with the ups and downs of international prices, the government committed the fatal mistake of adopting policies which prevented Japanese prices from moving together with world prices.

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What measures were taken by the government? In the field of exports the government extended export subsidies in various ways, whereas in the field of imports it followed a retrenchment policy in order to halt the loss of foreign exchange reserves. At the level of trade at that time, I estimate that about $400,000,000 in foreign exchange would have sufficed to satisfy her minimum requirements, of which one-third could be in sterling. By this estimate, the foreign exchange holdings of that time were more than enough. Consequently the government instead of restraining imports should have liberalized its imports to lower Japanese prices. Such a policy would certainly have proven to be more effective as well as less harmful than a blind retrenchment policy.

In the year ending October 1952, when foreign exchange losses began, Japan had accumulated foreign exchange reserves amounting to well over $600,000,000, thanks largely to the so-called Korean boom. Therefore, the government's failure to liberalize its foreign exchange control must be criticized.

The government's export policy was an even more serious failure. While subsidies allowed Japan to export goods below their domestic prices and avoid a decline of exports, this policy deprived Japan of the most effective means of narrowing the gap between her prices and those of the world market. By artificially removing goods from the domestic market, inflation was only encouraged. As we have seen, the price level, which was steady in 1952, rose a little in 1953 resulting in a further widening of the price gap. This developed into a vicious circle by causing a rumor of devaluation of the yen which in turn aroused stronger inflationary sentiment.

Although the ultimate catastrophe was fortunately averted, the experience of the so-called inflation in 1952 and 1953 suggests a lack of understanding of such issues on the part of the Japanese people. Still worse, now that the problem is solved, the people make no effort to learn the lesson that was taught them.

IV

What I tried to point out in the preceding section was not the errors of individual policies in the field of foreign trade, but rather the irrationality of the basic philosophy underlying those policies; and further, that the Japanese people can be surprisingly indifferent to difficulties caused by wrong policies.

The processes discussed earlier offer examples of this attitude

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of indifference. For instance, before launching the retrenchment policy, no thinking was done on how large foreign exchange reserves ought to be or whether losses of foreign exchange reserves are something to be really afraid of. Nor was any consideration ever given to the advisability of liberalizing import controls, while dissipating undue anxiety over the losses of foreign exchange, in order to bring about a price decline. Despite the bitterness of the deflationary experience, the people resigned themselves to the government's program with the naïve thought that any deflationary policy must be the countermeasure for any sort of inflation.

The reason I stress the attitude of indifference regarding the question of foreign exchange reserves is because this matter is closely related to the fundamentals of the Japanese-American relationship.

At the moment, the Japanese people are rejoicing without reason over increasing foreign exchange reserves. The government is pursuing a policy of piling them up limitlessly. However, this accumulation is possible only by sacrificing something which can be more important. It means that something which ought to have been possible was made impossible. Although a more liberal trade policy might have meant that we had more luxury goods than we needed, there is a definite possibility that there would have been more building of paved highways, more river control, more modernization of machinery and greater development of the island of Hokkaido. All of these are matters of urgent need for Japan. As they were disregarded and goods were squeezed out of the domestic market, our foreign exchange holdings are rushing headlong toward even greater accumulation.

Strangely enough, however, Japan has been consistently crying for investment from the United States. Supposing that we should launch a road-building program or development of Hokkaido, the trend would then be toward inflation and the reduction of exchange reserves. In this case, capital introduced from abroad would be most helpful. But the introduction of foreign capital is meaningless so long as no attempt is made to build roads or develop domestic resources. Without internal development, foreign capital will serve only to enlarge holdings that much further beyond what is necessary.

Recently the government, gradually awakening to the nonsense of mere accumulation through borrowing, has assumed a cooler attitude towards foreign capital. This change of attitude can be

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observed in its decision to exclude the so-called "impact loan." Government permits for dollar loans will be given only to those who actually want to import from the United States. This decision is hard to understand. If the government feels that it is so short of foreign currency as to be unable to provide foreign exchange to all those who want it, it is better for the government to accept any loan, impact or not, when offered. On the other hand, if the foreign exchange holdings are large enough, exchange permits should be given to anybody.

Consequently, a suspicion has arisen in business and government circles in the United States that the psychology of the Japanese government is not understandable. Such a suspicion is hindering the well-intentioned coöperation of those foreigners who are sympathetic with Japan.

We should courageously embark upon a variety of constructive enterprises, such as road-building and the development of Hokkaido, which will contribute to the basic strength of the Japanese economy. Any inflationary trend caused by such projects should be neutralized by calling on our foreign exchange reserves to whatever extent is necessary. It is a prerequisite that the government should liberalize the present exchange controls, which are still rigid. When the foreign exchange holdings decrease to the minimum safety level and further development programs might entail dangers, efforts should be made to invite more foreign capital if it is available. The government should thus demonstrate to the people the effectiveness of foreign capital in helping to further, without accompanying inflation, development programs that are beyond our capacity. In the face of this demonstration, the people will realize the genuine value of foreign capital and will learn to assume a sensible attitude towards it. At present, most of the people take it for granted that loans from abroad mean exploitation by foreign capitalists and they applaud the efforts of bureaucrats who want to reject foreign capital.

V

It may be interesting and profitable to speculate on how Japan might have solved her basic economic problems had her people faced the situation with fuller understanding.

Broadly speaking, Japan would first of all have avoided a zigzag course of inflation and deflation and instead would have been able to proceed on a more or less straight upward trend of eco-

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nomic development, just as West Germany has done. Moreover, the liberalization of import trade and the abolishment of bilateral trade would have been greatly advanced. In that case, *de facto* free convertibility would have been restored to a greater extent, as has been the case in West Germany. At the same time, the people would have been more open-minded about foreign capital. Foreign capital would have made possible generally low production costs and would have fortified the foreign exchange holdings, setting in motion a favorable cycle in which the greater exports resulting would have enabled greater liberalization of trade. In short, Japan would have been a much stronger country than she is today.

The arguments I have presented thus far in support of my statement that the essential difficulty is in attitude more than in material facts can be found in other economic areas, *e.g.* in connection with problems of finance, monetary policies, labor, etc. Moreover, the same is true in other fields of human activity—political, social and ideological.

The origins of these shortcomings must be sought, I believe, in the nature and condition of the Japanese social sciences. An American scholar who recently visited Japan commented that he was greatly surprised to find that Japanese scholars are still seriously discussing economics in Marxist terms. Another American made the remark, quite enlightening to some Japanese, that while in America it would be difficult to find five Marxist scholars among 8,000 professors and specialists in economics, approximately 80 percent of the Japanese economists are Marxists. He also wondered why the Japanese scholars dwell in a purely theoretical world when so many challenging practical issues await their treatment. A third American pointed out that Japanese scholars seldom direct their talk to the people but limit their discussions almost completely to one another. How these characteristics of the Japanese social scientists came about has never been clearly explained, but I believe the explanation must be sought in the total process of Japan's development since the Meiji Restoration. That process was characterized by a headlong rush to catch up with Western civilization, and the failure we have noted may be but one instance of a phenomenon that occurs inevitably in the impact of one more advanced culture on another.

However this may be, the fact remains that the Japanese people are not merely unable to give full scope to their basic strength but

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are even unaware of it. Present-day Japan, then, cannot place herself where she should be in the contemporary world. For instance, she is incapable of dealing properly with the problem of reparations, and must still rely on aid from the United States for her own defense. Stupidly enough, moreover, there are still a great many people who, lacking a knowledge of even the basic facts of exports structure, are obsessed with the illusion that trade with China is a prerequisite of Japan's future economic development.

What, then, must be done to give the basic strength of the Japanese economy full play? The answer lies in enlarging the understanding of the Japanese by bringing about a revolutionary change in the social sciences. Yet when we think of the difficulty of this, we come face to face with another and even greater difficulty. This is that the Japanese people as a whole have lost their national ideals and still suffer from the resulting spiritual vacuum. Americans often ask us where Japanese leadership resides. But to a people who have lost their ideals, national leadership remains something hard to find.

The Japanese people lost their ideals because the path they pursued with pride and confidence from the time of the Meiji Restoration led them to war, and the catastrophic outcome of the war showed the path to have been a wrong one. During the period immediately following, the people were preoccupied with improving their material life. When this objective was in great measure achieved the more basic and difficult problems revealed themselves. There can be no denying that when people no longer have a goal to strive for, they are likely to suffer a serious degeneration of morale. The future position of Japan in the world community hinges upon how the Japanese people solve these intellectual and psychological problems.

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AMBIGUITIES IN GUATEMALA

By John Gillin and K. H. Silvert

MANY journalists, especially in Europe and Latin America, have not been able to resist the temptation, whether in irony or in sober seriousness, to identify Guatemala as the "first liberated Soviet satellite." This can be made to appear as either a fine or barbarous thing, depending upon the individual's point of view. In the United States the story of the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and his Communist-infiltrated régime has long since disappeared, and the problems with which President Carlos Castillo Armas has been wrestling for the past 20 months naturally have attracted far less interest than did the revolution itself. Meanwhile the present "Liberation" government of Guatemala stands before the world and its own people in an ambiguous light. If difficulties are to be avoided for Guatemala herself and for the United States in its Latin American relations, this ambiguity requires clarification soon.

The ambiguity is twofold. First, the Castillo government is almost universally believed in Guatemala and the rest of the world outside the United States to be the creature of the Department of State. In the absence of any countervailing evidence, this belief is supported by some very decided pronouncements made by Secretary Dulles shortly before the shooting started in 1954 and by the actions and words of the American Ambassador during the fracas. Yet for more than a year after the revolution the United States did little to help the government of Castillo Armas and appeared relatively uninterested in its success.

Second, although in many respects repressive and undemocratic, the Liberation government has shown both in word and deed that, in the eyes of Guatemalans at least, it would like to be considered the heir of the basic politico-social revolution which in 1944 turned out the 14-year dictatorship of Jorge Ubico and established the first system approaching political democracy and the welfare state in the nation's history. In fact, President Castillo Armas and prominent members of his administration have repeatedly asserted not only that they do not intend to abandon the social and political reforms begun in 1944 but that they intend to carry them forward, although in purified form, purged of extreme left-wing and Communist elements and influences.

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Castillo Armas gives one the impression of a modest and earnest man to whom both efficiency and practical idealism mean a great deal. At the time of his military triumph in July 1954 more than a thousand persons fled the country under the impression that the Liberation would start a wholesale slaughter and impose a harsh and repressive dictatorship. Yet neither came to pass. Although it is admitted that some 200 to 250 individuals associated with the previous régime were summarily "executed" in the first days following Arbenz' fall by "spontaneous uprisings" in areas beyond Castillo's control, the new government successfully repressed such violence and restored order throughout the country. Moreover, no oppressive dictatorship was established and many of the forms, at least, of democracy were reactivated. Nevertheless, charges of financial corruption of officials, including the President himself, have been rampant and almost the only rebuttal offered has been police action. Discontent is rife among many sections of the population because the new government has failed to formulate and carry out positive policies of social welfare. It is clear enough that the Liberation was against Communism, but what it was *for,* except perhaps vaguely its big brother, the United States, has by no means been certain. That any government is for the United States is, of course, good news to North Americans these days, but it does not in itself arouse either vigorous patriotic feelings in Guatemalans or intense admiration in other Latin Americans.

Thus, whether we like it or not, in the eyes of much of the world—particularly Latin America—the destinies of the Liberation government and of the United States seem to be entwined. And the unusually cordial treatment accorded Castillo Armas during his November 1955 visit to the United States, including a long interview with President Eisenhower in the hospital, indicates that the State Department was willing to risk a substantial amount of prestige on the little Colonel and his régime.

II

Considerable argument has developed as to whether the Arbenz government was in reality Communist-controlled and as to whether Mr. Dulles and the State Department were not unduly excited in implying that this was so. The case for the Arbenz government was set forth in *La Batalla de Guatemala,* by Guillermo Toriello, last Arbenz Minister of Foreign Affairs, published in

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Mexico in 1955 and widely circulated in Latin America. Essentially it is as follows: No more than seven or eight avowed Communists held important posts in the government; the Guatemalan Workers' Party (the name the Communist Party gave itself in 1952) had only 532 registered members and was the smallest of four political parties forming the government coalition; the Arbenz government never implemented or advocated Communist measures, but was dedicated to carrying out democratically the constitution of 1945; and, in any case, party affiliations of Guatemalan officials and the government policies themselves are the business of Guatemalans and of no one else. This thesis finds many sympathetic listeners in Latin America, especially since Toriello himself was never a publicly recognized Communist, and because he presents his government as the guardian of the Latin American ideals of cultural and political independence from the United States and of noninterference in the internal affairs of any nation.

The other side of the story,[1] in essence, is this: It is true that the number of avowed Communists was comparatively small, although the figure 532 is merely the number used to register officially the Guatemalan Workers' Party; the actual number of party members is conservatively estimated at from 2,000 to 2,500, mostly in Guatemala City. Likewise the number of powerful office holders in the government was not large. Nevertheless, during the Arbenz period they included the personal secretary of the President, the President of Congress (who was next in line for the Presidency), four of 56 deputies in Congress, the head of the social security system (although he latterly had an ostensible falling out with his coreligionists) and most of its administrators, the head of the Department of Press, Propaganda and Tourism and many of its officers, many officers of the diplomatic service, and most of the officials of the agency charged with carrying out the Agrarian Reform Act. Communists were the chief men of the largest labor unions and had also captured the Peasants' Union. They held many other posts of effective power. It is not the number of obvious Communists in exposed positions of power that counts, but the influence they wield.

[1] This has been documented in such works as the State Department's "'Intervention of International Communism in Guatemala" (1954); Daniel James' melodramatically titled but carefully written volume, "Red Design for the Americas: Guatemalan Prelude" (1954); K. H. Silvert's "A Study in Government: Guatemala" (1954); and Theodore Geiger's "El Communismo Contra el Progreso en Guatemala" (1953).

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Furthermore, although it is true that the (Communist) Guatemalan Workers' Party was only one member of the government party coalition, its members and policies dominated the National Democratic Front (F.D.N.) which functioned not only as an electoral coalition but also as a Congressional steering committee and a sort of "kitchen cabinet" whose influence on Arbenz and the government in general exceeded that of the official cabinet. Finally, careful unpublished studies (supported by observations of these reporters) indicate that many government servants under Arbenz who sincerely believed themselves to be anti-Communist were unwittingly converted into defenders and executors of the Party line. This may, in fact, have been true of Arbenz himself, who appears to have been a rather introverted, non-intellectual career army officer who had developed certain "welfare state" ideals. Likewise, most former insiders still in Guatemala agree that the Communists, although small in number, were tightly organized and disciplined, indefatigable in their efforts, and, from the point of view of a somewhat bewildered Arbenz, the "most reliable" political group when it came to getting things done for the administration. Under such circumstances it matters little whether the President or other outstanding members of his government actually carried Party cards or not.

As early as June 1950, the distinguished Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States, Antonio Goubaud Carrera, who had done so much to promote our understanding of the Guatemalan social revolution, issued a statement in Washington supporting the position of the United States in the Korean crisis. After several days, the Guatemalan Foreign Office, under persistent questioning by reporters, made a terse, sour declaration that it "did not repudiate the Ambassador." Shortly, however, he was recalled to Guatemala, and after being subjected to many sorts of humiliation by President Arévalo and the government, committed suicide. Following this the anti-Yankee campaign within the country was stepped up and was finally manifested in open opposition to the United States in such international forums as the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

III

In 1944, it was apparently not realized that a fundamental social revolution was rumbling through Latin America, inspired not by Marxism but by Allied wartime propaganda and by such

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notions as the Four Freedoms of the Atlantic Charter. The Guatemalan revolution of 1944 was a serious attempt to make these ideals articulate, and effective in political action. If such a social —as distinguished from a merely political—revolution is not recognized for what it is and if appropriate action is not taken by the democracies, the situation is almost tailor-made for the Communists to exploit.

If one looks backward to the situation in 1944 before the fall of Ubico, the following cultural and political features stand out. The country was bound in a semi-feudal economic structure on an agricultural base characterized by large landholdings in the hands of a few proprietors and operated by forced labor, mainly that of Indians. The Indian was officially denigrated and was maintained within a caste structure, excluded from the national life. There was only a tiny middle class engaged in services, including governmental, rather than industrial production and commercial expansion. The concept of broad national interest among the population as a whole was undeveloped and neglected. The growth of professions, of science, pure or applied, and of scholastic achievement of all kinds was discouraged. Consequently the political structure was oversimplified, with a heavy dependence on the military. The administration of public affairs was personalistic and highly unprofessional. Under these conditions, special groups-in-interest could not organize themselves so as to force compromise solutions on the monolithic government. And for the most part local communities were politically dead; they were not integrated into the national scene but merely ruled by authoritarian *intendentes* appointed by the central power.

The revolution of 1944 set out to abolish these features of "backwardness." Forced labor was abolished in fact as well as in law, and workers, including agricultural labor, were given the right to organize into unions. A legal pattern was established for the breakup of large agricultural estates and for the formation of a landowning peasantry, to be provided with credit facilities through a national Agrarian Bank. One of the stated objectives was the "incorporation of the Indian into the circle of national life." This was implemented through an active National Indian Institute, by a great expansion of Indian and rural educational facilities, and by giving autonomy to local communities, many of which were almost completely Indian in population. The Indians, although decreasing proportionately, still constituted 53.5 per-

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cent of the population in 1950. Development of the middle classes was encouraged by establishment of effective autonomy of the University and a significant expansion of its curriculum and budget, by the development of a social security system, the elaboration of the banking structure, the establishment of a production development institute to aid small proprietors, and the official stimulation of private business under the "capitalistic system."

For the first time in history, candidates were nominated with some respect to the district they were to represent. The formation of political parties of diverse views, previously forbidden, tended to break down the Ubico pattern of personalism in government and also extended political activity from the capital to the provinces and local communities. The latter were allowed to elect their own officers and to manage most affairs of local concern. Since the first President of the revolution, Juan José Arévalo, was himself a university professor, he drew into the government many university men, intellectuals and technicians, with the effect that professionals and near-professionals gained prestige and the efficiency of public service was enhanced.

It is true, of course, that many of the reforms of 1944–54 were legally expressed aspirations, few of which were fully met in practice. Nevertheless, it appears that on the whole these aspirations represented the will of the people; the leftist administrators of 1951–54 capitalized on them to introduce organizational forms and controls in their own interests.

IV

The "grass roots" effects of this revolution can best be appreciated by examination of local situations.[2] In each rural community the story is essentially the same—political awakening, the development of national consciousness, the appearance of new aspirations and the awareness of "rights" and duties formerly unknown or suppressed. A sketch of one of these communities, San Luis Jilotepeque, will suffice here.

San Luis Jilotepeque is a municipio in the Department of Jalapa, about 100 miles east of the capital city in a straight line and about 170 miles by road. About two-thirds of the population (approximately 10,000) are classed as Indians of Pokomám lin-

[2] The present writers participated in a study of the effects of the changes of 1944–54 in ten typical rural communities, the results of which will be published in 1956 by Tulane University.

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guistic stock, and the rest as Ladinos. Prior to 1944 Ladinos owned about 70 percent of the agricultural land.

Under Ubico, Indians and Ladinos alike took no part in politics other than to vote ceremonially for the single government slate of Congressional candidates. Although San Luis is on the main pilgrimage route to the shrine of Esquipulas, during most of the year the road was in such bad repair that movement to and from the community was almost entirely by the feet of men or animals. San Luis was thus largely isolated from cultural (including technological and ideological) influences of the modern world, or even of the nation. Although not complete, the isolation was such that one could easily identify any new thing that came into the community, its origin, its route and who brought it. For all practical purposes the culture and political systems of both Indians and Ladinos were static.

Came the revolution of 1944 and things began to change, even in San Luis, whether for better or for worse. By 1955 the following innovations had become established. Roads and bridges had been improved so that regular thrice weekly bus service connected the town with the outside world both to the east and west. Mail was carried by bus and no longer "voluntarily" on Indian men's backs from the departmental capital 41 kilometers and two mountain ranges to the west. The number of copies of daily newspapers received had risen from five to 35. A diesel electric light plant provided street lighting, home lighting (for some 250 subscribers, mostly Ladinos) and current for 20 radios, seven electric refrigerators and several corn-grinding mills making *masa* for tortillas. The number of schools had gone up from four to 12, and school enrollment had increased more than 200 percent, with a proportionately higher augment among Indian children. University-trained principals had been in charge since 1946. All former labor for the local government was now paid for at a rate officially declared to be 80 cents a day. Movies were shown about once a week. A water system providing convenient faucets on street corners and in private houses (the latter for persons paying a special fee, of course) was installed in 1955. The church was restored by the Arbenz government and a resident priest established for the first time in 50 years. The main street was paved.

These things had provided access for the people of San Luis, Indian and Ladino alike, to ideas and organizational movements of the nation and the outside world at large. An increased stand-

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ard of real income was evidenced by a change to more expensive buying habits, especially in manufactured goods imported from outside the community. To mention one trivial example, the per capita sale of factory-made straw and felt hats increased about 950 percent between 1942 and 1954. This economic prosperity manifested by "more money in the pocket" was, of course, stimulated by world market conditions, but also unquestionably by policies of successive national governments such as payment for formerly forced labor, minimum wage legislation and encouragement of private ownership of land by former peons and sharecroppers through the Agrarian Reform Act.

From a political-cultural point of view, the most important effects in San Luis were not purely economic. They were the feelings of individual independence and "dignity of the person" which for the first time either in their own lives or in local tradition the inhabitants of San Luis came to know. They developed a new conception of the rôle of the individual in local and national concerns. In 1955 many an individual in San Luis who in 1942 had never dreamed of taking part in any affairs larger than the dreary concerns of his daily work, his *milpa,* or his modest landholding could look back on ten years of increasing participation in political movements and discussion of political issues. Local political autonomy, established by the constitution of 1945, gave the first opportunity for lessons in political participation. Mayors and councilmen were elected and for three years political divisions and issues were almost purely local. By the latter part of 1948 representatives of nationally organized political parties began to penetrate San Luis and to woo or demand the allegiance of the new participant-citizens.

In the municipal elections of 1953, no less than five parties, all of them officially affiliates of national groups of the same names, presented three slates of candidates. Although travelling representatives of the *Vanguardia Nacional,* a forerunner of the Communist Party, appeared in the community as early as 1948, the Communist Party or its successor, the Guatemalan Workers' Party, was never organized under its own name in San Luis.

Shortly after the promulgation of the Agrarian Reform Law (1952) a local *Unión Campesina* (Peasants' Union) was organized by outside agents and began vigorous agitation and, it is reported, occasional violent action. According to the municipal records, the number of arrests for "crimes against the person"

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and "crimes against public order" rose rapidly during 1951–1953. In the latter year four murders occurred. One of these involved the ambush of the son of the largest Ladino estate owner, and two others are said to have arisen from quarrels over the Agrarian Reform Law. Stands of timber were burned and growing field crops of noncoöperators were destroyed by members of the *Unión Campesina,* according to reports of 1955 informants. However, only some 237 persons were identified as members of the Union, of which about 180 are said to have been Indians.

One of the features of these developments was the fact that many of the younger and better educated Indians and lower-class Ladinos were drawn first into political activity and then into the more "radical" movements. As early as 1948, before the more leftist programs and organizations had put in an appearance, the Indians by local election outnumbered the Ladinos 4 to 2 on the municipal council. One of the results of the "clean-up" following the Castillo Armas victory was that nine of the younger leaders were taken captive to Chiquimula, the "Liberation" headquarters, where they were reported to have been summarily executed by a firing squad. Among these, according to available information, were five young literate Indians. Numerous other small leaders fled the community into exile or hiding elsewhere.

The excesses of local leaders seem to have been almost entirely inspired by outside "agitators." The desire for land was deeply imbedded in the ethos of both Indians and poor Ladinos alike in 1942, but as late as 1948 the methods contemplated locally to obtain wider distribution of it were entirely gradualistic and "democratic." Objectively, it can only be regarded as unfortunate that the Arbenz régime failed to maintain the pattern of orderly education in political participation on the local level which had begun so auspiciously during the first years of the Arévalo administration. And it is doubly unfortunate that events resulted in the elimination of the flower of the young leadership. However, it is to the credit of Castillo Armas that after the first roundup of "Communists" San Luis people say that they have been free of persecutions and spying since October 1954 (when the confirmation of Castillo Armas took place by "plebiscite").

Visiting the community in July of 1955, one found that although the old political divisions were no longer discussed and that memories of the "terror" of the last months of Arbenz were still alive, San Luis had not gone back to 1942. Ten years of ex-

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perience in political affairs on the local level, a decade of exposure to the national symbols and discussion of them, had left the average man with his eyes open and with a new interest in the world of which he now saw himself a part. No longer is San Luis an isolated and sad little country municipio, where "there is nothing you can do about it" and undesirable events and conditions are merely "the will of God." If the Castillo Armas régime fulfills its promises to maintain the conditions of democracy, San Luis is now equipped as never before to continue along the road toward progress and the elimination of social injustice. Essentially the same changes are found in other communities examined, although some are more "advanced," others less so, than San Luis.

V

The government of Castillo Armas thus took over a country that had experienced a decade of "democratic reforms" and had assimilated many of them into its culture. And the men whom Castillo brought into the government were aware of this. His closest supporters appear to be the remnants of the group that had been pushing the presidential candidacy of the then Chief-of-Staff Francisco Javier Araña when he was assassinated in 1949, almost certainly by *Arbencistas*. These persons, many of them young, were all supporters of the basic principles behind the revolution of 1944 and many of them had gained experience in the government of Guatemala City, an opposition center during the incumbency of Arbenz.

Yet the carrying out of commitments to further the basic reforms of the revolution of 1944 is by no means a simple matter and may be quite impossible unless the powers that be have a real understanding of the human resources of the country. Fortunately, Castillo Armas is aware of this and is setting something of a precedent in planning two conferences of social scientists who will be asked to bring their knowledge to bear on the problems of Guatemala. What are some of the factors and conditions which these social scientists might recognize and with which any Guatemalan government must ultimately contend?

First, there is the emergence in Guatemala and elsewhere in Latin America of what may be described as the Middle Mass, a largely unstable group which has provided both the motivation and the leadership for the social and political changes that have occurred in Guatemala since 1944. This segment of society is not

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the middle class, in the sense familiar to students of Northern Europe and the United States. It is a collection of "middle" groups, not yet consolidated, and lacking that long period of development in the "bourgeois virtues" known in Europe and North America. The distinguishing negative features of the members of the Middle Mass are that, on the one hand, they do not earn their living by manual labor and, on the other hand, they do not claim the power and privileges of the aristocracy. Yet they are accessible to the media of mass communications and therefore to aspirations and ideologies of the outside world. The inadequacy of the Middle Mass as a basis for social and political development lies in its absence of common goals. Its members tend to split between those who believe in progress by evolutionary means and those who favor reform by revolution.

Most officers of the army are of the Middle Mass and it is an axiom in Guatemala that, although the army does not govern, in the last analysis it determines who does. In the revolution of 1944 the army made common cause with other elements, consisting mainly of the less prosperous "intellectuals," smaller business men, professional men and students. For a decade these segments constituted the dominant coalition and they constitute the core of the Castillo Armas government today.

Although the revolution of 1944 was not "staffed" to any significant degree either by Indians or by lower-class Ladinos, its leaders were sensitive to the demands and expectations of these groups which constitute the great majority of the population. The three major goals of these segments of society—land reform, rights of labor, and education—commanded attention. The Indians and lower-class Ladinos are, after ten years, aware of their "rights" in these respects, and no government can long ignore them without the use of the most oppressive force.

During its first 18 months in power, however, the Castillo government has refused to take a firm stand on anything except Communism. The result seems to be a series of paradoxes and ambiguities that create uneasiness both within and outside of Guatemala and that gain the positive support of hardly anyone.

On the one hand official propaganda speaks of "eleven years of Communist rule" and on the other the dominant members of the administration pride themselves on being the intellectual and moral heirs of the revolution of 1944. Indeed, the anniversary of the fall of Ubico was officially celebrated in 1955, but the dicta-

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tor's old head of the secret police was once again discharging the same function, and many others of the old retainers occupied high positions. The Liberation government protests its love of democracy, but there has been maintained for over a year the National Committee for the Defense Against Communism, a direct dependency of the executive, with powers of arrest which do not recognize habeas corpus, *amparo,* or any other of the normal safeguards stemming either from the principle of division of powers or from normal constitutional civil guarantees. Conversely, its avowed hatred for Communism did not prevent the government from allowing as many as a thousand leaders and active supporters of the former régime to seek asylum and leave the country peaceably. *El Estudiante,* an oppositionist weekly published by a committee of law students, spares little in attacking the government and even the President personally, but appears regularly and without visible official molestation. And yet estimates concerning the number of formal and informal police agencies range between 11 and 19.

Castillo, focussing the total opposition on Arbenz, has apparently felt he had to accept help from *Ubiquista* and clerical elements. Perforce, each group could not have its own revolutionary candidate. Violently clashing opinions thus sought shelter under the same cover. *Aranista* congressional leaders bitterly criticized certain *Ubiquista* police actions; partisans of the church rowed with traditional liberals. Sometimes one group jailed the other: the leader of the President's own political "association," or party, was in jail on the very day that the 1954 plebiscite confirmed the presidency of Castillo Armas and elected the constituent assembly.

To complicate matters further, many of these persons were hungry for the fruits of power after their long fast. Scandals and rumors of scandals continued to rock the country. Charges of skulduggery attended the purchase by the government of the port of Champerico from a subsidiary of the Grace Line; bidding on road contracts sometimes contained suspicious elements; the problem of enlarging the telephone system in the capital led to violent competition between Ericsson and Siemens, with charges on both sides that bribes were offered and accepted. A late 1955 scandal concerned a corn importing company which allegedly made over a million dollars in six months of speculation on the grain market while the price of corn rose from a normal three or

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four cents a pound to as high as 15; at the same time the American Government shipped in corn as a gift to sell for four cents. *El Estudiante* linked the name of President with the grain operations, causing a most embarrassing national episode.

The United Fruit Company made the gesture of turning over about 100,000 acres of its lands for division among the peasants, and the government appealed to other landowners to do likewise. A handful responded. The government also experimentally divided a couple of its nationally-owned estates. An agency was set up for the planning of rural colonies, each to have a community center containing market, church, school, assembly hall, etc., and a handful of experts was imported from the United States to help. But the program is still on an experimental basis and the fundamental problem of redistributing the land has not been faced. Castillo naïvely asked his wealthy and conservative backers to contribute financially to the success of the Liberation. When they snickered, he resorted to a capital levy. The labor unions are still emasculated for lack of leadership. Real wages have suffered a serious decline. Small business marks time for lack of confidence and a clear credit policy. The schoolteachers are largely demoralized because the baleful National Committee for the Defense Against Communism keeps them under steady surveillance. Indian leaders want to know where they fit into the picture.

Lacking a clear-cut program and a stage on which issues can be democratically argued and compromised, the government drifted toward increasing dependence on the police power. Yet the Liberation has shown that it does not wish to return to the politics of Ubico, which were clearly of a different family. The real alternatives are not between the post-1944 governments, but rather between the Arévalo-Arbenz-Castillo succession and the past as symbolized by Ubico. The post-revolutionary governments have all been in the stream of modernism, what we may tritely call modern Western culture, whether the ideological whitewash be leftist or rightist. The present problem is whether this venture into the free world can be consolidated or whether a violent movement by either right or left opposition on the one hand, or a slow drift into a police state by the present government on the other, will eventually result in an inevitable new "Liberation."

As the year 1955 drew to a close—and with it the first 18

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months of the Liberation—certain forms of democracy had been restored in Guatemala. A new constitution had been approved and elections had been held for a new Congress (the unicameral form was continued) and for municipal officials. Three groups of parties—all anti-Communist—had been organized, although one coalition, termed the "opposition" by the press, refused to participate in the elections. It claimed that the whole procedure as decreed by the government was "undemocratic," a criticism which was echoed by several of the independent newspapers. One of them, *La Hora,* proclaimed editorially that the time had come when Castillo Armas must choose between democracy and dictatorship, a point of view that, surprisingly, was taken seriously in *El Espectador,* organ of the government party coalition (National Democratic Movement). And on the last day of the year it was reported on the radio that the President planned early in the new year to "purge" his administration in the interests of "efficiency" and "loyalty to the Liberation." Also late in the year a group of labor unions—34 had been allowed to organize by this time—protested the paralyzing effects of the National Committee for the Defense Against Communism, the superjudicial "snooping" arm of the executive. And another scandal had been unearthed involving officials of the Ministry of Communications who were allegedly selling highway bureau gasoline for their personal enrichment.

It is a considerably easier and shorter job to "liberate" Guatemala than to convert it to a fully democratic country of the modern world. The latter takes time, as well as enlightened leadership. The United States has much at stake and cannot afford to lose interest. Whatever the full truth may be, we are identified by much of the world as a conspirator in the Guatemalan Revolution of two years ago. If our first "Liberation" is to degenerate into a tawdry poorhouse of quarreling inmates, or another experiment in Communist infiltration, or a reversion to traditional "banana republic" reactionism, many people are going to think that we would do better to remain out of the liberation business. Peoples of the underdeveloped areas outside the Iron Curtain, to say nothing of the satellites themselves, are going to judge the results of the Guatemala liberation in terms of their ideas of the better life, not by the immediate military results of a few border skirmishes in June 1954.

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MOROCCO PLANS FOR INDEPENDENCE

By Ahmed Balafrej

ON November 16, 1955, His Majesty Sultan Mohammed V returned to Rabat after two years of exile. A new era began for the Moroccan people. In order to bring about this memorable day they had fought a heroic fight and made sacrifices. Now their hopes were to come true.

France's recognition of Moroccan independence indeed marks a turning point in the history of Franco-Moroccan relations. In the Celle-Saint-Cloud declaration of November 6, 1955, the government of the French Republic pledged itself to help Morocco achieve the status of an independent state within the framework of a freely negotiated and defined relationship of interdependence.

The Moroccan people cherish the hope of exercising the attributes of effective sovereignty and of seeing a régime of liberty, equality and democracy established in their country. They expect to enjoy freedom of expression, thought, assembly and movement such as exists in independent sovereign nations. They aspire, in other words, to a respectable way of life. They think it will be assured by exploiting the country's riches efficiently and distributing them in a manner to raise the standard of living, absorb unemployment and guarantee quiet and well-being for all.

As the Franco-Moroccan negotiations begin, we hope, of course, that France may really play the card of independence without any reservation or bargaining. These negotiations should be characterized above all by frankness and sincerity. The French government must show no ambiguity in leading Morocco to true independence. It did not take long for the Moroccan people to realize that the so-called "protectorate" treaty was the prototype of a colonial treaty. Its fear now is that perhaps that colonial treaty may simply be replaced by another colonial treaty under another name. For this reason what is asked for in the name of interdependence must not make a mockery of independence. The ties of interdependence must originate in independence. Only a state which is sovereign and fully independent can enter usefully and validly into a relationship of interdependence.

We hope that France has renounced the policy of assimilation and the colonial system and that she will comply with our desire to regain our sovereignty in both the domestic and the foreign

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field. Once independence has been solemnly recognized it must not remain an empty word; the Moroccan people must exercise the prerogatives of sovereignty. They trust France will secure the necessary coöperation of friendly Powers in bringing this about. They are aware of their responsibility to guarantee to all foreigners residing in Morocco the same freedom and security they enjoy in countries which are sovereign and democratic. In this connection the statement of the United States Government that it is willing to renounce its extraterritorial rights in favor of the free Moroccan government has been noted with satisfaction.

At the request of His Majesty the Sultan, the Istiqlal Party is participating in the recently constituted Moroccan government. This is essentially a negotiating government. Its primary mission is to liberate the national sovereignty and restore Moroccan independence. For the immediate future its plan of action follows in its main lines the directives outlined by the Sultan in his speech from the throne on November 18 and in the government declaration of December 7. The Sultan said in his speech:

> The time has come to mobilize all the energies available for the construction of a new Morocco. This undertaking will demand a thoroughgoing transformation of the habits, the institutions and the methods of government, as it will also imply an emancipation of the individual, assuring him the secure enjoyment of all his freedoms. Thus Morocco will succeed in attaining the independence that we have never ceased to claim not only as the natural right of all peoples without distinction, but also as the surest means of enabling them to benefit both from the evolution of the modern world and from the advantages of a democratic régime free from all racial discrimination and inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The main problem is therefore to assure the effective management of national affairs which was forbidden for Moroccans under direct French administration. Not only in the administrative field but in the economic and social fields also, basic reforms will have to be undertaken to provide the necessary security of person and property and promote general prosperity and well-being.

We believe that a democratic régime based on a constitutional monarchy is the one which corresponds best to the hopes of the Moroccan people. The social structure of the rural areas and particularly of certain so-called Berber regions lends itself perfectly to it. Long before the establishment of the French Protectorate there were communal and municipal assemblies in Morocco. These elected local assemblies actually constitute the core of the democratic system to which the Moroccan people remain

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deeply attached. With slight modifications, and in conjunction with adequate guarantees that elections will be free from intervention by the administrative authorities, these assemblies will form the basic elements of modern community life. They can manage local matters and prepare independent budgets. They will serve as a basis for the election of departmental councils which will have wider competence and can be of great help to the central authority.

As soon as we have attained our national sovereignty and when we have had a period of experiment and learning (which the Istiqlal Party hopes will be as short as possible), we shall proceed to free and democratic elections for a national assembly. This assembly will have fully sovereign powers and the Moroccan government will be responsible to it.

For the present the Sultan has expressed a desire that a consultative body of Moroccans should assist him in his task. Therefore a temporary consultative assembly will soon be formed; its members will be appointed, but they will be chosen to give as true a reflection as possible of all shades of opinion and all levels of society. Its duties will be to give advice on legal projects submitted by His Majesty for study and to advise the Moroccan government on projected reforms, on suggestions for the conduct of public affairs and on the course of Franco-Moroccan negotiations. It will undertake the study of a constitution and prepare a draft representing the combined will of the Sovereign and itself. This constitution can then be presented to an elected assembly.

The Istiqlal Party considers it necessary in addition to set up a second chamber for the study of economic and social problems. The decisive influence of economic matters on the whole life of a nation is especially great in the case of an underdeveloped country like ours. This makes it imperative that some superior body concern itself with economic problems, both to improve and exploit the country's resources at home and to improve its relations with foreign states directly or indirectly interested in the Moroccan economy. We wish Morocco to benefit from the advantages of a liberal economic régime in which private enterprise can enjoy its proper rewards and capital can find the security it needs for its development.

The social problems pressing for solution in Morocco are equally important. Measures for the development of trade-unionism and the awakening of the working classes to the rôle

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they are called to play in society will also fall within the competence of this assembly.

In a word, the new era which is opening for Morocco poses the problems of organization and structure required in a modern state. Some wonder if the archaic administrative system called "feudalism" can be replaced readily by a new administration competent to conduct the affairs of a modern state. First of all let it be remembered that it has always been wrong to speak of "feudalism" and "feudalists." A feudal organization such as existed in certain countries of Europe has never existed in Morocco. Particularly following the establishment of the French Protectorate certain local chiefs for understandable political reasons posed as legendary figures, characters out of the Arabian Nights —the Glaoui, for instance. They were created to serve as a threat against the central power, specifically against the Sultan whenever he might refuse to surrender the prerogatives of national sovereignty which are under his guardianship. The law provides that these personages should be agents of the central power, like *préfets,* appointed and relieved at will. Colonial policy as hitherto applied, however, turned them into the colonial Power's docile agents, giving them exorbitant privileges and an importance which they, in turn, often grossly exaggerated by clever propaganda. The only real feudalism existing in Morocco is that of the French civilian officials, each of whom acts as a petty lord with rights of life and death over the population in his realm. We believe that this form of control must be totally abolished once and for all. After that a reform of the caid system will take place. The pashas and caids will be given a fixed status. They will receive a salary from the state and will have to submit to fixed conditions of recruitment, promotion and discipline. In their capacity as local representatives of the central government they will exercise purely administrative functions; they will have neither judiciary nor fiscal powers.

The building of a modern state requires not simply enough men of ability to fill key political positions but specialists throughout the administration and above all in economic and technical fields. We hope that the ties of interdependence which France intends to have with Morocco will aim to provide precisely the technical assistance and coöperation which will permit us to form our own cadres in a relatively short time.

We intend to turn for help to international organizations such

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as the F.A.O., the W.H.O. or UNESCO and also to friendly countries for such technical aid as Morocco requires. I should like to specify, however, that we shall refuse any relationship that infringes our sovereignty or would stifle our personality.

The technical cadres of the Protectorate consisted of hardly more than 2,500 to 3,000 technicians. The figure gives an idea of the relatively small number of technicians that would be needed to provide normal services. It encourages us to believe that we shall be able to take over responsibility for the technical administration of our country within a period of about five years. We aim to reach this goal by setting up an accelerated system of technical instruction aimed particularly toward the formation of administrative cadres. An eminent French economist has stated that it is entirely possible to develop a large enough force of technical executive officers to assure that the government's agricultural policy will be administered efficiently. He believes that under an accelerated training system Morocco can have nearly 3,000 trained officials in this field within two years.

Thus with the coöperation of international organizations on the one hand and an accelerated program for training technicians on the other we can gradually take over the management of our affairs. We recognize that our country, young and new as it is, lacks experience and does not have all the technical resources needed by a modern state. We count on the assistance of France, who has interests to safeguard and develop, as well as of her allies, who will find it advantageous to coöperate with Morocco because of her economic potentialities and strategic position.

Some people might wonder whether religious leaders or certain groups in Moslem universities—even the Moslem religion itself—might not form an obstacle to modernization in the political and institutional field as well as in economic and social affairs. I should like to point out that Islam has no clergy and that the Moslem religion is not hierarchical. It is true, of course, that the Koran and the *Hadith* (the tradition of the Prophet), the written foundations of the Moslem religion, cover secular problems, but they do so by laying down general principles which are susceptible of evolution. These principles are in no way incompatible with the development of the world or with modern trends. On the contrary, they are conceived in the spirit of progress, of equality, social justice, tolerance and peace among men. More than that, the *Ijtihad*—the interpretation of these principles—allows the

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commentators in any case to adapt the principles of the Koran to the requirements of evolution and progress.

Odd as it may seem, the obstacles in the way of liberalism and modernism are to be found in certain French quarters which claim to be saturated with democracy and liberty, rather than among the Moslem population. The revolution which is taking place in Morocco not only was not thwarted by the religious leaders and Moslem university circles; these actually played a major part in spreading new ideas and persuading the Moroccan people to adopt them. The Islamic teachers and students of the Karaouyine University at Fez and of the Ben Youssef University at Marrakesh, for instance, were the first to demand the most extensive reforms in the social and family field.

The participation of women in public life is another matter which is becoming more and more important. The veil is falling like a dead leaf. Women stress their desire for emancipation along with the men. Factories have had a great influx of women workers. Women teachers are to be seen teaching in boys' schools and taking part in the fight against adult illiteracy. Women do not stop with demanding the right to take a full part in public activities but also claim the right to vote and to be eligible for public office, something they do not have as yet in certain European countries and which they have had only in the last ten years in France. During the Istiqlal Party Congress held at Rabat early in December 1955 the active participation of Moroccan women in all the work of the Congress was very noticeable. A special motion outlining in specific terms the rights and obligations of women was adopted as a result of the activity of women who had come from all parts of Morocco.

The Moroccan people are eager to learn and progress in every field. We know that while we must remain true to our Moslem identity we have to build a state on Western political principles.

It cannot be denied that there is such a thing as Moslem solidarity. Any event that occurs in one Moslem country has its repercussions in the others. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Morocco has always been anxious to guard its individuality, its personality. We are Moslems; we cling to our Moslem identity as an essential element of ourselves. But we also cling to our individuality, rooted in our geographic location and history.

We cannot remain indifferent to developments in the Arab countries or to trends which oppose them. In spite of being ab-

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sorbed in our own revolution and in securing our sovereignty and asserting and expanding our personality, we follow those events with keen interest. Through Morocco's geographic position, through her economic, strategic and cultural relations with the West and her religious, linguistic and historic ties with the Arab and other Moslem countries, she should be the link between two civilizations which complement and need each other.

The leaders in other Arab states who like us are trying to attain sovereignty for their countries do not always find the necessary understanding in the West nor are they able to secure assistance and coöperation on a dignified basis of equality. It is particularly regrettable that the United States does not have a clearly defined policy for this part of the globe. Certainly, any manifestation of understanding of these countries and any ties established with them by the West can have only a favorable influence in Morocco. The opposite is equally true. The economic problems and even more the strategic ones which are of immediate concern to the United States compel it to pay particular attention to the countries of the Middle East and North Africa and to develop a clearer understanding of their legitimate aspirations.

The agreement for the establishment of American bases in Morocco was concluded between the United States and France. Neither the Sultan nor the Moroccan government was consulted. Under the treaty of 1912 France was responsible for the security and territorial integrity of Morocco. Did she have the right to dispose of a part of the land under her protection to a third party? Did she have the right even to sublet it or to hand over the use of it to someone else without consulting and obtaining the consent of those primarily concerned—who happen to be the Moroccans? Even if it was done with a view to defending world peace, the operation was an abnormal one to say the least. If this situation were allowed to continue it would risk heightening hostility against the American bases, which at present is only latent.

Such are the hopes and fears of the Moroccan people as they stand on the threshold of a new era. We are fully aware of the fact that independence is not a cure-all. It is, nevertheless, the psychological spur which is indispensable for arousing the enthusiasm needed for building a modern state based on the principles of freedom and tolerance, and capable of joining with other peoples who defend the superior values that make life worth living.

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SPORT AS A SOVIET TOOL

By John N. Washburn

THE leaders of Soviet Russia have always considered sports to be a matter of primary importance to the state and have made their position clear in numerous Communist Party decrees and *Pravda* editorials. They have stated that there can be no "sport for sport's sake," that hunters, for example, must not merely look for game but consider themselves explorers with obligations to Soviet society. Their preoccupation with the utilitarian and socio-political aspects of sport is reflected in their definition of the term *fizkultura* (physical culture) which the July 13, 1925, decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party interprets as follows:

> Physical culture must be considered not only from the standpoint of physical education and health and as an aspect of the cultural, economic and military training of youth (the sport of rifle marksmanship and others), but also as one of the methods of educating the masses (in as much as physical culture develops will power and builds up endurance, teamwork, resourcefulness and other valuable qualities), and in addition, as a means of rallying the broad masses of workers and peasants around the various Party, soviet, and trade union organizations, through which the masses of workers and peasants are to be drawn into social and political activity.

Thus, sports can have no independent existence in the U.S.S.R. and are merely a means to an end—the consolidation of state power through mass training and indoctrination.

Prior to World War II the Communist Party in Soviet Russia utilized physical culture and sport primarily to build the country's defense potential and facilitate other domestic purposes; but in the past ten years these have played an increasingly important rôle in furthering the foreign policy objectives set forth by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. At the end of 1946 the U.S.S.R. was represented in only two international athletic bodies, but between 1946 and 1955 it joined 25 more. Official recognition of the Soviet Olympic Committee in May 1951 made it possible for the U.S.S.R. to participate in the 1952 Olympic Games. In 1955 Moscow permitted the international exchange of athletic delegations between the Soviet Union and the outside world to reach its postwar peak, with 187 foreign athletic teams coming to the U.S.S.R. to play against Soviet teams while 162 Soviet athletic teams went abroad to compete.

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The government has sought both to provide maximum competitive experience for Soviet athletic teams in preparation for the 1956 Olympic Games and to increase the number of teams dispatched to distant lands for political purposes. An example is the "Lokomotiv" soccer team that traveled to Indonesia, Burma and India. It played against an Indian team in Calcutta on December 1, the day after the huge mass meeting held there in honor of the touring Soviet leaders, Bulganin and Khrushchev.

A considerable body of Soviet Marxist dogma concerning bourgeois and proletarian sport has been formulated by Bolshevik theoreticians. Soviet Marxists maintain that under capitalism the bourgeoisie hypocritically proclaims the nonpolitical nature of sport while doing its utmost to distract toilers from the class struggle and to instill in them the base instincts which warmongers with criminal aims may utilize to advantage. To support their claim they invariably cite the following passage from an article by Maxim Gorky on the nature of sports in bourgeois lands:

> Sport there has one simple and clear purpose: to make man even more stupid than he is. There the cry "Down with reason, extinguish thought!" resounds louder and louder. This is a cry of fear and despair. Thought must be blinded and rendered impotent in order that there may be substituted for the power of reason unquestioning faith in the authority of the class state and the church; reason must be blinded so that it will not perceive the light that has been lit in the U.S.S.R. In bourgeois states they utilize sport to produce cannon fodder. . . .

After the start of the Korean war in 1950 Gorky's reference to "cannon fodder" was repeatedly quoted to "prove" that Uncle Sam was a warmonger using sport to train American youth for war.

This purportedly authentic picture of the political and martial nature of bourgeois sport is then contrasted with Soviet sport, whose avowed purpose is to destroy everything old and sordid that obstructs the growth of the new and pure proletarian culture. Under the benign supervision of the Communist Party, the Soviet government and wise leaders like Comrade Stalin—"the best friend of the physical-culturists"—sport is alleged to have been placed at the service of the masses, to have increased their cultural growth and their well-being, and to have developed their spiritual and physical capabilities. Bolshevik theoreticians laud Soviet sport for dedicating itself to the cause of peace, conveniently forgetting the once popular slogans—"The Red Army—

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The Real School of Physical Culture" and "Physical Culturists —The Red Army's Reserve." They also overlook embarrassing martial spectacles in the field of sports such as fencing with carbines to which rubber bayonets have been attached, still a regular event at all U.S.S.R. fencing championships.

Since sport is a matter of primary importance to the state all athletes up to and including those with the title of Honored Master of Sport are subject to a rigorous code of conduct both in training and in the course of championship competition. Suspension and loss of the honorary Master of Sport title will result from "misdemeanors incompatible with the calling of a Soviet athlete." G. Novak, holder of many world records in weight lifting since 1945, was stripped of his Honored Master of Sport title in 1952 for "amoral conduct." Another example of the Spartan approach was to be seen at the 1954 U.S.S.R. outdoor tennis championships, in which a semi-finalist was judged to have defaulted his match for appearing on the court five minutes after a designated hour. From this our young players will learn the lesson of punctuality, commented *Sovietskii Sport*. Chess players are also vulnerable. Several Grand Masters participating in the 1953 U.S.S.R. chess championships were subjected to sharp criticism for having been too prone to settle for "toothless ties."

An apolitical attitude is not tolerated in Soviet athletes. No sport can be outside the realm of politics. The code of political conduct for chess players, as announced in an official decree issued three years ago, requires Soviet Grand Masters and Masters to work systematically to improve their comprehension of Marxist ideology in addition to perfecting their techniques in chess. It is not uncommon, therefore, to find leading Soviet chess players manifesting their political orthodoxy by delivering anti-American tirades like that of Grand Master A. A. Kotov at the fourth All-Union Conference of Peace Supporters in Moscow in 1952.

The highest governmental body dealing with Soviet athletic policy is the All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport. Successor to the All-Union Council of Physical Culture, it is directly responsible to the Council of Ministers. From his headquarters in Moscow, the chairman for the past ten years, N. Romanov, directs the Union Republic Committees, which in turn control City Committees (of which the most prominent are those of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi and Minsk). The All-Union Committee maintains direct supervision over 15 institutes and

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38 "technicums" of physical culture as well as several institutes for scientific research in physical culture. Within both the All-Union and Union Republic Committees are so-called special sections, comprising a cadre section and a secret section, staffed by M.V.D. agents who handle security checks and recruit informers among athletes.

Through these special sections the M.V.D. can assert substantial pressure on the All-Union and Union Republic Committees. Its leverage derives primarily from the great power wielded by the M.V.D.'s own Dynamo Athletic Club, oldest and most influential in the Soviet Union. This nation-wide organization of the secret police and organs of state security controls approximately 120 stadia and operates an extensive network of stores selling athletic equipment. When the physical culture movement was revitalized under the decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party dated December 27, 1948, M.V.D. Colonel General Apollonov exercised fully as much authority as the chairman of the All-Union Committee. However, since the demise of L. P. Beria, the power of the M.V.D. in physical culture and sports has been somewhat reduced. In this connection it is significant that the fine hockey teams of the Air Force and the Central House of the Soviet Army were unexpectedly combined into a single team representing the Central Sports Club of the Ministry of Defense, which then humbled the Moscow Dynamo team in the 1955 U.S.S.R. ice hockey championships.

Another very important agency engaged in implementing athletic policy directives is the All-Union Leninist Communist Union of Youth, often termed the "soul of mass sport." Its central committee is credited with drawing up the comprehensive plan establishing a minimum level of general, all-round physical development for Soviet workers as part of the expanded physical culture program called for by Stalin at the Sixteenth Party Congress. The plan's official title is the "All-Union Physical-Culture Complex" but it is popularly known as the G.T.O., whose initials stand for "'Ready for Work and for Defense." The comprehensive G.T.O. plan developed in the early thirties comprises three sets of standards for Soviet citizens aged 14 to 40, both male and female. The original norms were made more exacting by specific government decrees in 1939 and 1954. The basic mission of the All-Union Leninist Communist Union of Youth is to draw the youth of the land into physical culture groups called "collectives,"

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whose members are given only a limited amount of time to pass the G.T.O. athletic tests in order that quarterly or annual G.T.O. quotas may be fulfilled according to plan.

The principal measure of athletic proficiency in the Soviet Union is the Single All-Union Athletic Classification System. In 45 recognized sports, from auto racing to checkers, five levels of proficiency have been generally established, starting at the bottom with Class C (the so-called "third category") and proceeding upward through Class B and Class A to the coveted Master of Sport category, and finally to the title of Honored Master of Sport. (In most sports there are also three junior categories.) The All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport sets the standards for each category of the Single Classification System. It has raised them twice in recent years. To qualify for a category rating under the Single Classification System a Soviet athlete must first pass the tests in one of the three sets of standards established by the G.T.O. plan. Before being awarded the Master of Sport title, for example, one must pass the advanced level G.T.O. tests with the grade of "excellent."

The G.T.O. plan and the Single Classification System reflect the two underlying principles of Soviet athletics—*massovost* (mass-ness) and *masterstvo* (proficiency). A broad base of mass participation in physical culture must exist before the skill of individual athletes can be developed on a national basis—this has been the policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for more than three decades. *Massovost* is held to be primary, while *masterstvo* derives from it. Mikhail Kalinin, former chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., explained the primacy of *massovost* in these simple terms:

> In our country physical culture is sport for the people, in our country millions participate in the physical culture movement. And it is obvious that talented athletes will sooner be found among these millions than among thousands, and that it is easier to find talented athletes among thousands than among hundreds.

The fact that the Soviet Union is internationally prominent in sports in which it has a mass base (chess, gymnastics, rifle marksmanship, etc.), but woefully weak in sports lacking any mass participation in the U.S.S.R. (tennis, figure skating, fencing, etc.), points up the importance of *massovost*.

One of the principal agencies for promoting *massovost* is the

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All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, which has primary responsibility for establishing physical culture collectives in industrial and commercial enterprises and for recruiting production workers and office employees for these collectives. To this end, orders from the Central Council are transmitted to Union Republic, area and regional councils and on down to local councils and to factory and plant councils at the production site. In actual practice this chain of command is surprisingly weak: *Pravda* revealed on July 21, 1951, that in over two years officials of the Central Council had not set foot in the large Torpedo Athletic Club at the Stalin Auto Works in Moscow. Trade unions first became active in the physical culture movement in 1935, when the Moscow City Committee of the Communist Party permitted unions in the Moscow area to establish their own athletic clubs. Today the Central Councils of 30 unions are operating athletic clubs throughout the country. Assigned to the individual factories and plants are physical culture organizers who must get the assigned quota of their factory's labor force into sufficiently good physical condition to pass the G.T.O. requirements. To achieve his goal the *fizorg* (physical culture organizer) often makes use of the device known as "socialist competition," challenging the *fizorg* of another factory to a contest in producing the assigned quota of parachute jumpers or rifle marksmen, for example, in the shortest possible time.

In accordance with specific provisions of the 1948 decree, increased publicity has been given to the physical culture movement through the press, radio, television and films. "All-Union Day of the Physical-Culturists," which falls on a Sunday in either July or August, is celebrated with more and more fanfare and publicity each year. Considerable excitement accompanied the announcement that a tremendous drive would be launched to discover new athletic talent in rural Russia by means of a series of local and regional competitions in rural areas, followed by rural-urban competitions in major cities and towns. The winners in these competitions will qualify for the so-called "Spartakiad of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R.," a mass pre-Olympic tryout scheduled for July and August of 1956 in a gigantic new stadium now under construction on the outskirts of Moscow. There will be competitions in 21 sports in which nearly ten thousand picked athletes representing all the Union Republics of the U.S.S.R. will be entered.

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In order to put the *massovost* principle into effect a large and expanding physical plant and an adequate supply of athletic equipment are essential. The state budget for public health, which includes appropriations for physical culture and sport as well as for sanitation and hygiene, rose more than 12 billion rubles between 1952 and 1956, reaching a total of 35 billion rubles this year. Millions of rubles have gone into additions to the Soviet athletic plant: 400 stadia have been built since 1945 and the U.S.S.R. now has over a thousand; eight institutes and eleven "technicums" of physical culture have been added since 1941, raising the number to 15 and 38 respectively. While these figures indicate an appreciable growth in the physical plant, they give no idea of the extent to which demand for adequate athletic facilities has exceeded supply. The winter resort patterned after Davos and St. Moritz built near Alma-Ata to provide speed skaters with ideal conditions for breaking world records is definitely atypical and is restricted to Soviet skaters of championship calibre. Athletic equipment, even in the stores operated by the Dynamo Athletic Club, continues to be in short supply, a situation resulting not only from insufficient output and the inferior quality of goods produced but especially from inefficient distribution and marketing of athletic equipment. However, the shortage of sporting goods does not affect outstanding Soviet athletes; the state provides them with the best equipment made, whether Soviet or foreign.

As the center of the world Communist conspiracy, the Soviet Union has not forgotten that sports can prove to be of great use as a weapon in the class struggle. The K.S.I. (Red Sport International) was founded in Moscow in 1921 to "train physical-culturists for the class struggle." Although it no longer functions as the Comintern's athletic affiliate charged with combatting S.A.S.I. (Sozialistische Arbeiter Sportinternationale), the athletic organization affiliated with the Second (Socialist) International, agents trained by the K.S.I. are still at work trying to penetrate the national sections of S.A.S.I. in Western Europe. As a result of systematic infiltration, French Communists gained effective control over the F.S.G.T. (Fédération Sportive et Gymnastique du Travail). Faced with a fait accompli the French Socialists in the F.S.G.T. withdrew and formed the U.S.T. (Union Sportive Travailliste), which represents the ideals of Socialist Léo LaGrange, France's first Minister of Sports and Recreation

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as a member of Léon Blum's cabinet. Although subsidized by the French government to the extent of 3,000,000 francs in 1955, the U.S.T. is still much weaker than its rival, which has ample Communist Party funds to draw on for such purposes as publishing a weekly newspaper and an illustrated magazine, and organizing costly propaganda spectacles like the annual cross-country race sponsored by the French Communist daily, *L'Humanité.*

Another aspect of Soviet sports that gives Americans pause is the policy of direct state subsidization of athletes of championship calibre. This practice was most actively promoted from 1934 to 1938 by I. I. Kharchenko, chairman of the All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport, and by N. K. Antipov, his predecessor. In return for extensive material aid athletes were obliged to help train additional cadres of athletic instructors as well as perfect their own particular skills. Such coaching work was held not to violate the athlete's amateur standing. The arrangement, as Antipov outlined it in 1934, was as follows:

> We must have a talk with each Master Instructor, clarify his material position, assist him, and give him the sort of job that will bring benefits to the physical culture organization and will give him the opportunity of engaging in systematic private training under excellent conditions. Now is the time to move from general talk to concrete activity. . . .
>
> Our instructor, by bourgeois concepts, is a professional, of course. We have thousands of such people and we shall have even more. How can there even be a question about allowing our instructors to enter competitions? In our country an instructor is just as much an athlete as anybody else.

This state-sponsored practice of removing potential champions from farm or factory to sinecures in the field of physical culture was carried to extremes in the period 1936–1938. According to *Krasnyi Sport,* several million rubles were spent on athletic subsidization in the Moscow area alone in 1938. Through devious channels much of the subsidization money reached the pockets of pseudo-athletes. Consequently, in 1939 it was decreed that future subsidies would go only to athletes certified as outstanding by the All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport. These athletes served as the nucleus of the expanded postwar sports program, and a number of the older and more experienced ones were appointed to fill the newly established posts of State Coach in each major sport.

In prewar days the state admittedly provided its best athletes not only with jobs and money but also with privileges and priorities in respect to living quarters, food supplies and vacations at

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resorts on the Black Sea coast. In the postwar period there have been occasional references to athletes holding sinecures and stories about athletes who sought to hold two or three positions simultaneously, thus subjecting themselves to severe criticism for *sovmestitelstvo*—the Russian term for multiple sinecures. Today such sinecures are skillfully camouflaged and never publicized. A very common practice is to provide athletes with a commission in the armed forces or M.V.D. that will serve as a "cover" for their full-time athletic activities. Olympic champion Emil Zatopek, the phenomenal Czech whose only duty as an officer in the Czech army is running, has his counterpart in the Soviet Army—Vsevolod Bobrov. Bobrov is the best hockey player in the U.S.S.R. today. Since he was recruited in Omsk ten years ago, he has had a brilliant athletic career playing under the auspices of the Central House of the Soviet Army. Athletes like Bobrov readily accept any army or M.V.D. commissions in order to secure greater political and economic security for themselves and their families and relatives.

A striking feature of the postwar expansion program in physical culture was the cash bonus system benefiting athletes who turned in record-breaking performances and who placed first, second or third in U.S.S.R. championships in individual sports. The first part of *Pravda's* announcement (October 22, 1945) giving details of the new bonus system read as follows:

> In order to stimulate the further growth of athletic proficiency the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. has given permission to the All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport to give out cash awards for outstanding performances. Thus, for example, an award ranging from 15,000 to 25,000 rubles will be given for establishing a U.S.S.R. record that surpasses the world record, and from 5,000 to 15,000 rubles will be given for establishing a U.S.S.R. record.

This cash bonus system, one of the least subtle features of Soviet professionalism or "state amateurism," was put on a clandestine basis long before the U.S.S.R. submitted its official application for admission to the International Olympic Committee. Although at the meeting of the International Olympic Committee held in Vienna early in May 1951 the Executive Committee questioned the amateur status of Soviet athletes, the Russian delegates replied that this practice had been discontinued and that henceforth the U.S.S.R. would abide by international amateur standards. The I.O.C., taking the Russians at their word, promptly voted 31 to 0, with three members abstaining, for the

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admission of the Soviet Olympic Committee. During a visit to Moscow in the summer of 1954, Mr. Avery Brundage, then President of the International Olympic Committee, again broached the subject of the genuineness of Soviet amateurism. N. Romanov, chairman of the All-Union Committee on Physical Culture and Sport, assured him his suspicions were groundless.

Soviet athletes participated in Olympic competition for the first time at the 1952 Games in Helsinki. Although they made a very creditable showing, their failure to win the unofficial team title caused Moscow to manipulate mass media behind the Iron Curtain in such a way as to create the impression that the Soviet athletes had triumphed over all. The fiction became a reality at the Seventh Winter Olympics held this year in Italy. The spectacular success of the Russians there will heighten interest in the track and field events of the Sixteenth Olympiad, to be held in Melbourne from November 22 to December 8. Although competition is between individuals, the Soviet Union's fanatical desire for national supremacy on the athletic field has served to place undue emphasis on team scores. We may be certain that a Soviet victory at Melbourne this year would be counted a major triumph in the Cold War.

At the foot of Mt. Kronion in the peaceful Olympia, the Alpheus and Kladeos rivers flow past the silent ruins of ancient Greek temples and altars. It was from this spot that the man who in 1896 revived the Olympic Games, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, expressed the hope that "l'Olympisme peut constituer une école de noblesse et de pureté morales autant que d'endurance et d'énergie physiques." It would be difficult to find a spirit more alien to de Coubertin's ideals of moral purity and nobility than the Soviet concept of sport as an element of state power and control, a means of ideological indoctrination, a tool at the disposal of the army and the secret police, a source of propaganda, and as a weapon of class warfare for international Communism.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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"Coexistence and the cold war are in fact two sides of the same medal. To win the cold war is to make coexistence possible." In pursuit of this theme the author, an editor of the British monthly, *The Twentieth Century,* emphasizes the importance of the Atlantic world and the need to modernize backward countries, with a pragmatic use of public planning. While the arguments occasionally cut across corners, this is a very stimulating and perceptive analysis of present international problems.

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS. By MAX BELOFF. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955, 134 p. $3.00.

Thoughtful lectures on the problems of harmonizing the democratic process with the delicate job of formulating and executing foreign policy.

THE DIRECTION OF WAR. By AIR VICE-MARSHAL E. J. KINGSTON MCCLOUGHRY. New York: Praeger, 1956, 261 p. $4.00.

An analysis of political direction and high command in war, including the problem of inter-service and inter-allied coördination.

AIR POWER. By ASHER LEE. New York: Praeger, 1956, 200 p. $3.75.

A concise but very able survey of the varied functions of air power and of ways of improving its organization and performance, by the author of previous works on the German and the Soviet air forces.

ATOMIC ENERGY: A CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL. By DAVID SHEA TEEPLE. New York: Duell; and Boston: Little, Brown, 1955, 165 p. $3.00.

A vigorous criticism of the Atomic Energy Commission. The author's proposal is to establish an executive department of atomic energy within the cabinet structure.

THE RAGGED EDGE: THE DIARY OF A CRISIS. By MARQUIS CHILDS. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955, 251 p. $3.50.

A columnist's report on the difficult months from the end of the Berlin Conference in February 1954 to the collapse of E.D.C., months which witnessed the defeat at Dienbienphu and the Geneva Conference on Indo-China.

HOW COMMUNISTS NEGOTIATE. By ADMIRAL C. TURNER JOY. New York: Macmillan, 1955, 178 p. $3.50.

Admiral Joy, who headed the U.N. delegation in the Korean armistice negotiations, here analyzes on the basis of his experience the Communists' methods at the conference table and sets forth the lessons they provide.

MODERN POLITICAL PARTIES. EDITED BY SIGMUND NEUMANN. Chicago:

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University of Chicago Press, 1956, 460 p. $7.50.

A "panorama" of studies, by a number of competent specialists, on the political party systems in the democracies, in the totalitarian countries and in the states defeated in the Second World War.

THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Albert Camus. New York: Knopf, 1955, 212 p. $3.50.

ACTUELLES II: CHRONIQUES 1948–1953. By Albert Camus. Paris: Gallimard, 1953, 186 p. Fr. 340.

Political and moral essays by one of the most sensitive and profoundly honest writers of our time. Between "The Myth of Sisyphus," written in 1940 and now translated into English, and the pieces on "Création et Liberté" there is, as the titles indicate, a notable development of the author's thought.

THE TRAIL OF THE DINOSAUR, AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Arthur Koestler. New York: Macmillan, 1955, 253 p. $3.50.

Essays, on political and other topics, dating from 1946 to 1955. The author says, though we may doubt, that this book is a "farewell to arms."

OPPRESSION ET LIBERTÉ. By Simone Weil. Paris: Gallimard, 1955, 273 p. Fr. 590.

Essays and fragments concerned with social and political topics, written for the most part in the mid-1930's.

WORLDWIDE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES. Edited by F. Bowen Evans. New York: Macmillan, 1955, 222 p. $3.00.

A useful compilation of materials designed to describe the nature, aims, methods and costs of Communist propaganda throughout the world, particularly in the year 1954.

THE LANGUAGE OF COMMUNISM. By Harry Hodgkinson. New York: Pitman, 1955, 149 p. $3.75.

A guide, in the rather unsatisfactory form of a dictionary, to Soviet jargon and the odd and special meanings Communism gives to certain terms and phrases.

REFLECTIONS ON THE FAILURE OF SOCIALISM. By Max Eastman. New York: Devin-Adair, 1955, 127 p. $2.75.

An unnecessarily polemical discussion, in which Mr. Eastman argues the incompatibility of Socialism, whether Marxian or Fabian, and personal liberty.

HISTOIRE DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES. TOME SIXIÈME. LE XIX^{e} SIÈCLE. II: DE 1871 À 1914: L'APOGÉE DE L'EUROPE. By Pierre Renouvin. Paris: Hachette, 1955, 401 p. Fr. 1100.

This next-to-last volume of a valuable history of international relations reviews the years from the creation of the German Empire to the eve of the First World War.

GESCHICHTE DES ZWEITEN WELTKRIEGES IN DOKUMENTEN. By Michael Freund. Freiburg: Herder, 1953–55, 2 v. DM. 57.50.

A useful and extensive documentary history with introductory comments. The first two volumes cover the period from the Czech crisis of 1938 down to the beginning of August 1939. More volumes to follow.

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE UNITED NATIONS. By Francis O. Wilcox and Carl M. Marcy. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1955, 537 p. $5.00.

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This volume, one of a series of Brookings Institution studies on the United Nations, is an extended and useful discussion of the proposals for revising various features and functions of the organization.

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY. By Willard N. Hogan. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1955, 202 p. $3.50.

A study of the "principle of concern"—recognition that conflict among the members of a group affects the entire group—as the basis for a system of collective security, with particular reference to the period since the First World War.

INTERNATIONAL MANDATES AND TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEMS. By R. N. Chowdhuri. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955, 328 p. Guilders 16.50.

An extensive historical and comparative analysis of the principles, agencies and territorial application of the mandates and trusteeship systems established after the First and Second World Wars.

THE ROAD TO PEACE AND TO MORAL DEMOCRACY. By Boris Gourevitch. New York: International Universities Press, 1955, 2 v. $20.00.

An interminable (2500 pages) and chaotic discussion of war, peace, Communism, Fascism and the road to the future.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1956, 228 p. $3.75.

This dependable annual reference book provides as usual information on the governments of all the countries of the world, summarizes party programs, and lists newspapers with their political affiliations and editors. It has been brought up to date as of January 1, 1956.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

TRADE AND WELFARE. By J. E. Meade. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1955, 618 p. $7.20. (With "Mathematical Supplement," 128 p. $4.00.)

This is the second and final volume of an important treatise on the theory of international economic policy, of which the first volume, "The Balance of Payments," appeared in 1951. Not for the casual reader.

ESSAYS IN PUBLIC FINANCE AND FISCAL POLICY. By Gerhard Colm. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955, 375 p. $4.75.

A collection of essays written between 1934 and 1954 and relating to the contribution that public and fiscal policy can make toward such national objectives as maintaining high-level employment, raising living standards and achieving mobilization.

TARIFF PROCEDURES AND TRADE BARRIERS. By G. A. Elliott. Toronto: University of Toronto Press (for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs), 1955, 293 p. $5.95.

A study of indirect or administrative protection—"procedural obstacles to trade that are adopted primarily in order to give protection to special groups of domestic producers"—in Canada and the United States.

DIE KONVERTIBILITÄT DER EUROPÄISCHEN WÄHRUNGEN. By G. Haberler and Others. Erlenbach-Zurich: Rentsch, 1954, 336 p. Swiss Fr. 11.65.

Essays on the convertibility of currencies, both as a general problem and from the point of view of a number of European countries—Italy, Belgium, France, Switzer-

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land, Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands.

WIRTSCHAFTSSYSTEME UND GESELLSCHAFTSSYSTEME. By Eduard Heimann. Tübingen: Mohr, 1954, 250 p. DM. 19.80.

Comparative studies of economic and social systems. Most of the pieces have appeared previously in American books and periodicals.

DIE VOLKSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE EINGLIEDERUNG EINES BEVÖLKERUNGSZUSTROMES. By Helmut Arndt. Berlin: Duncker, 1954, 133 p. DM. 9.40.

A formal and theoretical economic analysis of the problem of displaced persons.

RACE ISSUES ON THE WORLD SCENE. By Melvin Conant. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1955, 145 p. $4.00.

A summary of papers presented and discussions held at an international conference on race relations, held in Honolulu in the summer of 1954.

The United States

A DEMOCRAT LOOKS AT HIS PARTY. By Dean Acheson. New York: Harper, 1955, 199 p. $3.00.

As the title indicates, this essay by the former Secretary of State is a profession of faith in the Democratic Party and especially in its capacity to handle foreign affairs, though there is rather less on foreign policy than one might wish.

MACARTHUR: HIS RENDEZVOUS WITH HISTORY. By Major General Courtney Whitney. New York: Knopf, 1956, 547 p. $6.75.

A substantial survey of the whole of the extraordinary range of General MacArthur's career, by a close associate and former staff officer. While enriching our picture of MacArthur and presenting quite a bit of new documentation, it is certainly not a critical biography. Everything is seen and judged from the perspective of the General's headquarters.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AS GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK. By Bernard Bellush. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, 338 p. $5.00.

In this study of F.D.R.'s activities in the years 1929–33, Mr. Bellush finds many seeds of the New Deal, though he regards Roosevelt's governorship as less germinal than Al Smith's.

WOODROW WILSON AND THE BALANCE OF POWER. By Edward H. Buehrig. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955, 325 p. $5.00.

Dealing with the development of U. S. policies and attitudes in the transition from neutrality to involvement in the First World War, Mr. Buehrig has performed a useful service in depicting the rather tortured and confused process by which American leaders, and especially Woodrow Wilson, were forced from the relative security of the nineteenth century to the uncomfortable responsibilities of the twentieth.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. By John Lord O'Brian. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, 84 p. $2.00.

In these Godkin lectures for 1955 a distinguished American lawyer warns of the threat to our traditions of individual freedom contained in some of the efforts to preserve national security against subversion and infiltration.

FACTS TO A CANDID WORLD. By Oren Stephens. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955, 164 p. $3.50.

An intelligent examination of the American effort since the First World War

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to influence world opinion through overseas information programs. The author, mercifully, has no panacea to sell and is at his best in indicating the inherent difficulties of the undertaking.

THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT. Edited by Daniel Bell. New York: Criterion Books, 1955, 239 p. $4.00.

A collection of seven essays, by different authors, trying to pin down, define and explain the current of "radical conservatism" of recent years.

THE PASSING OF AMERICAN NEUTRALITY, 1937–1941. By Donald F. Drummond. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955, 409 p. $7.50.

A substantial study, originally a doctoral dissertation, on the shifting temper and direction of U. S. foreign policies in the four years before Pearl Harbor. While indicating a number of uncertain or false steps, the author feels that a great deal was, in fact, accomplished during that time.

THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF AMERICA. By David A. Shannon. New York: Macmillan, 1955, 320 p. $4.50.

An able, scholarly history of the emergence and subsequent eclipse of American Socialism. A good companion piece to recent studies by Bell, Quint and Kipnis.

THE AGE OF REFORM. By Richard Hofstadter. New York: Knopf, 1955, 328 p. $4.50.

A penetrating analysis of American political culture from the Progressive Era to the New Deal. The author, a Professor of History at Columbia, succeeds in evoking and explaining the sharply different moods of each period.

THE DOLLAR DECADE. By James Warren Prothro. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1954, 256 p. $4.75.

The world of the 1920's as seen through the eyes of spokesmen of the United States Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers.

PROFILES IN COURAGE. By John F. Kennedy. New York: Harper, 1956, 266 p. $3.50.

Essays, by the Senator from Massachusetts, on the topic of political and moral courage, as exemplified by such figures as John Quincy Adams, Daniel Webster, George Norris and Robert A. Taft.

AMERICA'S NEEDS AND RESOURCES. By J. Frederic Dewhurst and Associates. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955, 1148 p. $10.00.

A detailed and authoritative survey of the postwar American economy, valuable as a reference work but also containing able discussions of the dynamic features of our economy. This is a revised and more comprehensive version of a volume which first appeared in 1947.

MONOPOLY IN AMERICA: THE GOVERNMENT AS PROMOTER. By Walter Adams and Horace M. Gray. New York: Macmillan, 1955, 221 p. $3.50.

Two economists, with a good deal of experience in Washington, warn against the dangers of Big Business and of government policies which reinforce the trend, as they see it, toward special privilege and monopoly.

AMERICAN IMPORTS. By Don D. Humphrey. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1955, 546 p. $6.00.

The effects of the protective tariff on imports and on the domestic economy are the main theme of this valuable book. Tariff reduction is not regarded as a sufficient remedy for the "troublesome import deficit;" it will need supplementing by increased foreign investment. In considering his theme the author has brought

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together in usable form a large amount of statistical material.

THE CHANGING AMERICAN MARKET. By the Editors of *Fortune*. New York: Hanover House, 1955, 304 p. $4.50.

An inquiry into what the American consumer spends his money on, and why. The book's chapters originally appeared as 12 articles in *Fortune* magazine.

THE REPUTATION OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN. By Sigmund Diamond. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, 209 p. $4.00.

An analysis of public attitudes—as reflected in editorials, obituaries, etc.—of six famous businessmen: Stephen Girard, John Jacob Astor, Cornelius Vanderbilt, J. P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller and Henry Ford.

Western Europe

THE LAMPS WENT OUT IN EUROPE. By Ludwig Reiners. New York: Pantheon, 1955, 310 p. $5.00.

A general survey of European diplomatic history from Bismarck's fall to the end of the First World War. Adds little to our knowledge and understanding of this much explored era. (German original, "In Europa Gehen die Lichter aus," Munich: Beck, 1954, 416 p. DM. 15.80.)

WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND WORLD PROBLEMS. By August Schou. Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1955, 129 p.

The report on an international conference, convoked by the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo, June 13–20, 1955, and dealing with East-West relations, the prospects for a Western community, and the relations between the Western democracies and the economically underdeveloped countries.

VERS UNE EUROPE NOUVELLE PAR LE PLAN SCHUMAN. By Raymond Racine. Neuchâtel (Switzerland): La Baconnière, 1954, 242 p. Swiss Fr. 15.

An informed and intelligent commentary on the development of the Schuman Plan.

DAS RECHT DER MONTANUNION. By Franz W. Jerusalem. Berlin: Vahlen, 1954, 206 p. DM. 13.25.

A handbook of the law of the European Coal and Steel Community and its relation to the laws of member countries.

DIE ZAHLUNGSBILANZSCHWIERIGKEITEN WESTEUROPAS NACH DEM II. WELTKRIEG INSBESONDERE GEGENÜBER DEN USA. By Werner Schmassmann. Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1954, 201 p. Swiss Fr. 14.75.

A technical analysis of the causes of Europe's unfavorable balance of payments after World War II.

IN THE THICK OF THE FIGHT, 1930–1945. By Paul Reynaud. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956, 684 p. $7.50.

An account, largely based on personal recollections, of France in the thirties and of her defeat in 1940, by the last premier of the Third Republic.

LIBERATED FRANCE. By Catherine Gavin. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955, 292 p. $5.00.

A decade of French political history from the Normandy landing to the election of M. Coty as President of the Republic in December 1953. Well narrated, very critical of General de Gaulle's rôle in those years.

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LES RESPONSABILITÉS DES DYNASTIES BOURGEOISES. III: SOUS LA TROISIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE. LA GUERRE ET L'IMMÉDIAT APRÈS-GUERRE (1914–1924). By E. Beau de Loménie. Paris: Denoël, 1954, 502 p. Fr. 850.

The third volume in the development of the author's thesis that the upper bourgeoisie has managed to maintain its political and financial position through all changes of régime but at the expense of the health of the French body politic.

THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE. By Dankwart A. Rustow. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955, 257 p. $5.00.

An inquiry into "the political processes by which Sweden has been able to arrive at her remarkable and well-known achievements in social and economic policy, in foreign and domestic affairs."

MITTELEUROPA IN GERMAN THOUGHT AND ACTION 1815–1945. By Henry Cord Meyer. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955, 378 p. Guilders 23.75.

An able and scholarly history of the *Mitteleuropa* idea—Germany's relations with the other nationalities of Danubian and Eastern Europe. Greatest emphasis, approximately a third of the book, is devoted to the years of the First World War when, in the author's view, the idea first moved to the level of policy and action.

GESCHICHTE DES ALLDEUTSCHEN VERBANDES 1890–1939. By Alfred Kruck. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1954, 258 p. DM. 16.

A scholarly study of the Pan-German League. The author correctly feels that earlier studies of this organization, by Wertheimer and Werner, underestimate its importance to twentieth century German history.

THE KAISER. By Joachim von Kürenberg. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955, 461 p. $5.00.

A translation of a biography, valuable chiefly for the fact that the author had close access to the former Kaiser during his years of retirement.

GEORG LEDEBOUR: MENSCH UND KÄMPFER. Edited by Minna Ledebour. Zurich: Europa, 1954, 169 p. Swiss Fr. 8.

A brief memorial volume to the late German Socialist, who died in 1947 at the age of 97.

FÜNFZIG JAHRE UNTER DEUTSCHEN. By Friedrich Hielscher. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1954, 483 p. DM. 14.80.

The rather cranky memoirs of a German conservative who has disliked every form of political authority during the last 50 years.

ZWISCHEN BERLIN UND MOSKAU: ZUR GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCH-SOWJETISCHEN BEZIEHUNGEN. By Albert Norden. Berlin: Dietz, 1954, 387 p. DM-Ost. 5.

Published in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, this is a thoroughly unsatisfactory and slanted history of German-Soviet relations between 1917 and 1921.

GENERAL GROENER. By Dorothea Groener-Geyer. Frankfurt/Main: Societäts-Verlag, 1955, 406 p. DM. 19.80.

A substantial but certainly not definitive biography, by his daughter, of the late general staff officer and Defense Minister, an honorable and tragic figure of the Wilhelmian and Weimar eras.

HITLER, REICHSWEHR UND INDUSTRIE. By George W. F. Hallgarten. Frankfurt/Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1955, 139 p. DM. 4.80.

Documents and observations on the relations between Hitler, the Army and

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German industry in the years 1918–1933.

HITLER. By Otto Dietrich. Chicago: Regnery, 1955, 277 p. $3.95.
A fairly close view of Hitler's public and private life by the German *Reichspressechef* from 1933 to 1945. (A translation of "12 Jahre mit Hitler," Munich: Isar Verlag, 1955, 285 p. DM. 12.80.)

IM DIENST FÜR DEUTSCHLAND: 1918–1945. By Konstantin Hierl. Heidelberg: Vowinckel, 1954, 208 p. DM. 12.50.
Memoirs of the organizer of the *Reichsarbeitsdienst* under Hitler.

20 JULY. By Constantine FitzGibbon. New York: Norton, 1956, 285 p. $3.75.
One of the best books to appear in English on the background and consequences of the brave but unsuccessful effort to destroy Hitler on July 20, 1944. Makes thorough use of earlier accounts and is generally fair and balanced in its appraisals.

MAINSPRINGS OF THE GERMAN REVIVAL. By Henry C. Wallich. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955, 401 p. $4.50.
A thoughtful analysis of West Germany's economic recovery. Rejecting the myth of a miracle and eschewing monistic explanations, the author, Professor of Economics at Yale, emphasizes the effect of the East-West split, the intrinsic resources of West Germany, and the successful economic policies of Allied and later German governments.

CITY DIVIDED: BERLIN 1955. By Ewan Butler. New York: Praeger, 1955, 187 p. $3.95.
A rather breezy account of Berlin—its past and divided present—by a British journalist.

THE EXPLOSION: THE UPRISING BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN. By Rainer Hildebrandt. New York: Duell; and Boston: Little, Brown, 1955, 198 p. $3.75.
The uprising in East Germany in June 1953 as experienced by nine people who were involved in it.

DAS HEER UND DIE REPUBLIK: QUELLEN ZUR POLITIK DER REICHSWEHRFÜHRUNG 1918 BIS 1933. By Otto-Ernst Schüddekopf. Hanover: Norddeutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1955, 399 p. DM. 14.80.
A collection of hitherto scattered documents on the political rôle of the German Army during Weimar, with particularly extensive material on the revolutionary period 1918–1919 and the relation of the Army to the Nazis, 1930–1933.

DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY UNDER OCCUPATION, 1945–1954. Selected and Edited by Beate Ruhm Von Oppen. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1955, 660 p. $10.10.
A useful reference work; includes documents dealing with developments in the Soviet Zone as well as those in the Western Zones.

SOZIOLOGIE DER DEUTSCHEN PARTEIEN. By Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte and Karl Sacherl. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1955, 367 p. DM. 16.80.
After some theoretical considerations about the nature and rôle of political parties, the authors discuss the parties in the German Federal Republic—their organization, social structure and functions. A significant study but not easy reading.

DIE HEIMATVERTRIEBENEN UND DIE FLÜCHTLINGE AUS DER

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SOWJETZONE IN WESTBERLIN. By Hans Joachim von Koerber. Berlin: Duncker, 1954, 156 p. DM. 11.20.

A useful study of the movement into West Berlin of displaced persons from Eastern Europe and of refugees from the Soviet Zone of Germany.

SAUL UND DAVID: DIE PROBLEMATIK DER DEUTSCH-JÜDISCHEN LEBENSGEMEINSCHAFT. By Adolf Leschnitzer. Heidelberg: Schneider, 1954, 213 p. DM. 9.80.

An analysis of the strange relations between German and Jew, the alternation between intimate symbiosis and violent alienation: Saul solaced by David, yet hurling his spear at him.

BETWEEN LIBERATION AND LIBERTY. By Karl Gruber. New York: Praeger, 1955, 240 p. $4.50.

The former Austrian Foreign Minister's rather outspoken account of events in Austria from the eve of the war to 1953. The publication of the German language edition in October 1953 led to quite a stir and to Dr. Gruber's subsequent resignation.

THE REBUILDING OF ITALY. By Muriel Grindrod. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956, 269 p. $4.00.

A competent and balanced survey of Italy's political, social and economic development in the decade following the Second World War. Includes a chapter on Italian foreign policy in the De Gasperi era.

THE POPULATION PROBLEM OF SOUTHERN ITALY. By Robert E. Dickinson. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1955, 116 p. $3.00.

An essay on social geography based on field work in Southern Italy in 1951–1952.

LA FORMAZIONE DELLA CLASSE POLITICA NELL'ITALIA CONTEMPORANEA. By Giacomo Perticone. Florence: Sansoni, 1954, 266 p. L. 1600.

An analysis of the social and political currents underlying the development of the Italian parties and party system.

I DEMOCRATICI CRISTIANI. By Giorgio Tupini. Milan: Garzanti, 1954, 346 p. L. 1400.

A chronicle, substantial but partisan, of the Christian Democratic Party over the last ten years, by a party functionary.

DICTATORS FACE TO FACE. By Dino Alfieri. New York: New York University Press, 1955, 307 p. $4.95.

A translation of the memoirs of Mussolini's Ambassador to Hitler during the years 1939–1943. (Italian edition noted here April 1950.)

RICORDI DI UN AMBASCIATORE. By Pietro Quaroni. Milan: Garzanti, 1954, 186 p. L. 1200.

An Italian career diplomat's rather scattered recollections of individuals and episodes over the last 30 years.

ROSSANO. By Gordon Lett. London: Hodder, 1955, 223 p. 12/6.

A British officer's first-hand account of the Italian resistance movement in Liguria, a movement he was instrumental in organizing at the time of the Italian armistice.

SULLA VIA DELL'INSURREZIONE NAZIONALE. By Luigi Longo. Rome: Edizioni di Cultura Sociale, 1954, 486 p. L. 800.

A collection of wartime writings, a tenth anniversary celebration of the rôle of the Communist Party in the Italian resistance movement.

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GIBRALTAR. By José Plá. London: Hollis, 1955, 157 p. 16/.

A review of Spanish-British differences over Gibraltar, from the Spanish perspective. Sir Charles Petrie contributes a thoughtful and sympathetic introduction.

Eastern Europe

THE RUSSIAN MARXISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF BOLSHEVISM. By Leopold H. Haimson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955, 246 p. $5.50.

A study—one in the series of Harvard Russian Research Center Studies—dealing with the reception and adoption of Marxism by the Russian nineteenth century intelligentsia, with particular attention to the figures of Plekhanov, Akselrod, Martov and Lenin.

SOVIET ESPIONAGE. By David J. Dallin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955, 558 p. $5.75.

A sober and, for the subject, a very well documented description of the history of Soviet espionage, certainly the best book on the subject. In general the material is arranged chronologically and by country. In the author's view the Soviet intelligence system is probably larger than that of all other nations combined—though not always very effective.

THE NET THAT COVERS THE WORLD. By E. H. Cookridge. New York: Holt, 1955, 315 p. $3.95.

Another work on the Soviet espionage system—inferior to that by Dallin.

THE CASE OF COLONEL PETROV. By Michael Bialoguski. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955, 238 p. $3.75.

The story of the defection of the chief of Soviet espionage in Australia. The author, an agent of the Australian Security Service, was instrumental in bringing about Petrov's break.

THE PERMANENT PURGE. By Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956, 256 p. $4.75.

As the title indicates this book—one of the studies of the Harvard Russian Research Center—studies the purge as a continuing phenomenon of a totalitarian order. It is the author's well-considered view that the purge is an indispensable device for the continuation of such a régime.

BETRAYAL OF AN IDEAL. By G. A. Tokaev. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955, 298 p. $4.00.

The first volume of an autobiography by an Ossetian who defected from the Soviet Union in 1948. While the narrative goes only to 1935 it is of interest in its depiction of resistance and opposition to Stalinism, within the Communist Party, before the great purges.

NOTES FOR A JOURNAL. By Maxim Litvinov. New York: Morrow, 1955, 347 p. $3.75.

This book, which purports to be a journal kept by the late Soviet Foreign Minister, is, in the view of a number of competent scholars, a complete forgery.

ONE MAN IN HIS TIME. By N. M. Borodin. New York: Macmillan, 1955, 343 p. $4.50.

An informative autobiography of a Soviet biologist who eventually renounced his citizenship in 1948.

RED PLUSH AND BLACK BREAD. By Marguerite Higgins. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955, 256 p. $4.00.

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An enterprising correspondent's report of a recent ten-week tour of the U.S.S.R.

L'ÉCOLE SOVIÉTIQUE. By I. and N. Lazarévitch. Paris: Les Iles d'Or, 1954, 208 p. Fr. 600.

A critical and unfavorable survey of Soviet primary and secondary education.

SOVIET TREATY SERIES: VOLUME II, 1929–1939. Compiled and Edited by Leonard Shapiro. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1955, 237 p. $12.00.

The second volume of a series which is to present "every available bilateral diplomatic instrument to which the Soviet Government has become a party since 1917."

TALVISOTA 1939–1940. By W. H. Halsti. Helsinki: Söderström, 1955, 458 p. M. 1200.

The first of a projected three-volume history of the recent Finnish wars with the Soviet Union by a well-known military historian. Forty-eight maps add to the volume's usefulness.

DIPLOMAATTIEN TALVISOTA. SUOMI MAAILMAN POLITIIKASSA 1938–40. By Max Jakobson. Helsinki: Söderström, 1955, 400 p. M. 800.

Making skillful use of recently published materials, the Finnish Press Attaché at Washington views wartime developments in his country against the perspective of world politics.

TUTKIMUS TALOUDELLISESTA KILPAILUSTA SUOMEN NYKYISESSÄ YHTEISKUNTAELÄMÄSSÄ. By Ahti M. Salonen. Helsinki: Tammi, 1955, 222 p. M. 1100.

A dissertation exploring the rôle of economic competition in present-day Finnish society.

KURZEMES CIETOKSNIS: VOLUME II. By O. Freivalds. Copenhagen: Imanta, 1954, 219 p.

This second volume of documents and reminiscences dealing with the events in German-held Kurland (Kurzeme) from August 1944 to V-E Day contains material on German civil administration and on the flow of Latvian refugees to Germany and Sweden.

LISTY Z ROSJI DO GEN. SIKORSKIEGO. By Stanislaw Kot. London: Jutro Polski, 1955, 576 p.

This collection of letters and documents, covering Kot's ambassadorship to Russia after the conclusion of the Russo-Polish Agreement of July 1941, and his stay in the Near East from August 1942 to February 1943, contains interesting information on the freeing of Polish citizens from Soviet detention camps, the formation of the Polish army, the difficulties in getting the Soviets to carry out the terms of the agreement, the political background to the evacuation of the Polish troops from Russia, and the rivalry between Sikorski and Anders. In a polemical 75-page preface Kot ardently supports Sikorski and attacks Anders.

CHURCH AND STATE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By Ludvík Němec. New York: Vantage Press, 1955, 577 p. $5.00.

A priest discusses, with authority and much solid documentation, the situation of the Roman Catholic Church in Communist Czechoslovakia. The book is prefaced by a quite extensive theological and historical justification of the position of the Church.

TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA. By Eric L. Pridonoff. Washington: Public Affairs

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Press, 1955, 243 p. $3.75.

A very critical account of the Tito régime and of American policy toward Jugoslavia, concerned largely with the first couple of years the régime was in power.

GREEK ENTANGLEMENT. By Brigadier E. C. W. Myers. London: Hart-Davis, 1955, 289 p. 18/.

Brigadier Myers tells of his mission to Greece in 1942–43. A useful contribution to our knowledge of the tangled history of the wartime resistance movements.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BRITAIN IN WESTERN EUROPE. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956, 121 p. $1.50.

A report by a Chatham House study group which met to consider the implications of Western European Union for Great Britain and the Atlantic Alliance.

ZWISCHEN NIL UND HIMALAJA. By Friedrich von Schilgen. Cologne: Böhlau, 1955, 479 p. DM. 24.80.

A lengthy but superficial survey of the rise and especially the decline of British rule in the Near East and India.

GOVERNMENT BY COMMITTEE: AN ESSAY ON THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION. By K. C. Wheare. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955, 264 p. $4.00.

A most valuable study of the function of committees in British government, national and local: committees to advise, to inquire, to negotiate, to legislate, to administer, and to scrutinize and control.

CO-OPERATIVES: THE BRITISH ACHIEVEMENT. By Paul Greer. New York: Harper, 1955, 171 p. $3.00.

A survey of the British coöperative movement, based on an ardent conviction that coöperatives are the path by which we may avoid the perils of statism and the loss of individual freedom.

DIE BRITISCHE STERLING- UND DEVISENKONTROLLE. By Hans Bachmann and Franz Lütolf. Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1954, 128 p. Swiss Fr. 15.90.

Two Swiss economists give a clear and concise description of the main lines of development of British exchange controls and other devices for managing the use of sterling, up to the middle of 1954.

EDEN: THE MAKING OF A STATESMAN. By Alan Campbell-Johnson. New York: Ives Washburn, 1955, 306 p. $5.00.

A reasonably full treatment of the British Prime Minister's career—successful in recording Eden's diplomatic and political rôle over the years but not really getting at the personality, which remains surprisingly elusive.

WEST HIGHLAND SURVEY. Edited by F. Fraser Darling. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955, 438 p. $4.80.

The report of a survey of Scotland's West Highlands and the Hebrides, undertaken to explain the reasons for the economic and social deterioration of these regions.

FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS. By R. G. Casey. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1955, 181 p. $3.00.

A popular but informative account, by the Australian Minister for External

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Affairs, of the remarkable expansion of Australia's foreign policy interests and commitments in the years since 1939.

AUSTRALIA. By J. C. Horsfall. New York: Praeger, 1955, 223 p. $4.95.
A competent review of Australia's political and, especially, its economic development since the Second World War.

POLICIES FOR PROGRESS. Edited by Alan Davies and Geoffrey Serle. Melbourne: Cheshire, 1954, 172 p. 18/6. (London: Angus and Robertson.)
Essays in Australian politics edited for the Victorian Fabian Society.

The Middle East

THE MIDDLE EAST, OIL AND THE GREAT POWERS. By Benjamin Shwadran. New York: Praeger, 1955, 500 p. $7.00.
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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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